The Murison Commission Report
4 January 1934
Report of the Commission
Appointed by His Excellency the High Commissioner for Palestine
by Notification No. 1561 published in the Palestine
Gazette dated 6th November, 1933
Section I Preliminary.
Section II The sequence and nature of the events of the disturbances between the 13th October and the 3rd November, 1933.
A. The first disturbance at Jerusalem.
B. The disturbance at Jaffa.
D. The disturbance at Nablus.
C. The disturbance at Haifa.
E. The second disturbance at Jerusalem,
Section III The number and nature of the casualties.
Section IV The damage to property.
Section V General observations.
The terms of our appointment are “to enquire into and report upon the events immediately preceding the disturbances which took place in Palestine between the 13th October and the 3rd November, 1933, the precise sequence and nature of events within that period and the resultant casualties and damage to property.”
Disturbances in Palestine within the period named took place at only four centres, namely, Jerusalem, Jaffa, Haifa and Nablus. For the purpose of the enquiry we held sittings at three of these places – Jerusalem, Jaffa, Haifa. The first sitting was in Jerusalem and dealt with the first of the two disturbances in that city. Sittings in Jaffa and Haifa followed. The last sitting was held in Jerusalem again and dealt with the second disturbance in that city and also with the disturbance in Nablus. The reason for this distribution of sittings is to be found in the convenience of the witnesses, those for the Nablus disturbance being few in number and having easy access for examination at Jerusalem or (in one case) Haifa.
The dates of the disturbances within the period mentioned were as follows. The first disturbance in Jerusalem took place on the 13th October, The Jaffa disturbance occurred on the 27th October, that at Haifa on the 27th and 28th October, that at Nablus on the 27th October. The fifth disturbance took place at Jerusalem on the 28th and 29th October. Except in the case of Nablus we have visited the scenes of all the disturbances.
The total number of witnesses examined was ninety-three divided as follows: for the first Jerusalem disturbance fifteen; for the Jaffa disturbance thirty-three; for the Haifa disturbance twenty; for the Nablus disturbance five; and for the second Jerusalem disturbance twenty.
Of this total number fifty-five were of British, thirty-four of Palestinian, (twenty-seven Arabs, seven Jews), one of Syrian, one of German and two of American nationality. Of the same total of ninety-three witnesses, thirty were members of the Administration, forty-seven from the Police, two from the Army, three from the Air Force, and ten were independent. The Arab public, as a body, abstained from giving evidence. Only one Arab-apart from Arabs connected with the Government or the Services – gave evidence.
Prior to each sitting of the Commission public notice was given of the date of the sitting and an invitation given to anyone who wished to attend and give evidence.
With a view to making the report as clear as we can, we divide it into various sections dealing separately with the particular matters in regard to which we have been instructed to enquire and report.
The first section consists of these preliminary remarks.
The second section gives the narrative of the events which we find to have occurred in each of the five disturbances.
The third section deals with the number and nature of the casualities which occurred during the disturbances.
The fourth section deals with the damage to property.
The fifth section contains some general observations on the disturbances.
A. The First Jerusalem Disturbance.
On the 8th October, 1933, the Palestine Arab Executive Committee decided that a "general strike"; which in Palestine implies the cessation of business, the closing of shops and the stoppage or public transport, should be held on the 13th October and that on that day a large demonstration should be made in Jerusalem which should move from the gate of the Holy Mosque to the Holy Sepulchre, then to Jaffa Road via Sweiqat Allon ; then to the General Post Office and thence to the Damascus Gate in order that the Arab Executive should there deliver a statement to the demonstrators, after which they were to disperse.
It was further decided that a later meeting should be held to decide upon the holding of other demonstrations in Palestine. On the 9th October, Mr. Hall, the Officer Administering the Government, sent for Musa Kazim Pasha, President of the Arab Executive and pointed out to him that no political procession had been allowed in Palestine since the disturbances of 1929 and that Government would not allow a procession in Jerusalem, and advised him to have the resolution of the Arab Executive cancelled. The Officer Administering the Government further advised Musa Kazim Pasha to make any protest he desired through the legal channels and stated that he, the Officer Administering the Government, would bring such protest to the notice of the High Commissioner on his return.
The President stated that he himself could not cancel the resolution, but undertook to collect the members of the Arab Executive and to persuade them to send a delegation to the Officer Administering the Government to discuss their protest. No such delegation visited the Officer Administering the Government.
On the 11th October the Government issued a communiqué warning the public that any person taking part in a demonstration or procession would render himself liable to the penalties of the law.
