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JAPANESE PERCEPTIONS ON THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT

EISUKE NARAMOTO

Japan is a long way from Palestine. Among the developed industrial nations, it is probably the farthest from the Middle East not only geographically, but culturally and politically. Nevertheless, Japan's new status as an economic giant has made it difficult for it to remain isolated from regional disputes, even in distant areas such as the Middle East; its economic interests as well as the expectations of the international community compel a more active involvement in world affairs.

The Government Position

It was in the wake of the October 1973 war and the ensuing oil crisis that Japan—like the countries of the European Community, anxious to secure its oil supplies—broke ranks with the United States on Middle East policy. On 22 November 1973, the Chief Cabinet Secretary of the Foreign Ministry, Susumu Nikaïdo, issued a policy statement that represented his government's first solo initiative on the Middle East. The statement spelled out four principles that were to form the basis of a solution to the conflict:

- the inadmissibility of the acquisition and occupation of territory by force;
- the withdrawal of Israeli forces from *all the territories occupied* in the 1967 war (emphasis added);
- respect for the integrity and security of the territories of all countries in

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the region and the need for guarantees to that end;

- the recognition of and respect for the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations in bringing about a just and lasting peace in the Middle East.¹

What is significant in the statement—aside from the removal, in the second point, of all ambiguity concerning the territories to be evacuated and the explicit recognition, in point four, of the Palestinians as a people entitled to exercise political rights—is its conclusion, which warned: “The government of Japan will continue to observe the situation in the Middle East with grave concern and, depending on future developments, may have to *reconsider* (emphasis added) its policy towards Israel.”²

The Israeli government strongly protested the statement, which continues to form the basis of Japanese policy on the Arab-Israeli conflict to this day. The Arab countries, on the other hand, welcomed the Japanese posture and decided to exempt Japan from the oil embargo.

Throughout the 1970s the Japanese government’s position on the rights of the Palestinian people and the PLO became clearer. In June 1976, for example, the ruling Liberal Democratic Party invited Faruq Qaddumi, the head of the PLO’s political department, to Japan. In February 1977, the PLO opened an office in Tokyo. The government later made clear that the “legitimate rights” of the Palestinian people included the right to self-determination, and on 1 December 1979 Prime Minister Masayoshi Ohira declared to a plenary session of the House of Councilors that “Japan understands that the right of self-determination of the Palestinian people includes the right to establish an independent state.”³ PLO Chairman Yasir Arafat visited Japan for the first time in October 1981 at the invitation of a parliamentarians’ group composed of both ruling and opposition party members.

In the 1980s, however, at least partly in response to the oil glut, the Japanese government began to adjust its policy in the direction of striking a “positive balance” between the Arab and Israeli sides. As a former senior official at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) explained: “The adjusted policy aimed at strengthening the tie—especially the economic one—with Israel, which had been weak because of our fear of the Arab boycott. We had already built up firm relations with the Arab states and the PLO, but we thought we also needed good relations with the other side if we were to make a substantial contribution to the solution of the problem.”⁴ Thus, to balance Foreign Minister Shintaro Abe’s visit to Jordan, Syria, and Saudi Arabia in 1985, Israeli Foreign Minister and Deputy Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir was invited to Japan despite the protests from Arab diplomats in Tokyo. In June 1988, Japanese Foreign Minister Sosuke Uno visited Arab states and Israel (including Palestinian refugee camps in the occupied territories).

The “positive balance” policy culminated in invitations issued to both PLO Chairman Arafat and Israeli Foreign Minister Moshe Arens in the fall of 1989.

Arafat, invited in response to the "historic compromises" reached at the November 1988 Palestine National Council in Algiers and in order to "buttress and encourage the realistic policies of the Arafat initiative,"⁵ came to Tokyo in October 1989. The fact that he had been officially invited by the government (the previous invitation having come from parliamentarians) is perhaps the most significant aspect of the visit, since it could be interpreted as tantamount to government recognition of the PLO as the *de facto* government of the Palestinian people (even though Japan has not yet officially acknowledged the PLO's status as the *sole* legitimate representative of the Palestinians). The PLO leader met with both Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu and Foreign Minister Taro Nakayam. Mr. Kaifu "responded positively to Arafat's request that Japan play a greater political role in helping bring about a comprehensive settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict . . . and promised expanded Japanese financial and technical assistance to the Palestinians."⁶

