الموسوعة التفاعلية للقضية الفلسطينية | تقرير المخابرات الإسرائيلية بشأن تفريغ فلسطين من سكانها، 30 حزيران/ يونيو 1948 (بالإنكليزية)

الأقسام

عن المنصة

Intelligence Service (Arab Section)

Migration of Eretz Yisrael [Palestine] Arabs

Between December 1, 1947 and June 1, 1948

30 June 1948

Introduction to the Document by Akevot (Institute for Israeli-Palestinian Conflict Research), 4 July 2019.

[An IDF intelligence report from 1948 (...), having been concealed ever since it was uncovered in the 1980s,[ contradicts the Israeli narrative about the major factor in the displacement of Israel’s Arab residents during the 1948 war. According to this document, during the early months of the war, operations by Jewish combatants were the major cause of Arab displacement, and the role played by the Arab leadership in encouraging “flight” was negligible. Akevot Institute publishes the full document upon publication of its report SILENCING: DSDE’s Concealment of Documents in Archives.

During the first break in the fighting in the war of 1948, the IDF Intelligence Department compiled a report about the scale of Arab displacement since the beginning of the war. The 25-page document entitled “Migration of Eretz Yisrael Arabs between December 1, 1947, and June 1, 1948”, concludes that the displacement of some 70% of the Arabs during this time should be attributed to military operations carried out by Jewish forces, while orders given by Arab leaders impacted the displacement of only 5%. The report itself, spanning ten pages, reviews the scale of the migration and its causes and presents the areas where the displaced arrived. The annex contains a detailed list of the communities from which Palestinians were displaced and the degree of and reasons why each and every one of these communities was emptied of residents.

The document was first uncovered in the Hashomer Hatzair Archive (Yad Ya’ari) in the mid-1980s, by historian Benny Morris, who used it as the basis for his published article entitled “The Causes and Character of the Arab Exodus from Palestine: The Israel Defence Forces Intelligence Branch Analysis of June 1948”. Morris flagged several factual errors, but found the report to be reliable overall.

After Morris’ article was published in 1986, the document was removed from public access, initially on the orders of the Chief State Archivist, and later on the orders of the DSDE as part of wide-ranging and unlawful work carried out by the Director of Security of the Defense Establishment to deny public access to documents in various archives. (…) Akevot Institute researchers found another copy of the document at the Yad Ya’ari Archive and it is published here, in full, for the first time.]

Contents

1. General introduction.

2. Basic figures on Arab migration

3. National phases of evacuation and migration

4. Causes of Arab migration

5. Arab migration trajectories and absorption issues

Annexes

1. Regional reviews analyzing migration issues in each area [Missing from document]

2. Charts of villages evacuated by area, noting the causes for migration and migration trajectories for every village

1. General introduction

The purpose of this overview is to attempt to evaluate the intensity of the migration and its various development phases, elucidate the different factors that impacted population movement directly and assess the main migration trajectories. Of course, given the nature of statistical figures in Eretz Yisrael in general, which are, in themselves, deficient, it would be difficult to determine with certainty absolute numbers regarding the migration movement, but it appears that the figures provided herein, even if not certain, are close to the truth. Hence, a margin of error of ten to fifteen percent needs to be taken into account. The figures on the population in the area that lies outside the State of Israel are less accurate, and the margin of error is greater. This review summarizes the situation up until June 1st, 1948 (only in one case - the evacuation of Jenin, does it include a later occurrence).

2. Basic figures on Arab population movement in Eretz Yisrael

a. At the time of the UN declaration [resolution] regarding the division of Eretz Yisrael, the following figures applied within the borders of the Hebrew state:

1.	219 Arab villages.
2.	4 Cities with Arab populations as well (Haifa, Tiberias, Safed, Beit Shean)
3.	The Arab rural population in the State of Israel was	190,000
4.	The Arab urban population in the State of Israel was	92,000
5.	The Bedouin population in the State of Israel, in the Negev was	60,000 (estimate)
		342,000

b. The rate of migration from the State of Israel until June 1, 1948 (including Jenin and the south, until June 14, 1948):

1.	Approximately 180 Arab villages empty.
2.	3 cities entirely empty, and in Haifa, only 5,000 residents.
3.	Of the total rural Arab population in the country, the number of people who migrated:	152,000
4.	Of the total urban Arab population in the country, the number of people who migrated	87,000
5.	Negev Bedouin did not migrate at all from the country
6.	Total who left the State of Israel	239,000

In percentages:

1.	82% of the total number of Arab rural locales in the country were abandoned.
2.	80% of the total rural Arab population in the country left.
3.	94% of the total urban Arab population in the country left.
4.	0% of the total Negev Bedouin migrated.

c. The rate of migration in the territory of the Arab state + Jerusalem:

1.	At least 70 Arab villages were evacuated in the Arab state.
2.	3 Arab cities were evacuated - one completely (Jenin), and 2 of the majority of residents. (4,000 persons were left in Acre, and 4,600 in Jaffa).
3.	Two other Arab cities were partly evacuated (Lod, Ramla).
4.	50,000 villagers from the Arab state left and migrated.
5.	72,000 urban dwellers from the Arab state left and migrated.
6.	The total number of Arabs who migrated from the Arab state: 122,000.
7.	30,000 Arabs migrated from Jerusalem.
8.	In total, 152,000 Eretz Yisarel Arabs migrated from their places of residence outside the State of Israel.

d. The number of Arabs who remained in the State of Israel:

1.	No. of urban dwellers who remained in the State of Israel	5,000
2.	No. of villagers who remained in the State of Israel	38,000
3.	No. of Bedouins (in the Negev) who remained in the State of Israel	60,000
	[Total]	103,000
4.	39 inhabited Arab villages remained in the country (With respect to some, there is no information that they left).
5.	Only one of the cities of the State of Israel has an Arab population (Haifa: 5,000 persons).

e. The rate of migratory movement in Eretz Yisrael as a whole:

The number of displaced Arabs is 391,000.

(As stated in the introduction, the margin of error is 10%-15%).

Comments:

1.For more details regarding these figures and a breakdown by area - see the table below.

2. For a list of villages, towns, reasons for evacuation, trajectories, etc., see enclosed annexes.

3. Phases in the Arab migration

The six-month Arab migration (December 1947 to May and beyond) has four distinct phases:

First phase: Begins in early December and lasts until late February.

Second phase: The month of March.

Third phase: The month of April.

Fourth phase: The month of May.

The phases in detail:

First phase: The main feature of this stage is that, at this time, the migration movement is only beginning. It occurs in few places. In all fronts throughout the country, movement is extremely small. Only in the Central Region, movement takes place at the end of this phase, that is, mostly in February, when movement there begins and its intensity, per se, is medium.

Second phase: At this stage, a small amount of movement is felt in most fronts, and in fact, there is a slight reduction compared to the first phase. In some fronts, it seems that migration is waning. This is particularly true with respect to the Central Region, where activity was felt during the first phase. However, where the national trend is a decline, the Jaffa front, as well as the Sea of Galilee area, exhibit an increase with a stronger intensity than the intensity of evacuation in the first phase.

Third phase: This phase is marked by a moderate increase in almost most fronts, moderate increase in the Sea of Galilee area with the evacuation of Tiberias. Moderate increase in the Haifa area with the evacuation of Haifa. Moderate increase in the Tel-Hai district with increased activities on our part. No change in the state of migration in the Negev, which had yet to begin evacuation. Balanced situation in terms of the evacuation of Jaffa - i.e. slight increase from the previous phase and as a continuation thereof. Decrease in migration movement in the Gilboa area. However, a major increase in the Central Region, which peaks in this month, both on the national level and in terms of movement in the region itself. In conclusion: the third phase shows a moderate general increase with one peak point and one downward trend.

The fourth phase: This stage spans the month of May. It is the principal and decisive phase of the Arab migration in Eretz Yisrael. A migration psychosis begins to emerge, a crisis of confidence with respect to Arab strength. As a result, migration in this sage is characterized by:

Major increase in migration trajectory in Tel-Hai district.

Gilboa “

Jaffa “

Western Galilee “

Evacuation in Negev villages takes place in this month. On the other hand, the Central Region enters this phase having peaked already, with most villages having been evacuated. Therefore, for the Central Region, this phase is the "final stretch". Because the number of remaining villages in the Central Region was small, the seemingly significant decrease felt here is no more than the final touch. The only place where a true decrease is felt in this month is the Sea of Galilee area.