On the same date the Acting Chief Secretary wrote to the Arab Executive informing them that a demonstration or procession would not be allowed and telling them that any representations made through legal channels would be submitted to the High Commissioner on his return.
By section 32 of the Police Ordinance, No. 17 of 1926, whenever an unlawful assembly, riot or disturbance of the peace has taken place or may be reasonably apprehended, the District Commissioner may by order put into force the provisions of this section which are (a) that any police officer may disperse any assembly whatever in any public place, etc., and (b) any person found in any public place in possession of any knife, stick, bludgeon, etc. or any person inciting others to assemble, etc. may be arrested without warrant. A notice under this section was issued by the Acting District Commissioner, Jerusalem District, on the 9th October.
By section 33 (2) of the Police Ordinance the District Superintendent of Police may issue a notice requiring any person convening or collecting a procession which, in the judgment of the District Commissioner. if uncontrolled, may be likely to cause a breach of the peace, to apply for a licence to the District Commissioner. A notice under this section was issued by the District Superintendent of Police, Jerusalem District, on the 10th October, 1933. No application for permission to hold a procession in Jerusalem on the 13th October was made to the District Commissioner and no such permission was given by him.
On the morning of the 13th October the feeling in Jerusalem was strained and the District Superintendent of Police was of opinion that trouble might be anticipated.
It was decided not to interfere with the crowds leaving the Mosque after mid-day prayer so long as they were in the narrow streets or the Old City, but, if on leaving the Old City they attempted to form a procession or to make a demonstration, to disperse them. For this purpose forces of police were posted at the Jaffa Gate, the New Gate and the Damascus Gate, and a force of police was also posted in the Old City near the Mosque.
Instructions were issued by the Officer Administering the Government that the greatest possible restraint should be used by the police and by the District Officers and that, if possible, the statement that was to be made by Musa Kazim Pasha was to be taken from him· in the form of a petition.
While the people were in the Mosque area, a District Officer tried to persuade some of the more influential persons not to try and have a procession, but to hand in their petition to the District Commissioner.
At about 12.20 p.m. the people left the Mosque. The crowd was then estimated by one witness at between six and seven thousand and according to him was in a somewhat excited condition and was chanting and shouting “Allah el Akbar”. Musa Kazim Pasha was in the crowd and a party of veiled Arab women brought up the rear of the crowd.
It was anticipated that the crowd would leave the City by the Jaffa Gate and attempt to reach the Government Offices by following a route outside the City wall which would have been in accordance with the resolution of the Arab Executive issued on the 8th October, but just before reaching the Jaffa Gate, the crowd turned to the right and took a shorter route inside the walls of the Old City towards the New Gate. In consequence or this, some of the police at the Jaffa Gate were moved to the New Gate and some from the Damascus Gate were also moved to the New Gate. The map of Jerusalem shows the Jaffa Gate on the west of the Old City, the New Gate al the north-west and the Damascus Gate, immediately above which are the Government Offices, at the north.
On this new route the people had to pass the District Commissioner's Office. This they did at about 12.45 p.m. Owing to the narrowness of the streets, it is difficult to distinguish a procession from a body of people all of whom are moving in the same direction, but on passing the District Commissioner’s Office it appears that there were leaders leading the crowd. The District Commissioner attempted to induce these leaders to leave the crowd, in particular Musa Kazim Pasha, but they were prevented from doing so on account of the people on each side of them.
After the crowd had passed, the District Commissioner hurried round the outer line to the New Gate and was there in time to meet the crowd and with the District Superintendent of Police tried to persuade the people to disperse. The District Commissioner and the District Superintendent of Police went some distance into the crowd to Musa Kazim Pasha, who is an old man and appeared to be in difficulties. Their object was to get him out for his own protection.
The force of police at the New Gate was under the command of Mr. Kingsley-Heath and numbered approximately fifty. This force was drawn up as a cordon across the Suleiman Road (shown on the map as Suleiman Street) to prevent the crowd on leaving the New Gate turning to the right and proceeding down the Suleiman Road towards the Government Offices.
The crowd was excited on reaching the New Gate and was being incited by certain leaders to go on. It was headed by a number of young men, not of a good type.
The crowd pressed against the cordon and in Mr. Kingsley-Heath's opinion it was obvious the crowd was not going to disperse but was determined to break through. The District Superintendent of Police, after calling upon the crowd to go back and disperse and blowing a whistle, ordered a baton charge. The police then engaged the crowd and drove them mainly back in the direction or the New Gate, but some went up Suleiman Road towards the Post Office, i.e. in the opposite direction to Government Offices.
The District Commissioner had been caught in the crowd in his attempt to get Mousa Kazim Pasha out, but he was now able to bring out Musa Kazim Pasha and other members of the Arab Executive and they were allowed to pass through the police cordon and proceed down the hill.