The follow-up consultations, on both political and economic affairs, were held in Tokyo on 24 April 1990 between the PLO delegation headed by Ahmad Abu Alaa, director general of the PLO Department of Economy, and the Japanese represented by Makoto Watanabe, director general of the Middle East and African Bureau of MOFA. The PLO delegation requested Japanese economic and technical cooperation on such items as building infrastructure for the Palestinian economy and training for Palestinian students and experts. The Palestinians were especially eager that Japan have direct economic exchanges with Palestinians in the occupied territories; among the projects suggested were a vocational training center, the personnel of which would initially be Japanese, and a joint-venture hospital in Gaza to which the Japanese could contribute capital. They also requested that Japan directly import fruit, handicrafts, and other goods from the occupied territories.⁷ The Japanese government promised to "study the proposals," but its official stance is that it cannot give direct economic assistance to the PLO "because it is not a state."⁸

Mr. Arens visited Tokyo one month after Mr. Arafat. The main purpose of the trip was to open official consultations between Israel and Japan with a view towards strengthening bilateral relations and especially towards promoting trade. The follow-up meeting, held in Tokyo on 26-27 February 1990 between an Israeli delegation headed by J. Hadas, assistant director general of the Israeli Foreign Ministry, and Japanese officials, focused on the Arab boycott, trade, cultural exchange, and political affairs.⁹ According to the Israeli daily *Ma'ariv*, the fact that Japan agreed without conditions to hold such consultations showed a change in its previously-held policy not to have talks of this sort with Israel unless there was progress in the peace process.¹⁰

Despite the concern with even-handedness (Japan has decided to hold two sets of annual consultations, one with the PLO and one with Israel), Japan's official position on the Arab-Israeli question is still driven by the principles enunciated in the Nikaido statement. To these should be added the conviction, held for some ten years, that Israel and the PLO must recognize one

another, and support of the principle of an international conference, in which the PLO, as a party to the conflict, should participate.¹¹

More recently, certain Japanese official statements could seem to indicate a tilt towards the Palestinians. On the occasion of the Rishon le Zion affair when an Israeli gunman killed seven Arab laborers on 20 May 1990, a MOFA spokesman called "upon those involved, particularly on the Israeli side, to exercise self-restraint in coping with the situation" and went on to say that while the incident appeared personally motivated, "the reason for the ensuing escalation is that the Middle East peace process is at a standstill. Palestinians in the occupied territories are living under severe political, economic, and social conditions." The statement's conclusion, expressing strong hope that "a new Israeli government will be speedily formed and proceed to an early solution to the problem,"¹² would seem to hold Israel responsible for the impasse.

Moreover, at the time of the UN Security Council debate on the issue in May 1990, the Japanese government through its representative at the United Nations circulated a letter to the Secretary-General implying support of the proposed Security Council resolution and denouncing "the excessive force with which the Israeli authorities reacted to the subsequent popular demonstration of anger" and urging "the United Nations to take effective action in order to secure their [the Palestinians'] just treatment."¹³ Statements made at the time the new Likud-led government was formed on 11 June are in the same sense.

It is perhaps because of such statements that the PLO seems generally satisfied with the basic course of Japanese official policy (despite PLO requests for a more active Japanese commitment to the issue and for formal recognition) while Israelis complain privately of Japan's "bias," saying that "the Japanese always expect Israel to make all the concessions and the Arabs to make only verbal concessions."¹⁴

But the policy of maintaining links with both sides is firm. A MOFA official, commenting on the timing of the Arens and Arafat visits and the subsequent consultations with each party, aptly summarized the Japanese policy of "positive balance."

These [two visits and the ensuing consultations] were independently planned and prepared. We had no scheme to mediate between the two parties. Rather we were very careful not to give the impression that we were playing off the Israelis and Palestinians. The guidelines regulating these events were not to try to do what goes beyond our capabilities, and not to engage in double-dealing. What is important in Japan's contribution to Middle East peace is first to have well-founded principles and second to tell the parties frankly and clearly our positions based on those principles. When the first oil shock came, we fell into a panic because we had very weak relations with the parties in the Middle East and had only limited knowledge and information on the conflict. We can never repeat that.¹⁵

Political Parties

Most Japanese politicians have very limited interest in or knowledge of the Middle East in general and the Arab-Israeli conflict in particular. Especially since the oil glut, real parliamentary debate on the issue has been rare. Hence, it can be said that Japanese policies on the Palestine problem have been formed chiefly on the initiative of MOFA with little input from the political parties.