Conclusion: The mass migration of Eretz Yisrael Arabs took place in April-May. May was a climax and recorded as the month during which most of the Arab migration took place, or, more precisely, the Arab flight.

4. Causes of Arab migration

a. General

It is reasonable to assume that this migration was not financially motivated - be it a shortage of employment, food or any other financial distress. So long as residents remained where they were, the Arab economy was not harmed in such a way that broke the population's ability to support itself. The financial factor was a motivator in migration only during the very initial phases of the migration movement, when the wealthy among the Arabs, wishing to secure their property and factories, were quick to emigrate. A fluctuation in Arab economic stability was felt in the cities, a fluctuation that was a migration catalyst for some social strata, but this fluctuation - such as the migration of the wealthy, is not a major factor when discussing the mass migration of Eretz Yisrael Arabs.

It is also reasonable to assume that the population movement was not the result of "purely" political factors, meaning: political decisions, in the narrow sense of the word, had no effect whatsoever on the migration movement. Although the massive Arab migration proliferated particularly in the month of May, this should not be taken to be the result of the political significance of that month. Here, it should be noted, that inasmuch as there were locales where the political factor was a motivator for migration movement, this was confined to the cities, and there too, in very limited strata and on a minute scale. These numbers are so small, compared to the general wave of migration and its intensity, that it can be assumed, with certainty, that political factors had no effect whatsoever on the movement of the Arab population.

In reviewing the factors that affected migration, we list the factors that had a definitive effect on population migration. Other factors, localized and smaller scale, are listed in the special reviews of migration movement in each district. The factors, in order of importance, are:

1. Direct Jewish hostile actions against Arab communities.

2. Impact of our hostile actions against communities neighboring where migrants lived (here -particularly - the fall of large neighboring communities).

3. Actions taken by the Dissidents [Irgun, Lehi].

4. Orders and directives issued by Arab institutions and gangs.

5. Jewish Whispering operations [psychological warfare] intended to drive Arabs to flee.

6. Evacuation ultimatums.

7. Fear of Jewish retaliation upon a major Arab attack on Jews.

8. The appearance of gangs and foreign fighters near the village.

9. Fear of an Arab invasion and its consequences (mostly near the borders).

10. Arab villages isolated within purely Jewish areas.

11. Various local factors and general fear of what was to come.

b. The factors in detail.

Without a doubt, hostilities were the main factor in the population movement. Each and every district underwent a wave of migration as our actions in that area intensified and expanded. In general, for us, the month of May signified a transition into wide-scale operations, which is why the month of May involved the evacuation of the maximum number of locales. The departure of the English, which was merely the other side of the coin, did, of course, help evacuation, but it appears that more than affecting migration directly, the British evacuation freed our hands to take action.

Note that it was not always the intensity of the attack that was decisive, as other factors became particularly prominent - mostly psychological factors. The element of surprise, long stints of shelling with extremely loud blasts, and loudspeakers in Arabic proved very effective when properly used (mostly Haifa!);

It has, however, been proven, that actions had no lesser effect on neighboring communities as they did on the community that was the direct target of the action. The evacuation of a certain village as a result of us attacking it swept with it many neighboring villages.

The impact of the fall of large villages, centers, towns or forts with a large concentration of communities around them is particularly apparent. The fall of Tiberias, Safed, Samakh, Jaffa, Haifa and Acre produced many large migration waves. The psychological motivation at work here was "If the mighty have fallen....". In conclusion, it can be said that at least 55% of the overall migration movement was motivated by our actions and their impact.

The actions of the Dissidents and their impact as migration motivators: The actions of the Dissidents as migration motivators were particularly apparent in the Jaffa Tel-Aviv area; the Central Region, the south and the Jerusalem area. In other places, they did not have any direct impact on evacuation. Dissidents' actions with special impact: Deir Yassin, the kidnapping off five dignitaries from Sheikh Muwannis, other actions in the south. The Deir Yassin action had a particular impact on the Arab psyche. Much of the immediate fleeing seen when we launched our attacks, especially in the center and south, was panic flight resulting from that factor, which can be defined as a decisive catalyst. There was also panic flight spurred by actions taken by the Irgun and Lehi themselves. Many Central Region villagers went into flight once the dignitaries from Sheikh Muwannis were kidnapped. The Arab learned that it was not enough to make a deal with the Haganah, and there were "other Jews", of whom one must be wary, perhaps even more wary than of members of the Haganah, which had no control over them.

The Dissidents' effect on the evacuation of Jaffa city and the Jaffa rural area is clear and definitive -decisive and critical impact among migration factors here. If we were to assess the contribution made by the Dissidents as factors in the evacuation of Arabs in Eretz Yisrael we would find that they had about 15% direct impact on the total intensity of the migration.

To summarize the previous sections, one could, therefore, say that the impact of "Jewish military action" (Haganah and Dissidents) on the migration was decisive, as some 70% of the residents left their communities and migrated as a result of these actions.

Orders and directives issued by Arab institutions and gangs: This evacuation, which may be termed "orderly evacuation" was carried out for strategic reasons, at the demand of the gangs, the Arab Higher Committee or the Transjordan government - whether as a result of a plan to turn the village into a base from which to launch attacks on Jews, an understanding that the village could not be defended, or fear that it would become a fifth column, especially if it had made an agreement with the Jews. The impact of this factor was mainly felt in the Gilboa area (threats to the Zu'biya), the Sea of Galilee area (Circassian villages), the Tel-Hai area (border villages), the center (isolated cases) and the Jerusalem area (Legion orders to evacuate a string of villages to serve as bases in northern Jerusalem, and the order issued by the Arab Higher Committee to the village of Esawiyah). However, compared to other factors, this element did not have decisive weight, and its impact amounts to some 5% of all villages having been evacuated for this reason.

Jewish psychological warfare to make Arab residents flee. This type of action, when considered as part of the national phenomena, was not a factor with a broad impact. However, 18% of all the villages in the Tel-Hai area, 6% of the village in the central region, and 4% of the Gilboa region villages were evacuated for this reason.

Where in the center and the Gilboa regions such actions were not planned or carried out on a wide scale, and therefore had a smaller impact, in the Tel-Hai district, this type of action was planned and carried out on a rather wide scale and in an organized fashion, and therefore yielded greater results. The action itself took the form of "friendly advice" offered by Jews to their neighboring Arab friends. This type of action drove no more than 2% of the total national migration.

Our ultimatums to Arab villages: This factor was particularly felt in the center, less so in the Gilboa area and to some extent in the Negev. Of course, these ultimatums, like the friendly advice, came after the stage had been set to some extent by hostilities in the area. Therefore, these ultimatums were more of a final push than the decisive factor. Two percent of all evacuated village locales in the country were evacuated due to ultimatums.

Fear of reprisals. This evacuation, which can also be termed "organized evacuation" came mostly after actions against Jews had been launched from inside the village or its vicinity. An Arab attack on a Jewish convoy (the "Ehud" convoy on route to Ahiam, for instance), or a Jewish Arab battle (the Mishmar HaEmek front, the Gesher front, the attack on Lehavot, etc.), automatically impacted the evacuation of nearby villages. One percent of evacuated Arab locales left due to this factor.

All other factors listed as the appearance of gangs and foreign fighters in the vicinity of a village, fear of the consequences of an Arab invasion that could turn the village into a battlefield, especially on the borders of the country, and the fact that certain villages were isolated inside purely Jewish areas, were also motivators for evacuation, depending on the locale. In some areas they had a greater impact than in others, just as in other areas, they had almost no impact at all. All these factors together account for no more than 1%.

General fear. Although this factor is listed last, it did have a sizeable impact and played a significant part in the evacuation. Still, given its generality, we chose to conclude with it. When the war began, various reasons caused general fear within the strata of the Arab public, which chose to emigrate for no apparent, particular, reason. However, this general fear was the primary manifestation of the "crisis of confidence" in Arab strength.