The crowd which had been driven back through the New Gate now began to throw stones, rocks and shoes at the police and similar missiles were also being thrown from the roofs of houses and in consequence a second baton charge was ordered. This charge drove the crowd back through the New Gate into the City. They were followed by the District Superintendent of Police telling them to go home. A short distance inside the New Gate the street forms a “ T” and on reaching this point the crowd again stoned the police and it became necessary again to use batons. This dispersed most of the crowd.
Meanwhile the persons who had been driven up the hill towards the Post Office were driven further up the hill by the police and a police cordon was thrown across the road at the Post Office. After these charges, the District Commissioner was able to persuade the people to disperse and by 2 p.m. most of them had gone and he was able to return to his office.
Some minutes after the baton charges, the party of Moslem women arrived at the New Gate from the City and were allowed to pass through the police cordon in the direction of the Damascus Gate. According to Mr. Kingsley-Heath they numbered some twenty or thirty and were accompanied by one or two men. Flight-Lieutenant Domville puts the numbers rather higher and explains that the men, some of whom were the husbands of some of the women, insisted upon accompanying them.
This party on its way to the Damascus Gate was reinforced by other persons and by the time it reached the Damascus Gate this party and the crowd there was estimated by the District Officer at about five hundred and by the Deputy District Superintendent of Police who was in command of the police at the Jaffa Gate at about fifteen hundred to two thousand. The District Officer estimates the women at sixty or seventy. Mr. Moody, Acting Chief Secretary, who saw the episode from the Government Offices says that the area of the Damascus Gate was not densely packed with people and estimates that there were probably about two hundred.
Before the party from the New Gate reached the Damascus Gate they were addressed by the District Officer and asked to disperse. They did not do so and the force of police at the Damascus Gate was stoned by the crowd anti the women became troublesome to the police, screaming at them and waving handkerchiefs at them. The crowd was at its noisiest outside the Government Offices which are close to the Damascus Gate and some women are stated to have been kicking against the gate of Government Offices.
At this time the force of police at the Damascus Gate numbered sixty, of whom twenty were mounted.
It became necessary for the police to use batons on the crowd. A charge was made by the mounted men which drove the crowd to the Damascus Gate, but as the police were still being stoned a further charge was made by the dismounted men which drove the crowd through the Damascus Gate into the Old City.
The women were involved in the crowd when the charges were made, but were extricated by the District Officer and eventually sent home. None of them was injured. Some of this crowd were also dispersed in the direction of the Jericho Road.
The total casualties treated at the Government Hospital were five police and six members of the public. With the exception of two police the injuries treated were not serious and consisted chiefly of slight contused wounds. Of these two police, one had an arm broken and other bruises and the other had a contused wound on the head which necessitated his being kept in hospital for a day or two.
B. The Jaffa Disturbance.
The material for the narrative of the Jaffa disturbance rests on the evidence of thirty-three witnesses and upon a number of photographs and various documents. As in all of these disturbances most of the witnesses belong to the Government or one of the Services. We have also, however, the evidence of four persons who are entirely unconnected with Government. It is fortunate that this latter class of witness substantially confirms the story of the disturbance as told by the Government witnesses.
Although the incidents of the disturbance all took place within the hours of daylight on one day and, in fact, substantially between the hours of 12 noon and 1.30 p.m., the rapidity with which the events succeeded each other and the sporadic nature of the conflicts between the crowd and the police tend to some confusion in ascertaining the precise nature of the events, but nevertheless the material incidents can be ascertained with what we regard as sufficient accuracy.
Before we come to the narrative of the actual events of the disturbance it will be convenient to refer to some matters which led up to it.
The idea of a demonstration at Jaffa originated from the Arab Executive at Jerusalem. The date originally fixed for it was the 20th October, but, it is said, this was afterwards altered to the 27th because the Jaffa Lawn Tennis Tournament was fixed for the 20th, and one of the leaders was much interested in the Tournament.
The actual route of the procession to take place was prescribed by the Committee of the Moslem Christian Association at Jaffa and the Executive Committee of the Palestine Arab Youth Congress in Jaffa. It started from the Mosque and went along Port Head, then up the road called Ajami Hill or Ajami Road; then along the Salahi Road and King George's Avenue to the bandstand where it was to end. This is referred to as the “long” route.
It appears that on Monday, the 23rd October, Mr. Crosbie, the District Commissioner, conferred with His Excellency the High Commissioner in regard to what was likely to happen.