Nonetheless, there are certain tendencies within parties. The main government party, the Liberal Democratic Party of Japan, by and large subscribes to MOFA policies—its chief concern being a secure oil supply and stable trade relations. While more than half of the party members are indifferent to the Palestinian problem, the majority of the remaining members are probably pro-Arab or pro-Palestinian. The position of the Socialist Party of Japan, the main opposition, is more sympathetic to the Palestinians than is the government, demanding official recognition of the PLO as the “sole legitimate representative” of the Palestinian people, acknowledgement of the declaration of the Palestinian state, and the granting of official diplomatic status to Palestinian representatives. It also urges the government to take more effective measures than verbal protest to stop Israeli repression of Palestinians in the occupied territories.¹⁶ The Democratic Socialist Party, a small opposition party, is generally viewed as the most pro-Israel of the Japanese parties and maintains good relations with the Israeli Labor party; and the Japan Communist party has links with Rakkah.

Differences of opinion on the Middle East among Japanese politicians are often based more on personal perceptions than on party platforms, which is why a number of the associations formed by National Diet members to promote good relations either with the Arabs or the Israelis are bipartisan. For example, the Parliamentary League for Japan-Palestine Friendship, formed in 1979, groups 72 Diet members from all the major parties represented in Japan's two houses except the Democratic Socialists.¹⁷ It was this organization, currently headed by former Foreign Minister Masayoshi Ito (a Liberal Democrat), that was responsible for Arafat's first visit to Japan. The Japan-Israel Parliamentary Friendship League, established in 1984 on the occasion of an unofficial visit by David Kimche, director general of Israel's Foreign Ministry, also includes various parties among its 38 members.¹⁸ Its acting president is Nakayama Masaaki, a Liberal Democrat and ex-minister of Post and Telecommunications, replacing the former head of the Democratic Socialist Party. But the oldest and largest of the parliamentary organizations concerned with the Middle East is the Parliamentarians' League for Japan and Arab Friendship, established in 1973, which is composed of 118 Diet members all belonging to the main government party, the Liberal Democrats. This group, however, is not as active as it was previously.¹⁹

Business Circles

The 1980s saw a sharp decline in the Japanese business community's interest in the Middle East and the Palestine problem, dramatically illustrated by the differing responses to Arafat's successive visits to Japan. When the Palestinian leader first visited in October 1981, Shigeo Nagano, president of the Japanese Chamber of Commerce, and thirteen other business leaders went to great lengths to arrange meetings with him.²⁰ At his second visit in 1989, no prominent businessman even wanted to see him. Arafat's references at his public lecture in Tokyo to the potential market for Japanese goods of 200 million Arabs and Japan's dependence on Arab oil were undoubtedly expressions of his unhappiness at this trend.²¹

The present indifference of Japanese business circles to the Arab-Israeli conflict—which shows little sign of changing in the near future—can be traced both to the oil glut and to the perception that the oil trade is not necessarily connected to the Palestine problem. Moreover, some Japanese corporations are increasingly interested in trade with Israel, and believe that Arab divisions make collective retaliation against companies dealing with the Jewish state difficult. Meanwhile, Japanese imports from the Middle East, especially oil, are decreasing in monetary terms, from \$45 billion in 1980 (32 percent of total Japanese imports) to \$23 billion (11 percent of the total) in 1989 largely because of falling prices although there was also a reduction in volume. Imports from Saudi Arabia, Japan's largest Arab trading partner, declined from \$19.5 billion (13.9 percent of the total) in 1980 to \$10 billion (7.9 percent) in 1985 to \$7 billion (3.3 percent) in 1989. In contrast, imports from Israel (the most important being diamonds) have increased remarkably since 1985, although they are far smaller than those from the oil-producing countries. Japanese exports, despite fluctuations, show a similar trend: those to the Arab states are decreasing relative to previous levels while those to Israel (especially cars) are increasing.²²

Public Opinion

There has been no nationwide survey of public opinion on the Arab-Israeli conflict or the Palestine problem. Nonetheless, the annual survey conducted on foreign policy issues by the prime minister's office gives some indication of Japanese attitudes.²³ The survey shows, despite some fluctuation in the figures, a general trend of declining interest in the region through the 1980s, doubtless reflecting the impact of the oil glut. One of the survey questions was "What geographic areas most concern you?" to which respondents could give more than one answer. In 1980, the Middle East was second only to Asia, mentioned by 30 percent of the respondents (as opposed to 38 percent for Asia). By 1986, only 9.5 percent of the respondents mentioned the Middle East, which came in sixth place, falling far behind Asia (43.4 percent), North America (41.9 percent), and the Soviet Union/Eastern Europe

(24.2 percent).²⁴ (Because of the Gulf crisis, the Middle East figure may be as high in 1990 as it was in 1980; however, it has yet to be published.)