It is reasonable to assume that 10% of all villages evacuated for this reason, such that, in effect, the impact of the "crisis of confidence" was the third most important factor following our actions and the actions of the Dissidents and their impact. Local factors also had a rather marked impact on migration movement: failed negotiations, plans to impose restricted settlement, inability to adjust to certain realities, failed negotiations for maintaining the status-quo or non-aggression agreements - all had an effect in certain areas (for instance, the south), but fail to have any presence in other areas. It can be said that 8%-9% of the evacuated villages in the country were evacuated because of various local factors. These factors are listed by locales in the regional reviews attached herein.

General comments:

1. Evacuation psychosis:

The pace of evacuation often increased as a result of the emergence of an evacuation psychosis that surfaced like an infectious disease. So, for instance, it is reasonable to assume that, in Acre, the mass arrival of Haifa refugees who instilled the evacuation psychosis in Acre residents had a decisive impact. Given minor attacks and a push by various catalysing factors, a mass immigration movement from Acre has also started, with this psychosis having its fair share in it. In considering the factors for evacuation, it appears that this "unseen" factor cannot be disregarded.

2. The Typhus plague, where it appeared, was a catalyst in the evacuation - more than the disease itself, the panic that erupted due to rumors about the spread of the disease in the area, was the evacuation motivator.

3. The impact of extremely loud explosives, loudspeakers, etc., as psychological intimidation actions had on the migration movement must be highlighted (incidentally, no attempt was made to attach loud sirens to the wings of aircrafts that were bombing enemy posts - so these might have a great impact).

4. In places where a serious Arab fighting force was present, the village did not evacuate easily, and only a direct, serious action, took down this force and led to an evacuation.

5. In the early stages of the evacuation, when the scope was still small, Arab institutions tried to counter flight the evacuation and restrain the migration waves. The Arab Higher Committee decided, at the time, to take measures to depress flight by imposing restrictions and penalties, using threats and propaganda in the press, on the radio, etc. On this issue the Arab Higher Committee tried to enlist the help of neighboring countries, which often shared the same interests on this point. They mostly tried to prevent the flight of young men of conscription age. However, none of these actions were at all successful as no positive action was taken that could have restrained the factors that motivated and pushed the migration. The actions taken by the preventative mechanism simply led to corruption, and permits were issued in return for bribes. When the mass flight took place, this mechanism also collapsed, leaving only sporadic propaganda which yielded no real results.

5. Arab migration trajectories

a. General

One of the central questions in the discussion of Arab migration in Eretz Yisrael is the new centers where they are concentrated. On this issue, villagers and urban migrants are two different discussions. As a rule, it can be said that the origin of a group largely determined the migration destination. Most residents of Haifa originate from Lebanon and Syria, and so, the migration trajectory of most Haifa residents was toward Lebanon and Syria. Similarly, the people of Faluja, in Jaffa, returned to their village. However, it should be noted that most of the wealthy urban dwellers and people of means in the cities emigrated abroad.

Urban Arab dwellers markedly showed a more decisive migration trend. The road to the urban dweller's "final destination" was much shorter than that of the villager. While the urban dweller did not move around between stops along the way, the villager often had to move from one place to another multiple times. This affair, of the villager's wanderings, stems from several reasons, but mostly, the family origin of villagers determined the migration routes taken by those fleeing. For instance, in the first phase of the evacuation and flight, migrants tended to move from the planes to the mountains, or from the south to the coastal region.

Another factor that impacted migration trajectories in rural areas in the early stages was villagers fleeing to the nearest, largest Arab urban center - even if they had no family connections, work connections or acquaintances there. Here, security was the decisive factor. This factor was largely integrated with previous factors, and in other cases, in the absence of other factors, it was the decisive one. For these reasons, a villager had to divide his migration trail, unbeknownst to him, to multiple phases, multiple stops - as indeed, these factors did not always take him to a safe area.

A review of the migration trajectories of villagers reveals multiple stops, a much less apparent trend in the migration of city dwellers. So, for instance, some residents of the village of Beit Susin in the south, migrated to al-Mughar and from there to Yavneh, from Yavneh to Ashdod and from Ashdod to Gaza. For this reason, villages that served as destination points in the first phase of the flight, turned into points of escape in the second phase, and so forth. Many migrated to Beit Shean from neighboring villages, and had to flee from there when residents of Beit Shean themselves fled.

It is also important to note that given that villagers' migration routes were initially rather short (in terms of how far they got from the village), and given that a village was evacuated without our stationing a unit there permanently, there was also a movement of return to villages that had been evacuated, which forced us to engage, on more than one occasion, in expelling residents of a certain village.

There are no "national centers" of migration absorption to speak of, not only because no one organized the migration movement and took care to direct it in certain trajectories, but also because of the trajectories the Arab migration movement took. True, we ultimately do find centers where many Arab migrants remain, many who came from different parts of the country. This is the outcome of a long trail with many stops along the way, which was random, created solely by the security criterion. In this respect, Syria, Lebanon, Egypt and Transjordan abroad, the Arab Triangle, the Ramallah and Birzeit area and the southern coastal plain of Eretz Yisrael do form the main centers that absorbed Arab migration in Eretz Yisrael. However, this should not be taken as an indication on the national level.

One of the main questions, which we cannot answer, is: How many migrated abroad and how many to centers inside Eretz Yisrael? On this issue, we can only make several assumptions:

1. The wealthy among city dwellers migrated primarily to Arab countries.

2. Many villagers, including those lacking means, who came mostly from border areas, migrated to Syria and Lebanon.

3. The main migration to Egypt came from Jaffa, the south, Haifa and Jerusalem.

4. The main migration to Transjordan came from the Sea of Galilee communities, the Yizrael district, the Gilboa district, Acre, Jaffa and Jerusalem.

5. It appears that Syria and Lebanon received most of those who migrated abroad, followed by Transjordan, and lastly, Egypt.

b. Population absorption centers

The following is a list of the centers where those fleeing migrated. The list is divided by the different parts of the country, and the centers for each district or area are listed in order of importance.

1. Tel-Hai district

Syria	Lebanon	Darabshiyah	Hula marshes
Golan	Sa'sa'	Qaddita

2. Sea of Galilee

Transjordan	Syria	Lebanon	Nazareth and its vicinity
Lubya	Mughar	Boutaiha	Haifa
Samakh (until it fell)	Safed (until it fell)

3. Yizrael district

"Triangle" villages	Karmel villages	Safuriya	Ilut
Tur'an	Abu Shush	Nazareth	Transjordan

4. Gilboa

Transjordan	Nazareth and vicinity	Arab triangle	Gilboa Mountain
Beit Shean (until it fell)

5. Haifa city limits

Syria	Lebanon	Lebanese border area	Triangle (until it fell)
Nazareth and Shfaram	Few to Egypt	Few to Cyprus

6. Acre city limits

Lebanon

Border villages

Transjordan

Few to Cyprus

7. Haifa-Western Galilee District

Northern border villages (Yarka, Tarshiha)	Lebanon	Triangle	Ghabisiyya
Sa'sa'	Ijzim	Dalia	Ein Hawd
Umm a-Zinat

8. Central Region

Nablus	Tulkarem	Rummanah	Umm al-Fahm
Barta'ah	Baqah al-Gharbiyah	Jat	Kufrein
Taybeh	Qalansuwa	Qalqiliyah	Kafr Qasem
Majdal	Tantura	Ijzim	Beit Lid
Ramla	Lod	a-Sindiyana	Haifa (until it fell)

9. Jaffa city limits

Ramla	Lod	Gaza	Khan Yunis
South - coastal plane	Egypt	Amman (a few)	Syria, Lebanon (a few)

10. Jaffa villages

South

Triangle

Ramla

Lod

11. South

Gaza and coastal plane area	Ramla	Lod	Hamama (a few)
Masmiyya (a few)	Beersheva (a very small number)

12. Negev

Gaza	Coastal areas outside the country
	Khan Yunis	Majdal	Beit Lahyia
	Nazla	Khreibeh	Damra