On Tuesday, the 24th October, the District Commissioner interviewed the Jaffa leaders. He informed them that he would not allow a procession by the Jong route to be held, but, in order that they might “save their faces” with the Arab Executive at Jerusalem, he offered to receive an Arab delegation, if it came from the Mosque gate in the Clock Tower Square, at his offices which were situated just across the square. In fact, he was ready to receive a peaceful presentation of grievances, but not to countenance any defined public procession. This attitude was in conformity with his instructions from His Excellency the High Commissioner.
The local Arab leaders refused this offer. They made a counter-suggestion that they should be allowed to form a procession from the other Mosque gate, which is situated in Port Road, to his offices; this being by fifty yards a longer route than the very short one proposed by the District Commissioner, but a route at the same time very considerably shorter than the route which the local leaders had contemplated in the first instance. The route of the countersuggestion was accepted by Mr. Crosbie on behalf of the Government. It is in future referred to as the “short” route.
It is quite clear from the evidence that there was a serious divergence of opinion among the Arab Party in regard to· which of the two routes the proposed procession would follow. The Extremist Party, consisting of the younger Arabs, insisted that the procession should take the long route. The Moderate Party, which consisted of the older Arabs and included the President of the Arab Executive in Jerusalem, Musa Kazim Pasha (who had come to Jaffa to take part in the demonstration in Jaffa), favoured the short route.
The difference between the long route and the short route is of particular importance. The Government had stated clearly that they would regard a Procession by the long route as illegal and would disperse it by police action. They had, however, intimated, through Mr. Crosbie, that they would not so regard what he calls the “transit” from the Mosque Gate by the short route, and that if the short route were taken there would be no interference by the police.
It appears. however, that in the meantime other leaders of the Arab Executive in Jerusalem had arrived in Jaffa from Jerusalem. They supported the Extremist Party. Arab meetings were then held in Jaffa on Thursday, 26th October, and on the morning of Friday, 27th October, apparently to decide which route should be taken. In the end, however, no actual decision was reached. It further appears that even after the procession had commenced there was still no certainty as to which route it was going to follow. This circumstance greatly increased the difficulties of the police both in making arrangements for and in dealing with the situation.
In narrating the events in the first riot at Jerusalem on the 13th October we have referred to the legal position between the Government and the participants in these processions, and there is no need to repeat the law there stated. It is enough to say that in Jaffa as in Jerusalem, the requisite notices were given, and the position in Jaffa on the 27th October (as in Jerusalem on the 13th October) was that no permission had been either asked for or given for the holding of the procession. The result, therefore, was that immediately the procession turned, as it did, away from the Square (where the District Commissioner's Offices were situated) into Ajami Road it abandoned the short route and was, for the time being, committed to the long route. It thereupon, if not before, became an illegal procession. It would, in fact, seem to be the case that the Extremist Party had been determined all along to force the procession by the long route without regard to any question of its legality.
We come now to the actual events or the disturbance.
The District Commissioner, Mr. Crosbie, a very competent witness, said that on Friday morning, 27th October, there was no particular appearance or trouble in the town before 10 a.m. It is generally agreed, however, that there was considerable tension in the atmosphere. This was increased at about 10 a.m. by a slight disturbance created by the arrival of a party of Arab ladies from Jerusalem. They went to an office in the Ajami Road where some inflammatory speeches were delivered to the crowd, which now numbered about one thousand. The Ajami Road leads southward from the main Square in which the principal events of the riot took place. The Square is referred to sometimes as Governorate Square, but generally as the Clock Tower Square, or simply as the Square. A little later some other slight disturbances took place in the Ajami Road in addition to that following the arrival of the ladies from Jerusalem.
At about 11:30 a.m. the mid-day prayer commenced at the Mosque, which apparently was filled with a number of people far in excess of an ordinary congregation at mid-day.
At 12.5 p.m. after the prayers were finished, the persons in the Mosque came out into Port Road and joined the crowd of people already assembled in Port Road. A sort of procession was formed. A large number of people gathering from the adjoining streets followed. They were armed with sticks and the crowd increased rapidly. One witness (Inspector Selim Hanna) says that four thousand people had been waiting in the Square before the Mosque prayers began, and that of these some went into the Mosque and the rest waited on in the Square and in Ajami Road and the adjoining roads to join the procession when it began after prayers were finished.
Where Port Road comes into the Clock Tower Square, Musa Kazim Pasha was seen making an attempt to turn the procession northwards through the Square to the District Commissioner's Offices. This was an effort' to make the procession take the short route, and was in accordance with the Moderate policy. The Extremist Arabs, however, prevented this diversion and turned the procession southwards up Ajami Road, that is, along the line of the long route.