The question "With what area should Japan maintain closest economic ties?" to which only one answer was permitted showed a similar decline: 17.2 percent mentioned the Middle East in 1980 compared to 7.9 percent in 1983, 4.4 percent in 1986, and only 3 percent in 1989.²⁵

Despite this overall decline, however, there are numerous political, cultural, humanitarian, and religious groups and organizations promoting ties with either the Arabs or the Israelis.

During the 1960s and 1970s, the pro-Arab/Palestinian groups²⁶ were largely politically (or politico-economically) oriented and primarily comprised of two very different constituencies—leftists (including students, intellectuals, and labor activists), who were attracted by the idea of armed struggle against imperialism and international solidarity that they saw in the Palestine resistance, and businessmen, who were mainly interested in Middle Eastern oil. This situation changed in the 1980s. The involvement of the business community, as already mentioned, waned largely due to the oil glut, while the Japanese leftists became less active in this arena (as in others during this period). On the other hand, the extensive media coverage of the 1982 Lebanon invasion, and particularly the Sabra and Shatila massacres, shocked ordinary Japanese and called their attention for the first time to the plight and sufferings of the Palestinian people. Rallies were held protesting the Israeli invasion and petitions were circulated demanding an immediate Israeli withdrawal.

The result of this new interest was the emergence of groups that were more humanitarian than political, and more pragmatic than theoretical. For example, a foster parent organization for Palestinian orphans was set up after the Sabra and Shatila massacres on the initiative of Ryuichi Hirokawa, a photojournalist who had entered the camps just after the atrocity. The organization now includes more than 400 foster parents, has adopted 440 children, and since 1984 has sent more than 90 million yen (\$600,000) to the children through Bayt Atfal al-Sumud, a nongovernmental welfare organization in Lebanon.²⁷ The intifada has strengthened this general trend towards humanitarian and practical aid among the pro-Arab/Palestinian groups.

As for the pro-Israel associations in Japan, the oldest and largest is the Original Gospel Movement, a Christian revivalist group commonly known as "Makuya." Established by Ikuro Teshima, a charismatic leader from the non-church Christian movement, it began to send its followers to Israel in 1962 to study Hebrew and the scriptures. The group, which believes that the establishment of Israel foretells the coming of the Messiah, held a rally in Tokyo supporting Israel during the October 1973 war. Its publication, *Seimei no Hikari* (meaning "Shining of the Life") has a circulation of over 25,000.²⁸

Another important organization is the Japan-Israel Friendship Association, established in 1966, which has about a thousand members.²⁹ It sponsors various cultural activities and publishes *Gekkan Isuraeru* ("Monthly Israel").

Its president, Shintaro Ishihara, a well-known novelist and a Liberal Democratic member of the House of Representatives, criticized the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the occasion of Israel's 42nd anniversary on the grounds that it doesn't give due consideration to Israel and is too concerned about courting the Arabs' favor.³⁰

Although the numbers of people interested in the Arab-Israeli conflict might be increasing, it should be noted that the influence of these pro-Arab/Palestinian and pro-Israeli groups on national politics is minimal.

Summing up, sympathy with the Palestinians appears to be gradually increasing among the Japanese public at large, even as the interest of the business circles in both the Palestine issue and the Middle East as a whole is generally declining. The majority of Middle East specialists, whether journalists or academics, seem to be sympathetic to the Palestinian rather than the Israeli case. The number of people actively committed to either side, however, is considerably smaller than one finds in the countries of Europe and North America.

Afterword: The Gulf Crisis

After completion of this report, the Gulf crisis erupted. As a result, Japanese public interest in Middle East affairs has soared, especially after hostilities were launched mid-January. The level of interest in the region has now exceeded even that witnessed during the periods of the first and second "oil shocks," although this time more attention is paid to the political than to the economic dimensions, albeit with greater focus on the current aspects of the crisis such as military operations, diplomatic initiatives, and statements and decisions by President Bush, Saddam Hussein, and other actors. Despite this current orientation, however, more and more Japanese are asking such questions as: "What is the legacy of Western imperialism in the Middle East?" "What does 'linkage' of the Gulf and Palestinian issues mean?"