13. Jerusalem

Hebron	Bethlehem	Beit Jala	Ramallah
Birzeit	Transjordan	Gaza and Egypt	Syria (the wealthy)
Lebanon (the wealthy)	Egypt (the wealthy)

c. Issues with absorption

The absorption of Arabs of means was not a problem per se, since they provided for themselves and handled, some more, some less, the new cost of living. However, since most of the migrants were not of this social stratum, not to mention that many left without any possessions, once the waves of migration began to arrive, serious issues with absorption emerged. The problems grew worse as time went by. This was expressed in the persistence of calls from Arab countries for refugees to return to their homes, and artificial pressure on young men of conscription age to return to the front. The sheer number of announcements issued by Syria and Lebanon indicate that the refugees were beginning to become a serious burden, and that they were clearly making their mark on the economy of neighboring countries and society there - especially in Syria and Lebanon. It is no coincidence that Azzam Faha declared that the number of Eretz Yisrael refugees in foreign countries is up to 250,000 (the number may be a slight exaggeration, but it is close to reality). In addition, it is no coincidence that the Transjordan radio - Radio Jerusalem - began broadcasting announcements, a series of "educational lectures" for the people of Eretz Yisrael urging them to return to their country and help "the war effort", providing "definitive proof" that those who returned were not risking their lives, especially considering the fact that "all over the world, only 10% fight and the rest serve in the rear", and especially "when the Arabs are on the brink of certain victory". The announcements made by King Abdullah regarding the refugees etc., are also characteristic. These announcements and declarations simply prove that as early as in the first weeks following the peak in migration, late May and early June, the refugee problem in neighboring countries was beginning to be bothersome in different ways that we address below. The issue was especially irksome due to the particularly large number of people lacking means among the migrants.

One of the important questions related to the problem of Arab migration was whether the Arab migrant would become a fighter or not. The Arab fighter has not turned into a fighter. His sole focus now is collecting handout money. He has accepted the lowest standard of living, choosing it over joining the war. There are many factors at play here, but two are central: First, the assessment of Jewish strength and the crisis of confidence in Arab strength. Second, the war in Eretz Yisrael developed in such a way that there was no room for "volunteers" to fight, not to mention that the main volunteer force, the "Liberation Army", fell apart at the time. The refugee problem troubling Arab countries has a significant impact on society and on the economy and brings with it problems which will grow worse, particularly given that no serious, comprehensive and organized measures are taken by Arab countries to resolve the issue.

---------

Annex No. 1

Evacuated Arab Villages by District:

a. Tel-Hai district

Total residents 23,790

Migrated 20,620

Remained 3,170

Village populations during normal times
Madahil	)		Kirad al-Ghanname		350
Arab al-'Azaziyat	)	410	Kirad al-Baqqara		360
Khisas		530	Deishum		590
Zuq a-Tahtani	)		Malikiyya		360
Zuq al-Fawqani	)	1050	Nabi Yusha'		70
Shawka		200	Qadas		320
Abil al-Qamh		330	'Alma		950
Hunin		1620	Saliha		1130
Khalisa		1840	Rihaniyya		290
Na'ima		1310	Ras al-Ahmar		660
Lazzaza		230	Dallata		360
Qaitiyya		940	Qaddita		240
Manshiyya (included with Zuq a-Tahtani)			Ammuqa a-Tahta	)
Mansura		360	Ammuqa a-Fuqa	)	140
'Abisiyya		830	Ein Zaitun		620
Dawwara		700	Biriyya		240
Hamra			Mirun		290
Muftakhira		350	Mughr al-Kheit		490
Salihiyya		1520	Mansurat al-Kheit		900
Zawiya		760	Arab al-Heib
Jahula		420	Ja'una		1150
Buwaiziyya		510	Zhahiriyya		350
Khiyam al-Walid		210	Akbara		410
Dirbashiyya		310	Safed		5770
Ghuraba		220	Sammu'i		310
Arab a-Zubeid	)		Fir'im		740
Mallaha	)	890	Qabba'a		460
Baisamun		20	Marus		80
'Ulmaniyya		260	Arab al-Zanghariyya		840

Degree of Evacuation

Date

Village

Full/Partial

Evacuation cause

Evacuation trajectory, comments

18.1

Mughr al-Kheit

Our reprisal

To Syria, after stealing our sheep

herd

“

Mansurat al-Kheit

“

“ “

To Syria

12.2

Shawka

“

“ “

To Shawka Fuqa, returned shortly after.

26.3

Khisas

29.3

Khiyam al-Walid

Participated in

attack on Lehavot

To Syria. Some returned later.

7.4

Madahil

To the Golan

20.4

Arab a-Zubeid

General departure

of Mughrabis

To Lebanon

20.4

'Ulmaniya

Our action

Many killed

21.4

Huseiniyya

Effect of our action

in ‘Ulmaniya

22.4

Kirad al-Baqqara

Effect of our action

“ and fear of invasion.

To Syria. Some joined the Syrian

army

22.4

Kirad al-Ghanname

Effect of action and

fear of invasion

To Syria. Some joined the Syrian

army

30.4

Madahil

Prior to attack on

Kfar Szold

To the Golan. Knew about the

attack and fled beforehand.

1.5

Arab al-'Azaziyat

Attack on Kfar

Szold

To Banyas. Joined gangs.

1.5

Khiyam al-Walid

“ “

To Seida-Syria. Fled completely

after returning earlier.

1.5

Hamra

Attack on Lehavot,

our harassment

To Syria and Dirbashiyya.

Participated in attack on Lehavot.

1.5

Ghuraba

Attack on Lehavot,

our harassment

To Syria and Dirbashiyya.

Participated in attack on Lehavot.

1.5

Muftakhira

Attack on Lehavot

In Dirbashiyya. Returend later.

2.5

Ein Zaitun

Destruction of

village by us

Many killed

2.5

Biriyya

“ “

2.5

Qaitiyya

Harassment, threat

of attack and convoy passage

Returned later

3.5

Hunin

Fear of our attacks

In Lebanon

4.5

Arab a-Zanghariyya

Searches by us

Syria (?)

4.5

Arab al-Qudeiriyya

“ “

“

4.5

Arab as-Samakiya

“ “

“

9.5

Ja'una

As Safed faltered

Ras al-Ahmar. Our actions in Safed

had an effect.

9.5

Deishum

Concentration of

gangs our them and our actions

To Lebanon

10.5

Safed

Occupied

Beirut, Damascus, Huran. Critical

impact on the vicinity.

10.5

Akbara

Many killed

10.5

Zhahiriyya

Safed impact (?)

10.5

Abil al-Qamh

Fear of invasion,

fall of Safed.

To Lebanon. Some fled in the

beginning of the incidents.

11.5

Qaddita

Fall of Safed impact

Sa’sa’ – outside borders of State of

Israel.

11.5

Zuq a-Tahtani

" " " "

To Lebanon

11.5

Khalisa

Asked for agreement with fall of Safed. Refused. Fled.

To ‘Udaysa, Lebanon. There had

been an agreement with them previously. Kept well.

11.5

Buwaiziyya

Fled with the

evacuation of Khalisa

To Lebanon. Afraid because they

were on our traffic line.

12.5

Sammu'i

Fall of Safad

14.5

Na'ima

" "

To Syria. Entered negotiations

beforehand, but fall of Safed determined.

14.5

Shawka

" " fear of

invasion

To Syria

16.5

Muftakhira

The Sheikh was

afraid and left with everyone

This is the final flight, after they

returned once.

16.5

Nabi Yusha'

Our attack on

Police station

19.5

Qaitiyya

Threats and our

whispering operations by us

Final exit, since some returned.

21.5

Zuq al-Fawqani

Our Whispering

operation and mortars

Effect of mortars strong.

21.5

Lazzaza

Our Whispering

operation

To Syria

24.5

Manshiyya

Our Whispering

operation

To Lebanon.

24.5

Zawiya

Our attack

Some to Hula marshes, some to

Syria.

24.5

Ammuqa a-Tahta

Our action

To Lebanon.

24.5

Ammuqa a-Fuqa

" "

25.5

Khisas

Whispering

operation and Safed effect

To Syria

25.5

Saliha

Our warnings and

Whispering operation

Some to the marshes and some to

Syria

25.5

Mansura

Our Whispering

operation

To Syria

25.5

Baisamun

" "

25.5

'Abbasiyya

Flight from Mansura impacted

To Syria

25.5

Dawwara

Whispering operation

To Dirbashiyya

25.5

Salihiyya

Wanted to negotiate. We did not turn up. Afraid

Friendly village, fear because we

did not turn up to negotiate.

