The war on
Immediately after completing the withdrawal from Gaza in August 2005, Israel stepped up Hamas and PIJ assassinations in the
In January 2006, Hamas won the
From the end of November 2006 until late February 2008—a full 15 months—the cease-fire held well, despite Israel’s search for soldier Gilad Shalit (who had been captured in June 2006) and its continued siege and routine military operations. On 27 February 2008, Israel launched Operation Hot Winter in response to Gaza rocket fire: 111 Palestinians (at least half of whom were civilians) were killed and over 400 Palestinians, mostly civilians, were wounded. Two Israeli soldiers and one civilian were killed. Between March and June 2008, Israel and Gaza continued to exchange attacks and rocket fire, spurring intensive Egyptian attempts to reach a cease-fire. On 19 June 2008, Hamas and Israel agreed “in principle” on a phased cease-fire to last for 6 months. Hamas largely observed the cease-fire until 4 November.
By the time Israel launched Operation Cast Lead
on 27 December 2008, the Gaza Strip had been under varying degrees of closure. Social and economic conditions in the Strip in late 2008 were dire, and Hamas faced growing domestic pressure to act or to renew the cease-fire under more favorable terms. As Hamas was contemplating its options, Israel assassinated a senior PIJ commander in
The Three-Phase Assault
The Israeli assault was planned as a three-phase operation: (1) an air assault to destroy a list of targets assembled over the previous 6 months; (2) a ground incursion into open and suburban areas to secure control of areas from which Palestinian rockets were fired into Israel and to pursue other Hamas-affiliated targets; and (3) deep incursions into Palestinian towns and camps so as to “deal a knock-out blow” to Hamas.
Phase One began with an air assault at midday on 27 December, hitting more than fifty targets across the Gaza Strip, including a police graduation ceremony that killed 60 cadets. By the end of the day at least 228 Palestinians had been killed and more than 700 wounded; it was the highest single-day Palestinian death toll in the occupied territories since 1967. The next week essentially consisted of a duel between Israeli air power (augmented by naval gunfire and artillery strikes) on the one hand, and Palestinian rocket and mortar fire aimed largely at the “Gaza envelope” (the Israeli localities surrounding the Strip) on the other. One Palestinian rocket hit
As Phase One unfolded, Israel’s main targets were (a) Hamas and the resistance’s military assets, including its rocket-launching and productions sites; (b) resistance leaders and military commanders, including the offices of PM
Phase Two began on the evening of 3 January 2009, with a massive artillery barrage. Ground forces were sent into Gaza for the first time: the Paratroops,
For the next two weeks, Israeli operations focused on controlling open areas and encircling towns and refugee camps but stopped short of making deep incursions into densely populated areas. After heavy fighting on the outskirts of the northern district of
During the next week of fighting, Israel significantly increased its air and naval attacks (even as
Casualties and losses
The figures for Palestinian casualties are mostly in the same range. The
Analysis and assessment
Despite causing widespread death and destruction, Israel failed to achieve a decisive or strategic victory in Cast Lead (or in its successive Gaza campaigns). Most Hamas leaders (and fighters) survived Cast Lead, and the group’s control of the Gaza Strip was not threatened. Furthermore, Hamas retained weapons and tunnels beneath the Gaza–Egypt border through which to smuggle more arms. Indeed, Cast Lead left Israel in a strategic quandary that it has yet to resolve: it needed to exert sufficient force to deter Hamas from attack or retaliation for Israeli actions, but it did not have the ability and/or will to reoccupy Gaza, which it would have had to do to defeat Hamas decisively. With no clear answer to “the day after” question, a reoccupation would enmesh Israel in a new long-term, costly, and open-ended presence with the constant threat that a more radical organization could take over Gaza after an Israeli withdrawal and/or in the absence of the
Cast Lead also reflected a significant shift in Israeli strategic thinking. The ability of the Palestinian resistance to fire rockets into Israel accelerated an already existing move within Israel toward “homeland defense” as a new and hitherto unprecedented addition to Israel’s traditionally offensive-minded doctrine. (This had been proposed in the Meridor Report in April 2006 but would become a formal part of Israeli doctrine only in 2015.) On an operational level, after 2008 Israel turned to technical/ technological defensive means, culminating in the deployment of the Iron Dome system in 2011.
During Cast Lead, Israel showed signs of investing in more effective means of defending its troops in the field, and it deployed its Trophy missile protective system against anti-tank missiles and RPGs on its latest Merkava-4 tank for the first time and used armored D9 bulldozers against resistance bunkers and defensive posts. It widely used drones in targeting and intelligence gathering operations; tested new means of digitized mapping and C4I systems; and employed robotic warfare, electronic and cyberwarfare, and dog sniffer teams. All of these methods were subsequently further integrated into Israel’s operational practices.