The Japanese people's growing interest in Middle East politics is chiefly due to anxiety that Japanese government measures, adopted under strong American pressures, will gradually involve the country in the war as a quasi-belligerent. One such measure is an additional \$9 billion in financial aid to the multinational forces—an amount beyond the previously pledged \$4 billion; half of which was for the coalition forces, and half was in economic assistance to Jordan, Egypt, and Turkey. An opinion survey in early February showed the latter \$9-billion allocation to be opposed by the larger part of the Japanese public, especially the majority of women.³¹ Most of the opposition parties (and perhaps some Dietmen of the ruling party as well) are highly critical of government actions, arguing that to help either of the belligerents in any way is not compatible with the constitutional principle categorically forbidding the use or threat of force in resolving international disputes.

Such anxieties were initially expressed in floods of letters to newspaper editors and in anti-war meetings, demonstrations, and petitions. Most of the

rallies, sponsored by various grassroots organizations, were small—usually from tens to hundreds—but they take place almost daily somewhere in the Tokyo metropolitan area. The largest anti-war rally so far, which mobilized about 10,000 people, was held on 7 February in Tokyo by the Japan Socialist Party and trade unions. A number of influential trade unions and religious groups have begun fundraising campaigns to provide humanitarian aid to people in the region—chartering airplanes and buses to evacuate war refugees from Jordan to Cairo, for example. The grassroots organization “Campaign for Palestinian Children” is calling for urgent donations for food for Palestinians in the occupied territories. Here one notes a striking contrast between the NGOs and the government, which seems reluctant to extend aid to civilians suffering from the war.

Meanwhile, more and more Japanese are taking interest in the historical background of the Middle East, including the origins of the Palestine problem, even though the government has rarely mentioned this issue since the crisis began. A ten-fold increase in sales of books dealing with the region—both popular and serious—has been noted since the war began.³² Public lectures and symposia on the Middle East and Islam are held throughout the country, often attracting larger audiences than similar events at the height of the oil shock. A public symposium on Islam and Islamic civilization on 11 and 12 February 1991, for example, drew about 600 people, whereas a year before attendance would have been at most a hundred. One effect in Japan of the Gulf crisis and subsequent war, therefore, has been to lead the Japanese people to seek a greater understanding of Middle East affairs, including the Palestine question.

NOTES

1. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (MOFA), *Chûtô Hunsô Kankei Shiryô Shû* [Documents on Conflicts in the Middle East], vol. 1 (1975), pp. 54-55.

2. This was the most controversial sentence hotly debated among the ministers and high officials of Japan. Some of them were strongly opposed to the expression “reconsider,” arguing that it was undiplomatic even to suggest to sever official ties with Israel. Masayoshi Ohira, then foreign minister, was reportedly against the statement, although Kakuei Tanaka, then prime minister, and a majority of officials were for it. The Saudis, it was said, had strongly urged that Japan use this expression if wanted to be free from the oil embargo. Finally, this economic consideration prevailed over the debate.

“The ministers then had little knowledge of the [Arab-Israeli] conflict, and did not understand what the word ‘reconsider’ really would mean,” one former MOFA official—who was against the statement at the time—told the author. (Personal interview, Toyko, 24 May 1990.)

There are several interesting books on this subject. See, for example, Yanagida Kinio, *Okami ga Yattekita Hi* [The Day When the Wolf Came] (Tokyo: 1979), esp. pp. 58-90; and Ishikawa Yoshitaka, *Oiru Gaikô Nikki* [A

Diary of the Oil Diplomacy], (Tokyo: 1983), pp. 63-65, 74-76, 224-28.

3. MOFA, *Gaimushô Kôhyô Shû*, vol. 3 (1981), p. 113. For more details on the development since 1973, see, for example, Eisuke Naramoto, “Japan Aligned with the PLO,” in *Japan Quarterly* (January-March 1990), p. 22.

4. Personal interview with the former official, Tokyo, 11 July 1990.

5. Personal interviews with MOFA officials, Tokyo, June 1990.

6. *Japan Times*, 4 October 1989.

7. *Japan Times*, 28 April 1990; and interviews with persons informed on the matters.

8. Personal interview with a MOFA official, 18 June 1990.

9. Personal interviews with MOFA officials, Tokyo, July 1990. Details of the consultation have not been published.

10. *Ma'ariv*, 26 February 1990.

11. “The Position of Japan on the Question of Peace in the Middle East,” unpublished paper furnished by a MOFA official, July 1990.