26.5

Fir'im

Our attack on them

To Lebanon

26.5

Qabba'a

Our attack on them

26.5

Marus

Our attack on them and in the area

" (?)

28.5

Malikiyya

Our occupation

To Lebanon. Wanted to return and tried to negotiate

28.5

Qadas

Effect of occupation of Malikiyya

To Lebanon

28.5

Ghuraba

Final evacuation

b. Sea of Galilee District

Village populations during normal times
Maghar	2,140	Kafr Sabt	480
Yaquq	210	Samra & Nuqeib	290
as-Samakiya	380	Kafr Kama	660
a-Tabigha	330	'Ubeidiyya	920
Ghuweir Abu Shusha	1,240	'Ulam	720
Eilabun	550	al-Hamah	290
Majdal	240	Hadatha	550
Arab al-Mawasi	1,870	Tiberias	5,770
Bu’eineh	540	Adasiyya
Nimrin	320	Sirin
Hittin	1,190	Ma'dhar	510
Lubya	2,350	Samakh	3,660
Shajara	770	Arab a-Zubayd
al-Manara	490	Khirbat al-Qadish	410
Arab Nasir a-Din	90

Degree of Evacuation

Date	Village	Full/Partial	Evacuation cause	Evacuation trajectory, comments
22.12	Tiberias	-	Fear	From outlining area into central areas
1.2.48	Samakh	P	Tension, as located on crossroads	Mostly the wealthy, women and children are evacuated. 50% had left before the complete evacuation.
5.3	'Ubeidiyya	F	Fear as a result of being surrounded by Jews	To the area of Nazareth
15.3	Adamiyya	F	Transjordan government orders	Since they are Persian, many to Persia and the rest to Transjordan
6.4	Sirin	F	Transjordan government orders	Area of Nazareth and Transjordan
6.4	‘Ulam	F	“ “	“ " “
6.4	Hadatha	F	“ “	“ " “
6.4	Ma'dhar	F	“ “	“ " “
15.4	Samakh	F	Fear when they heard about the action in Tiberias	To border villages in Transjordan. Bedouins.
18.4	Tiberias	F	Our action. Lack of local leaders. The wealthy fled earlier	Nazareth, Lubya, Hammah – Syria, Transjordan, Lebanon
19.4	Arab al-Zubayd	F	Tiberias effect.	To Ein Mahil. Sometimes come down to work fields
21.4	Samra & Nuqeib	F	Tiberias effect	To Syrian mountains. The village are tenant farmers. Syrian origin
21.4	Khirbat al-Qadish		“ “	To Lubya and Samakh
21.4	Ghuweir Abu Shusha	P	“ “
21.4	Arab Shajara	P	“ “	Nazareth

c. Gilboa District

Village populations during normal times
Qumya	450	Arab al-Bawati	)
Sulam	500	Kafr Bawati	)	700
Dahi	120	Hamidiyya		300
Nein	200	Beit Shean		5000
Indur	600	Arab az-Zinati		500
Tamra	70	Arab ‘Arida	)
Kafr Misr	400	Arab Safa	)	600
Tira Harb	200	Arab al-Khuneizir		400
Taiyiba	450	Farwana		350
Na’ura	250	Samiriyya		500
Kafra	700	Jabbul		250
Yubla	150	Zir’in		1300 (out of the country)
Murassas	600	Nuris		700
Danna	400	Mazar		350
Bira	500	Sandala		350
Kawkab al-Hawa	600	Tall a-Shawk		120
Arab al-Bashatiwa	1,000	Arab a-Sakhina		200

Degree of evacuation

Date	Village		Full/ Partial	Evacuation cause			Evacuation trajectory, comments
30.3	Qumya		F	Isolation among Jews, lack of transportation and work			To Beit Shean, Nazareth and Transjordan
30.3	Bawati		F	Light reprisal action			To Transjordan. Bedouin
15.4	Tira		F	Friendly Jewish advice
1.5	Beit Shean		P	Fear and Haifa effect			To the Triangle and Transjordan
1.5	Jabbul		P	Fear
1.5	Hamidiyya		P	Fear, proximity to Jews
1.5	Zir’in		P	Our attacks are a factor
11.5	Farwana		F	Our action			To the Triangle
12.5	Beit Shean		F	Occupation. Fear.Haifa effect			Evacuation lasted until 22.5
12.5	Hamidiyya		F	Fall of Beit Shean			To Transjordan, to the Triangle (Arraba)
12.5	Samiriyya		P	Farwana impact			To the Triangle
16.5	Kawkab al-Hawa		F	Occupation of the village by us			To Transjordan
16.5	Kafra		F	Occupation of Kawkab effect			To Transjordan and the Triangle
16.5	Yubla		F	Kawkab action effect			To Transjordan
16.5	Murassas		F	“	“	“	“
16.5	Danna		F	“	“	“	“
16.5	Bira		F	“	“	“	“
16.5	Arab al-Bashatiwa		F	“	“	“	“
16.5	Arab a-Sakhina		F	Because of attack on Tira Zvi. Afraid to remain in proximity to Jews. Harassment action – catalyst.			Went up the Gilboa.
18.5	Jabbul		F	Effect of our action in Kawkab			To Transjordan?
20.5	Sulam		F	Members of the Zu’biya. protégé Arabs.			To Nazareth.
20.5	Dahi		F				To Nazareth.
20.5	Nein	)	F	Evacuated upon receiving			“
20.5	Tamra	)	F	threatening letters from the			“
20.5	Kafr Misr	)	F	gangs, and with the arrival of			“
20.5	Tira Harb	)	F	foreigners to the area – feared			“
20.5	Taiyiba	)	F	their villages would be seized			“
20.5	Na’ura	)	F	by foreigners
20.5	Khuneizir	F		Beit Shean and Gesher front			To the Gilboa
20.5	Arab Safa	F		“ “			To Transjordan (originally from Transjordan
20.5	Arab ‘Arida	F		“ “			“ “
20.5	Arab az-Zinati	F		“ “			“ “
24.5	Indur	F		“ “			To the Nazareth area
27.5	Samiriyya	F		Our action in the village			To the Triangle
28.5	Danna	F		Our notice to clear out
28.5	Zir’in	F		Occupation
30.5	Mazar	F
31.5	Sandala	F		Occupation of Mazar influenced

d. Yizreel District

Population during normal times
Nazareth	14,200	Ghubayya Fawqa	)
Zippori	4,330	Ghubayya Tahta	)
Kafr Manda	1,260	Naghnaghiyya	)	1,260
Rummanah	880	Abu Shusha		720
Kafr Kanna	1,960	Qira		140
Reina	1,200	Umm a-Zinat		1,450
Mashhad	660	a-Rihaniyya		340
‘Illut	1,310	Daliyat a-Rawha		310
Ma'lul	690	Buteimat		110
Yafia	1,400	Khubbeiza		290
Iksal	1,000	Umm al-Shawf		530
Dabburiya	1,290	Umm al-Fahm		4,000
Ein Mahil	1,040	Arab a-Zubeidat
Sejera (Sea of Galilee district)		Arab al-Khalf
Lid al-'Awadin	710	Arab a-Sa’ida
Ein al-Mansi	100	Arab al-Qa’biya
Lajjun	600	Arab al-Hujayrat		200
Jenin	3850	Arab al-Jawamys		150
Zabuba	560	Arab al-Mazarib		100
Arab Susafi	150	Arab al-Ghazalin
Arab Hudeidin		Arab Zbeih		1,500
Kufrein	920	Arab Sa’yda
Waldheim	260	Beit Lahem		8,800
Mujaidal	1,600

Degree of evacuation

Date	Village	c	Evacuation cause	Evacuation trajectory, comments
	Shajara	F	Our attack	Nazareth, Tur’an, Ein Mahil
	Lid al-'Awadin	F	Mishmar HaEmek effect	To the Triangle. Tried to return and expelled.
	Ein al-Mansi	F	Our attack	To the Triangle
	Lajjun	F	“ “	“
	Jenin	F	“ “	Serious focus of invasion
	Rummanah	F	Fear of attack	To the Triangle
		F		“
		F		“
		F		“

Date

Village

Evacuation cause

Evacuation trajectory, comments

Shajara

Our attack

Nazareth, Tur’an, Ein Mahil

Lid al-'Awadin

Mishmar HaEmek

effect

To the Triangle. Tried to return and

expelled.