As for Hamas, its fighters relied on guerrilla warfare tactics; they sought to avoid large-scale open confrontations with the better-equipped Israeli forces and to make best defensive use of an urban environment that would negate some of Israel’s technical and tactical advantages. Tunnels were used for defensive cover from air and naval strikes and as command centers and munition and rocket production and stockpiling. The tunnels provided cover for surprise attacks and booby-traps, improvised explosive devices (IEDs), and other defensive means to harass and distract Israeli troops. Notably, Palestinian rocket attacks on southern Israel continued unabated throughout Cast Lead, albeit with variable frequency; 59 rockets were fired on the first day of hostilities, reaching a low of 9 on 10 January, then rising again to 19 on the last day, 18 January. The constant rate of rocket fire reinforced the perception that Israel had failed to achieve its stated objective.
For Hamas and the resistance movement, the takeaway from the Israeli attack of 2008 was that it should seek new means of challenging Israel and undermining its deterrence and defensive based-strategy through a trilateral approach comprising (a) acquiring or developing longer range and more accurate missiles that could strike deeper and with greater effect into Israel, (b) strengthening Gaza’s underground defensive complex so as to protect fighters and leaders and rocket production facilities, and (c) developing a more “offensive” doctrine based on tunnels and land and sea infiltration (such as frogmen units) into Israeli-held territories. With the Shalit experience in mind, Hamas and the resistance also placed great emphasis on taking Israeli prisoners as a means of exerting psychological pressure on Israel and pursuing the long-standing Palestinian national aspiration to free fighters and political prisoners held in Israeli jails. (Shalit was eventually released in 2011 in return for 1,027 Palestinians held in Israeli jails.) After 2008, Hamas also sought to develop a more indigenous rocket production capability so as to reduce its reliance on weapons smuggled in from abroad. Nonetheless, Hamas’s attempt to use force as a means of breaking the siege directly or by mobilizing international pressure on Israel was not successful in 2008, and its long-term strategy of using Gaza as springboard for expanding its political role and presence has met with limited success since.
After its experiences in 2006 in Lebanon and 2008–9 in Gaza, Israel sought to adapt to the difficulty of securing a clear military decision by using concentrated force as a means of deferring the next round of conflict, or what later came to be known as “mowing the lawn.” For Israel, the problem was that this assumed that the opposing side could not accumulate sufficient strength in the interim so as to raise the cost of future Israeli actions beyond what was acceptable or tolerable. Furthermore, and more broadly, what Hamas confirmed (and
Cast Lead had other consequences. With the growing ability of satellite TV to transmit live images from conflict zones (subsequently supplemented by social media), Israel had to contend with a worldwide public relations issue as the number of Palestinian civilian casualties rose, particularly that of women and children. The disproportion in casualties between the two sides also led to questions about the basis and legitimacy of Israel’s use of force. As a direct result, the United Nations Human Rights Council established a fact-finding mission to examine competing claims of war crimes during the conflict. The mission presented its report (the Goldstone Report ), and although it was ultimately disappointing, it nevertheless established an international precedent in holding Israel to account. The legal bases of Israel’s use of force and the question of disproportionality and Israel’s public image were to become a central feature of the 2008 war and subsequent campaigns. Despite Israel’s awareness of the constraining effect of such imagery on its military freedom of action, it has found no evident means of mitigating the negative impact of witnessing a regional superpower unleashing the full range of its military capabilities on a relatively small irregular force within a confined geographic space, packed with civilians.
Cohen, Raphael S. et al. From Cast Lead to Protective Edge: Lessons from Israel’s Wars in Gaza. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2017.
“Israel/ Gaza Operation ‘Cast Lead’: 22 Days of Death and Destruction.” London: Amnesty International, 2009.
Israeli army official website: https://www.idf.il/en/minisites/wars-and-operations/operation-cast-lead/.
Meridor, Dan and Ron Eldadi. Israel’s National Security Doctrine: The Report of the Committee on the Formulation of the National Security Doctrine (Meridor Committee), Ten Years Later. Tel Aviv: The Institute for National Security Studies, February 2019.
“Report of the United Nations Fact-Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict.” Geneva: UN Human Rights Council, September 2009.
“Rockets from Gaza: Harm to Civilians from Palestinian Armed Groups’ Rocket Attacks.” New York: Human Rights Watch, August 2009.
“Special Focus Operation Cast Lead.” Journal of Palestine Studies 151, no. 3 (Spring 2009). See in particular “Israeli Military Operations against Gaza, 2000–2008”: 122–38; “Prelude to Operation Cast Lead: Israel's Unilateral Disengagement to the Eve of War”: 139–68; “Statistical Indicators on the Eve of Operation Cast Lead”: 169–71; “The Israeli Arsenal Deployed against Gaza During Operation Cast Lead”: 175–91; “Day-by-Day Casualties, Israeli Sorties, and Palestinian Missiles Fired”: 201–6.
Zanotti, Jim et al. Israel and Hamas: Conflict in Gaza (2008–2009). Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2009.
The War on Gaza (2008-09): Operation Cast Lead/ Battle of al-Furqan
2008 to 2009
27 December 2008 - 18 January 2009
Letter Dated 4 May 2009 from the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the Security Council
4 May 2009
Report of the Fact-Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict (Goldstone Report)
25 September 2009