12. MOFA, “Statement by the Director-General for

Public Information and Cultural Affairs of the Foreign Ministry on the Rifle Shooting of Palestinians and Escalation of the Situation in Israeli-Occupied Territories," F.P.C. Press Release no. 0274-09 (Tokyo: Foreign Press Center, 22 May 1990).

13. Letter dated 31 May 1990 from the Permanent Representative of Japan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, (A/45/298, S/21339, 31 May 1990).

14. Personal interview with a diplomat, 13 July 1990.

15. Personal interview with the MOFA official, Tokyo, 5 June 1990.

16. Personal interview with Eiji Yasui, International Secretary of the Japan Socialist Party, Tokyo, 13 July 1990. He suggested economic sanctions to protest the measures taken by the Israelis to suppress the intifada, as a "personal view."

17. Telephone conversation with the office of Yoshiko Otaka, secretary general of the Parliamentary League for Japan-Palestine Friendship, 24 July 1990. The League's membership by political affiliation is 32 Liberal Democrats; 26 Socialists; 5 Kômeitô; 4 Communists; 2 Rengô; 2 Shinsei Club members; and 1 Independent. Ms. Otaka is a Liberal Democrat.

18. Telephone conversation with the office of Masaaki Nakayama, acting president of the Japan-Israel Parliamentary Friendship League, 2 July 1990. The League's membership by political affiliation is 33 Liberal Democrats; 1 Kômeitô; 1 Democratic Socialist; 1 Rengô; and 1 Independent. (When the late Kasuga was president, many Democratic Socialists were members).

See also Ben-Ami Shillony, "Japan and Israel: A Special Relationship," in *Japan and the Middle East in Alliance Politics*, ed. by R.A. Morse (Princeton, NJ: The Asia Program, Woodrow Wilson Center for Scholars, Princeton University, 1984).

19. Telephone conversation with the office of Takamori Makino, secretary general of the Parliamentarians' League for Japan and Arab Friendship, 24 July 1990.

20. *Japan Times*, 15 October 1981 and other Japanese newspaper evening editions, 14 October 1981.

21. The author attended the lecture. Also see Japanese newspapers, 3 October 1990.

22. Statistics on the custom clearance in Japan, ar-

ranged by the Japan External Trade Organization.

23. Naikaku Sôndaijin Kanbô Kôhshitsu, *Gaikô ni Kansuru Seronchôsa*, September 1980-October 1989. The surveys are not always conducted in the same month of each year.

24. This question was asked every year from 1980 to 1986.

25. This question was asked every year from 1980 to 1989, except 1988.

26. On these groups, the author interviewed Yoshiko Tanaka (a Japanese member of the ICCP), Kôichi Kobayashi (former secretary general of the Japan Palestine Congress), and others. See also Yasumasa Kuroda, "Japanese Perceptions of the Arab World: Their Nature and Scope," in R.A. Morse, ed., *op. cit.*, pp. 41-55, esp. pp. 47-48. The author, of course, is solely responsible for the analysis.

27. Another important humanitarian organization of this kind is the Campaign for Palestinian Children, which enlists about 3,000 "supporters" and "friends" in total. It has sent some 15 million yen (\$100,000) since 1986 to nongovernmental organizations in the Middle East for welfare projects for Palestinian children.

28. Ebisawa Yudo, ed. *Nihon Kirisutokyô Rekishi Dai-jiten* [Great Encyclopedia of the History of Christianity in Japan] (Tokyo: 1988), s.v. "Genshi Fukuin Kirisuto no Makuya;" also *Kirisutokyô Shinbunsha* [Newspaper Company of Christianity], *Kirisutokyô Nenkan* [Yearbook of Christianity], 1989 edition (Tokyo: 1989). According to Shillony, the membership of the group reached about 50,000. See Shillony, *op. cit.*, pp. 88-89.

29. Shiba Co., Inc., *Zenkoku Kakushu Dantai Meikan* [A Dictionary of Organizations and Groups in Japan], 1989 edition (Tokyo: 1989), s.v. "Nihon-Isuraeru Shinzen Kyôkai."

30. *Gekkan Isuraeru*, June 1990, p. 8.

31. For example, opinion survey by *Asahi Shinbun* newspaper, published on 5 February 1991. According to this, 39 percent of the questioned are for the proposed financial aid to the multinational forces, while 41 percent is against. As for women, only 28 percent are for it, 54 percent are against.

32. Telephone interview with Mr. Aira Kitagawa, a publisher who specializes books on the third world.