Ein al-Mansi

Our attack

To the Triangle

Lajjun

“ “

“

Jenin

“ “

“. Serious focus of invasion

Rummanah

Fear of attack

To the Triangle

Zabuba

“ “

“

Ghubayya Fawqa

Our attack

“

Ghubayya Tahta

“ “

“

Abu Shusha

“ “

“

Qira

Fear, and effect of attacks in the area.

To Transjordan

Umm a-Zinat

Our attack

To the Karmel and Umm al-Fahm

Rihaniyya

Fear

“

Daliyat a-Rawha

Fear

To the Triangle

Buteimat

“

To Umm al-Fahm

Khubbeiza

“

16.4

Arab a-Zubeidat

Ramat Yohanan incidents

Tzipori lands

Arab al-Khalf

“

Arab Sa’yda

““

“

Arab al-Mazarib

Concerns

Arab Zbeih

Our attack

Tur’an, Nazareth, Karmel

Arab a-Sa’ida

Mishmar HaEmek incidents

To the Karmel

Arab al-Hujayrat

Mishmar HaEemek, Ramat Yohanan incidents

To Tzipori

Arab Susafi

To Abu Shusha and Mansi

9.2

Arab Hudeidin

“

Naghnaghiyya

Kufrein

e. Haifa and Western Galilee District

District population during normal times
Shfaram	3950	Manshiyya	1140
Balad a-Sheikh	4500	Sumeiriyya	820
Haifa	71200	A-Zib	2050
Al-Mazra’a	460	al-Bassa	3140
Ard al-Saris		Umm al-Faraj	860
Yajur	610	Nahr	3070
Ghabisiyya	740	Amqa	1930
Fureidis	870	Kuweikat	1130
Acre	15000	Damun	340
Ein Ghazal	2410	Sheikh Daud	590
Ijzim	2970	Kafr Lam	380
Iqrit	520	Ein Hawd	380
Quseir	320	Jaba’	1270
I'billin	1800
Kabri	1640
Umm a-Zinat	1470

Degree of evacuation

Date

Village

Full/

Partial

Evacuation cause

Evacuation trajectory, comments

7.1

Balad a-Sheikh

Refinery incident

To the Triangle and Acre

7.1

Hawasa

“ “

3.2

Haifa

Fear of what is to Come

Syria and Lebanon, mostly the

wealthy evacuated

6.2

Mazra’a

Surrounded by Jews

A few stayed under protection of

General McMillan

12.2

Ard al-Saris

Appearance of foreign force

To Shfaram

18.2

Yajur

18.2.

Haifa

Fear for the Children

To Lebanon. [Archbishop George]

Hakim’s operation

15.3

Arab al-Ghuneima

Haifa effect

To Damun and vicinity

4.4

Hawasa

Many

4.4

Ghabisiyya

18.4

Yagur

Many

Appearance of Muhammad Mahmoud

To the Triangle, Kabri and Acre.

20.4

Shfaram

Druz defeat in Ramat Yohanan

To Nazareth

22.4

Tira

Appearance of Foreigners

22.4

Haifa

Most

Haifa occupation Operation

To Lebanon, Syria, Acre, Triangle

and Tantura

24.4

Reidis

[Fureidis?]

Many

Order from Arab Army to evacuate women and children

25.4

Acre

The wealthy

Haifa action effect

To the border villages, Lebanon

25.4

A-Sheikh

Everyone

“

25.4

Hawasa

“

25.4

Yajur

“

Ein Ghazal

“

To the Triangle

25.4

Ijzim

“

26.4

Iqrit

Rumour about convoy to Yehiam

Northwards to the border

27.4

Quseir

Haifa effect

Northwards

1.5

Acre

Many

“

2.5

I'billin

All

To Sa’sa’ and Sha’ab

3.5

Tira

Many

Appearance of foreigners.

Center of foreigners

5.5

Kabri

All

Fear of reprisals after the attack on Ehud

[illegible], Lebanon, north

6.5

Acre

Many

Harassment, Typhus plague

To Haifa, Transjordan, Syria

f. Central Region and Jaffa District

District population during normal times
Tantura	1650	Fardisya	20
Fureidis	870	Arab an-Nuseirat
Sabbarin	1880	Tira	3440
Sindiyana	1390	Qalansuwa	1660
Umm a-Shawf	480	Arab al-Rumeilat
Bureika	320	(near HaMaapil)
Arab al-Ghawarina	690	Sayyidna 'Ali
Qannir	750	Jlil	1020
Kafr Qara	1510	Kafr Saba	1370
Arab Turqman		Biyar 'Adas	300
Arab al-Bara		Sheikh Muwannis	2000
Qisarya	1240
Wadi ‘Ara	260	Arab Abu Kishk	1900
Sarkas		Arab Salama	800
Dumeira	620	Miska	650
Arab al-Fuqara	340	Khirbat 'Azzun	994
Arab a-Nufei'at	910	Mirr	190
‘Ara	890	Fajja	1360
Kh. Zalafa	370	Arab al-Jarmala
Khirbat Manshiya	280	Yahudiyya	6560
Arab Hawarith	1440	Kafr 'Ana	2000
Umm Khalid	1050	Saqiya	1240
Khirbat Beit Lid	500	Khairiyya	1600
Salama	7610	Jammasin	2050

Degree of evacuation

Date	Village	Full/Partial			Evacuation cause		Evacuation trajectory, comments
21.2	Khirbat 'Azzun	P					To the village of ‘Azzun, Sheikh Muwannis, first village evacuated in this area.
25.12	Summeil	Everyone					Jammasin
31.12	Arab al-Balawina	Everyone			Fear
7.1	Jammasin	Many
12.1	Qisarya	Beginning
31.1	Arab Abu Rizik	Everyone
3.2	Arab an-Nuseirat	Everyone			Our actions		To Taybeh, Qalansuwa. The village is empty
3.2	Sayyidna 'Ali	Everyone			Fear of hostile action. Surrounded		Qalqiliyah and vicinity. Village occupied by our forces.
3.2	Kafr Mirr	Everyone			General fear		To Kafr Qasem and the mountains. Village is empty.
8.2	Jarmala	P			Gang orders		To Kafr Qasem
9.2	Qisarya	P			Rate of evacuation [greatly increased]
11.2	Arab a-Shubak	Everyone			Reprisal by Dissidents		To Arab Abu [kishk]
11.2	Khirbat 'Azzun	Everyone			Fear and actions		To village of ‘Azzun
15.2	Arab Turqman	Everyone			Fear of hostile action by us		Mansi Wad, Almuha
15.2	Qisarya	Everyone			Occupied by our forces		Tantura, Haifa Village is empty
15.2	Kafr Mirr	-			Some returned
15.2	Arab al-Rumeilat (near HaMaapil)	F			General fear and Whispering operation by us		To the mountain and to Bureij
15.2	Arab al-Rumeilat (near Netanya)	P			General fear and Whispering operation by us		To the mountain and to Bureij. 150 on May 4.
15.2	Arab al-Rumeilat (near Kadima)	F			General fear and Whispering operation by us		To the mountain and to Bureij
15.2	Arab Haweitat	F			General fear		To the mountains between Taybeh and Irtah.
17.2	Dhaqaba	Everyone			Appearance of foreigners at the locale.
17.2	Fajja	P			After the Irgun action.
25.2	Arab Hijazi	Everyone
27.2	Wadi ‘Ara	Everyone			After the attack on Ma’anit		‘Ar’ara, Ya’bed. Occupied by our forces
6.3	Bureika	Everyone
15.3	Arab Mahadw	Everyone			Fear of reprisal after Arab mine was laid in vicinity		To Tulkarm. Village is empty.
15.3	Arab Hawarith	Everyone			After we sabotaged Arab transportation near the village		Qaqun, Baqa al-Gharbiyye. The village is empty.
17.3	Jammasin	Most			General fear		To Ghasam
20.3	Umm Khalid	Everyone			Located inside Jewish community. Afraid of it and of hostile actions		Tulkarm. Occupied by our forces.
20.3	Khirbat Beit Lid	Beginning			After we sabotaged Arab transportation		To Beit Lid. Village is empty
23.3	Arab al-Koz	Everyone					To Lod
30.3	Arab Abu Kishk	Everyone			After splitter’s action in Sheikh Muwannis		Kharish
30.3	Sheikh Muwannis	Everyone			After the abduction by the Dissidents		Qalqiliyah, abroad. Fled with Arab Abu Kishk.
30.3	Arab Salama	Everyone			Effect of Dissidents in Sheikh Muwannis		Kharish
30.3	Arab a-Nufei'at	Everyone					To Sarkas
1.4	Jaramalla	Everyone			General fear		Majdal Kafr Qasem. Some come and work during the day.
3.4	Arab Imrir	Everyone			After robbery and murder committed by Dissidents		To the area of Qalqiliyah and Jaljulia. The place is empty.
3.4	Arab al-Hawk	Everyone			After robbery and murder committed by Dissidents		Taybeh, Tira. Some returned to their tribe in Negev.
3.4	Arab al-Fallaq	Everyone			Cattle robbery by Irgun, and transportation problems		Tira and Triangle. The village is empty.
3.4	Jlil	Everyone			Effect of Dissidents and their action in Sheikh Muwannis		Qalqiliyah and Tira. Occupied by our forces.
3.4	Khirbat 'Azzun		End	End of evacuation at the demand of the Haganah		To the village of ‘Azzun. Occupied by our forces.
5.4	Qannir		P	Beginning of evacuation. Fear of our actions		Jenin area.
5.4	Khirbat Beit Lid		Everyone	Fear. Transportation		To Beit Lid
10.4	Arab al-Fuqara		Everyone	Received order to evacuate from Haganah		Baqa al-Gharbiyye, Jit. Village is empty.
10.4	Arab a-Nufei'at		Everyone	Received order to evacuate from Haganah		Baqa al-Gharbiyye, Jit. Village is empty.
10.4	Bamariya		Everyone	Received order to evacuate from Haganah		Baqa al-Gharbiyye, Jit. Village is empty.
12.4	Biyar 'Adas		Everyone	Our actions in the area		Jaljuliya and vicinity. Occupied by our forces
15.4	Sarkas		Everyone	Received order to leave from Haganah		Wadi al-Moya, Baqa al-Gharbiyye, Jit. Village is empty.
15.4	Khirbat Zalafa		Everyone	Effect of vicinity		‘Atil, Zeita. According to advance agreement between us and them.

15.4	Khirbat Manshiya		Everyone	Effect of vicinity		According to advance agreement between us and them.
15.4	Miska		Everyone	On orders of the Haganah		Tira, Qalqiliyah. Occupied by our forces.
15.4	Abu Zureiq		Everyone
17.4	Arab al-Bara		Everyone	Fear of hostile actions by us		To Sarkas, Tantura. Ein Ghoz, Ijzim. The village is empty.
17.4	Kafr 'Ana		P			Ramla, Lod.
20.4	Sawalima		Everyone
25.4	Saqiya		Everyone	Occupied by our forces		Ramla, Lod and the vicinity.
25.4	Khairiyya		Everyone	Occupied by our forces		Ramla, Lod and the vicinity.
25.4	Salama		Everyone	Occupied by our forces		Ramla, Lod and the vicinity.
25.4	Kafr 'Ana		Everyone	Occupied by our forces		Ramla, Lod and the vicinity.
25.4	Qannir		End	Effect of the area –stoked fear		Jenin area. The village is destroyed
25.4	Beit Dajan		Everyone	After occupation of Khairiyya		Harassment by Jews. Yahudiyya. Lod, Ramla
26.4	Bureika		Everyone	Fear		To Sindiyana
26.4	Sarkas		Everyone	Fear of actions		To Lod
28.4	Rantiya		Everyone	After our attack		Laban, Shuqba, al-Manar, Yahudiyya,
1.5	Yazur		Everyone	Harassment by Jews Jaffa effect		Lod, Jammasin and Sheikh Muwannis
2.5	Sindiyana		P.	Fear of Arab revenge as they lent to Jews
4.5	Yahudiyya		Everyone	Occupied by the Irgun		Ramla, Lod and vicinity. Occupied by Irgun
4.5	Tira (Qaqun)		P.			Men still there.
5.5	Bureika		Everyone	Effect of attack on Qannir		‘Inin, Rummanah. Some present –surrendered.
6.5	Tantura		P.	Evacuation of women and children
8.5	Kafr Qara		Everyone	Our attack on them.		‘Ar’arah, Barta'ah, Ya'bad. The village is empty.
8.5	‘Ana		Everyone	Effect of our attack on Kafr Qara		‘Ar’arah, Ein Salha. The village is empty.
10.5	Arab al-Jarmala		End	General fear.		Majdal, Kafr Qasem, come to work during the day.
14.5	Sabbarin		Everyone	Occupied by the Irgun		‘Ar’ara, Ya’bed. Occupied by the Irgun.
14.5	Sindiyana		Everyone	Occupied by the Irgun		‘Ar’ara, Ya’bed. Occupied by the Irgun.
14.5	Umm a-Shawf		Everyone	Occupied by the Irgun		Rummanah, Umm al-Fahm. Occupied by the Irgun.
14.5	Qalqiliyah		P.	Women and children.		Was receiving point, turned into flight point
15.5	Arab Jalad		Everyone	Effect of [declaration] of Jewish state		Tulkarm, Danaba. The village is empty.
15.5	Kafr Saba		Everyone	Occupied by our forces		Qalqiliyah area. Occupied by our forces.
15.5	Fajja		Everyone (end)	Our pressure – Whispering operation		To the mountains – the remaining few left.
19.5	Qalqiliyah		Everyone	After harassment actions by us.
20.5	Hablah		Everyone	Harassment actions by us.
21.5	Tantura		Everyone	Occupied by our forces.		Everyone held captive in their locale. Our forces are in the village.

g. The south and the Negev

Population during normal times
Bureir[*]		4000	al-Mansura	100
Huleiqat	)	1500	'Arab Suqreir	430
Kawkaba	)	1500	Yasur	1070
Najd		600	Sawafir Gharbiyya	1030
Sumsum		1200	Sawafir Shamaliyya	680
Jammama		150	Julis	1130
Muharraqa	)	1100	Batani a-Sharqi	710
Kawfakha	)	1100	Barqa	980
Huj		800	Beit Daras	3010
Beit Tima		1060	Arab as-Satariyya (Abu Khatab)
Sarafand al-Kharab		1130	Na'ani	2270
Wadi Hunein		1770	Abu Shusha	950
Shafun			Saidun	230
Arab Satariyya (Abu Suweira)			Khulda	300
Arab Rubin	1550		Dayr Muheisin	360
Qubeiba		1870	Beit Jiz	600
Zarnuga		2600	al-Qabab	2160
Yibna		5920	Shahma	310
Bir Salim	950		Bureir[*]	4000
'Aqir	2710
Mughar	1900
Bashshit	1770
Qatra	1320

[*name of locality repeated in original Hebrew]

Degree of evacuation

Date	Village	Full/ Partial	Evacuation cause	Evacuation trajectory, comments
12.5	Bureir	F.	Our actions	Mostly to Majdal and others: Beit Lahiya, Nazla Hirbiya
12.5	Huleiqat	F.	Bureir evacuation effect	Nazla Hirbiya, Beit Lahiya, Majdal.
12.5	Kawkaba	F.	Bureir evacuation effect	Nazla Hirbiya, Beit Lahiya, Majdal.
12.5	Najd	F.	Our ultimatum	Nazla Hirbiya, Beit Lahiya, Majdal. Over time, some returned.
12.5	Sumsum	F.	Our ultimatum	Nazla Hirbiya, Beit Lahiya, Majdal. Over time, some returned.
22.5	Jammama	F.	Our action.	Remained in their area, being semi Bedouin
25.2	Muharraqa	F.	Our action.	Remained in their area, being semi Bedouin
25.5	Kawfakha	F.	Our action.	Remained in their area, being semi Bedouin
28.5	Huj	F.	Ultimatum	To Dimra
29.5	Beit Tima	F.	Our action.
				Evacuation trajectory	comments
20.4.48	Sarafand al- Kharab	F.	Fear. Surrounded.	Ramla, Lod	Handover of Rishon LeTzion police to us.
17.4.48	Wadi Hunein	“	Bombing of Hassan Salameh headquarters.	“ “
9.5.48	Shafun	“	Occupation of Beer Yaakov camp	“ “
9.5.48	Arab Abu al-Fadl	“	“ “	Qubeiba, Yibna
9.5.48	Arab Satariyya (Humeida)	“		Beersheba
1.6.58 [sic]	Arab Rubin	“	Expelled as a result of our action	Coastline sands, south of Yibna
27.5.48	Qubeiba	“	Our action, expulsion	Yibna sands, Ashdod
27.5.48	Zarnuga	“	Occupation and expulsion	Yibna and Ashdod
4.6.48	Yibna	“	“ “	To southern communities, al l the way to Gaza	All residents of Yibna, Zarnuga, Qub. Went south all the way to Gaza when these locales were occupied
9.5.48	Bir Salim	“	Attack on orphanage	Ramla – Lod
6.5.48	'Aqir	F.	Our action, occupied	Mughar, Bashshit, Yibna, Ramla	Some remained in the village (women, elderly and children)
18.5.48	Mughar	F.	Occupation.	Yibna, Ashdod, Gaza, Khan Yunis
13.5.48	Bashshit	“	“	Mughar, Yibna, Gaza and vicinity
17.5.48	Qatra	“	“	Masmiyya	Was protégé village until Egyptians arrived near Ashdod.
20.4.48	al-Mansura	“	“	Village completely destroyed
25.1.48	'Arab Suqreir (Abu Suweira)	“	“	South to the sands and to Gaza
11.6.48	Yasur		“
18.5.48	Sawafir Gharbiyya	“	Fled as the front approached Hamama
18.5.48	Sawafir Shamaliyya	“	“ “
11.6.48	Julis	“	Occupation
13.5.48	Batani a-Sharqi	F	Occupation	Ashdod, Hamama
13.5.48	Barqa	“	“	Hamama, Ashdod
11.5.48	Beit Daras	“	“	“
9.5.48	Arab Satariyya Abu Khatab	“	Fled because of military actions nearby	Yibna Sands
14.5.48	Na'ani	“		Some to Ramla, some to Qazaza. Was protégé village after it surrendered. Abandoned on 10.6
20.5.48	Abu Shusha	“	Occupation
20.1.48	Saidun	“	Village abandoned
20.4.48	Khulda	“	Occupation
20.4.48	Dayr Muheisin	“	“
20.4.48	Beit Jiz	“	“
	Beit Susin	“	“
	al-Qabab	“	“
14.5.48	Shahma	“	Actions in the area		Village abandoned

h. Jerusalem area

Population during normal times
Lifta	2730	Qastal	100
Qalandia	200	Saris	600
Beit Safafa	1510	Bidu	560
al-'Eizariyah	1130	Nabi Samwil	210
Abu Dis	2070	a-Tur	2960
Beit Sahur	2590	Beit Hanina	1700
Bethlehem	9140	Judayra	200
Beit Jala	3740	Bayt Nabala	630
Jericho	3210	al-Jib	890
'Esawiyah	780	Rafat	300
Dayr Yasin	650	Shu'fat	810
'Ein Karim	3390	Dayr Muheisin	500
Qalunya	970	Beit Jiz	600
Beit Iksa	880	Beit Surik	510
Malliha	2070	Dayr Ayyub	350
Ramallah	5180

Degree of evacuation

Date	Village	Full/ Partial	Evacuation cause	Evacuation trajectory, comments
31.12	Lifta	P.		To Malliha
1.1	Arab Romema	Everyone
1.1	Upper Lifta	Everyone		To Malliha
2.1	Jerusalem - Katamon	Many		To Egypt, Lebanon
4.1	Qalandia	Everyone
5.1	Jerusalem - Katamon	Many		To Egypt, Lebanon
8.1	Jerusalem – Sheikh Jarah	Very many
9.1	Jerusalem - Schneller	Everyone		Beit Nabala, Ramallah
11.1	Jerusalem - Musrara	Very many
18.1	Beit Safafa	P.
18.1	Jerusalem – Sheikh Badr
27.1	'Eizariyah	Many		Mostly toward Hebron.
27.1	Abu Dis	Many		“	“		“
27.1	Beit Sahur	Many		“	“		“
27.1	Beit Safafa	Many		“	“		“
1.2	Bethlehem	Small part		To Jericho and Transjordan
1.2	Beit Jala	“	“		“	“	“
4.2	Jerusalem – near Talpiyot	Everyone
12.2	Jerusalem - Talbiye	Everyone	Our propaganda
16.2	Beit Safafa	Everyone		Foreigners on site
16.2	Jericho	A few		To Transjordan
27.2	'Esawiyah	Everyone	Close to Jews	To immediate vicinity
8.3	Jerusalem	The wealthy, women, children		Mostly to Lebanon
8.3	Qalandia	Everyone
22.3	'Esawiyah	Returned	after running to the near vicinity
30.3	'Esawiyah	Everyone	Received order to evacuate from Arab Higher Committee
1.4	Jerusalem - Musrara	Everyone
9.4	Dayr Yasin	Everyone	Dissidents’ action	Most were killed
10.4	'Ein Karim	Everyone		Malliha, Beit Jala, Ramallah
10.4	Qalunya	Women and children
15.4	Beit Iksa	Everyone
18.4	Dayr Abu Tor	Everyone	Dayr Yasin effect
21.4	Malliha	p.	“ “ and appearance of foreigners
21.4	‘Ein Karim	P.	Women and children, and appearance of foreigners.
28.4	Ramallah	Small part	To Bethlehem
28.4	Jerusalem	Small part	To Bethlehem
3.5	Qastal	Everyone	Our occupation, the opening of the road
3.5	Qalunya	Everyone	“ “
3.5	Saris	Everyone	“ “
3.5	Bidu	Everyone	“ “
3.5	Beit Iksa	Everyone	“ “
3.5	Nabi Samwil	Everyone	“ “
3.5	Abu Dis	P.		Only women and children
3.5	Abu Tor	P.		“ “ “ “
3.5	'Eizariyah	P.	Appearance of many foreigners
6.5	Malliha	P.		To Bethlehem
6.5	Jerusalem – South	Everyone		To Christian institutions in the Old City and Bethlehem
9.5	Jerusalem – Old City	Many		Muslims go to the villages
11.5	Jerusalem – Old City	Many		Hebronites return to their city
11.5	Beit Iksa	Everyone	Our action
13.5	Judayra	Everyone	Orders from the legion to evacuate, needed as base
13.5	Bayt Hanina	Everyone	“ “ “ “ “ “ “ “
13.5	Bayt Nabala	Everyone	“ “ “ “ “ “ “ “
13.5	al-Jib	Everyone	“ “ “ “ “ “ “ “
13.5	Rafat	Everyone	“ “ “ “ “ “ “ “
13.5	Shu'fat	Everyone	“ “ “ “ “ “ “ “
15.5	Jerusalem –Christians	Everyone		To Bethlehem
21.5	Jerusalem – Old City	Many
29.5	Dayr Muheisin	Everyone	Our action
29.5	Beit Jiz	Everyone	“ “
?	Beit Surik	“	“ “
? ?	Dayr Ayyub	“	“ “
29.5	Jerusalem, outside the wall	Everyone	Occupied by us
30.5	Jerusalem – Old City	Many	With the fierce battles

Source: Akevot. “Intelligence brief from 1948 hidden for decades indicates Jewish fighters’ actions were the major cause of Arab displacement, not calls from Arab leadership.” Translation from Hebrew into English by Akevot from the original record's source: Hashomer Hatzair (Yad Yaari) Archive, file 95-35.27(3).

https://www.akevot.org.il/en/article/intelligence-brief-from-1948-hidden...

وثيقة

نص

تقرير المخابرات الإسرائيلية بشأن تفريغ فلسطين من سكانها، 30 حزيران/ يونيو 1948 (بالإنكليزية)

التاريخ

30 حزيران 1948

الموقع

اللغة الأصلية

العبرية

تقرير المخابرات الإسرائيلية بشأن تفريغ فلسطين من سكانها، 30 حزيران/ يونيو 1948 (بالإنكليزية)

تقرير المخابرات الإسرائيلية بشأن تفريغ فلسطين من سكانها حتى 31 أيار/ مايو 1948