At this point, Crosbie says there was “a perfect forest of sticks” waving in the air and Judge Copland in his evidence uses the same expression. The photographs show the crowd waving their sticks.
The head of the procession, following a lane opened up by the crowd, now advanced hall-way up the hill called Ajami Rood. The photograph shows this lane clearly. Then a curious and unexplained incident occurred. The crowd suddenly turned round and faced the Square, away from which they had hitherto been going. They, in fact, abandoned the long route. They now advanced down Ajami Road towards the Square crying “Aleihem”, that is, “Attack them”. In this Square the police were drawn up in the form of a cordon. There were sixty foot police and forty mounted police behind them.
The temper of the crowd at this moment is described by almost all the witnesses in terms which show that their attitude was in a high degree hostile. They are described as “menacing'” and “truculent” and “dangerous”. Many of the photographs exhibited confirm this view.
The number of the crowd at this point has been variously estimated. Mr. Crosbie says they were ten thousand in number. Mr. Nashasbibi says there were between two thousand and three thousand. Judge Copland says there were between six and seven thousand. Mr. Faraday's estimate is between seven thousand and eight thousand. Mr. Cafferata's estimate is between three and four thousand. Flight-Lieutenant Domville says six thousand. It is difficult to arrive at any definite figure. From the various photographic exhibits it is quite, clear that the assembly had reached an alarming size. We have ascertained that the area covered by the crowd in the Square and the adjoining streets was approximately 2960 square yards, and we are informed that in England the number of a crowd is calculated at three persons to the square yard. This would indicate that the Jaffa crowd was 8,880. Upon the whole, we estimate that the number was something over seven thousand.
Mr. Faraday who was in command was now in an exceedingly difficult· position. With a hundred police, sixty on foot and forty mounted, all unarmed, except tor batons, he was face to face with an excited menacing mob of seven thousand people, very many of them armed with offensive weapons. These weapons are described as being of various kinds, such as bars of iron, staves, heavy stones, butcher's hooked irons, saws, and chains. A number of them were exhibited to us. We also saw lumps of iron, scale-weights of two and three pounds each, and a nondescript collection of sharp-pointed iron pegs, etc. All we need say of these weapons is that they were very definitely dangerous. Many of them were photographed as they lay in the streets.
The first action by the police was an appeal by Mr. Faraday, and (as is indicated in one photograph) by Inspector Faiz Istambuli calling upon the crowd in Arabic to disperse.
This appeal produced no effect and a series of events followed in rapid succession. Mr. Faraday ordered a baton charge, with the necessity for which the District Commissioner in his evidence before us expressed his entire agreement. The foot-police first rushed on the crowd and then opened out to allow the mounted police to come in between them and force back the crowd. This first baton charge was definitely timed by Mr. Pollock to have taken place at 12.11 p.m. The charge was conducted by Mr. Cafferata with thirty-eight men and Mr. Broadhurst with twenty-four men, sixty-two in all. The result was that the crowd was forced back about ten yards up the hill called Ajami Road. To that extent Ajami Road was clear; and the comers of the two roads running into the Clock Tower Square from opposite sides, namely, Port Road and Siksik Street, were also clear. One photograph shows the· position at this moment. Two British constables were badly wounded by knives in the back in this – the first baton charge .
The crowd, however, almost immediately re-formed and attacked the police with a shower of brickbats, stones, table-tops, bottles, pieces or wood and iron, etc., thrown from the roofs of houses or from the street. Against this attack a second baton charge was ordered. This baton charge, which proceeded on the same lines as the first, resulted in the crowd being pushed back twenty yards further than the point to which they had been previously forced back.
The crowd, however, again returned to' the attack and a third baton charge followed; but, probably through the denseness of the crowd, it had little effect. It was now about 12.15 p.m.
The position now became so threatening that a firing party, which had hitherto been kept out of sight in the Police Barracks, was ordered out into the Square. They formed a line facing the crowd on a level with the Clock Tower. The firing squad consisted of fifteen men. The evidence clearly establishes· that at this point Mr. Faraday again warned the crowd to disperse. Mr. Faraday says so himself and his statement is confirmed by that of Judge Copland.
At this moment and before any volley was fired some mounted horses rushed into the Square from Suq el Khudra and Siksik Street and from Ajami Road. These, through slipping on the asphalt, fell down with their riders and created a good deal of confusion. Judge Copland says there were a dozen or fifteen riderless horses in the Square. Constable Thomson says there was “a terrible chaos”. It will appear later where these mounted horses came from.
It is to be noted that after the second baton charge and before any firing by the police there is evidence that some shots had been fired by the crowd at the police from the neighbourhood of Siksik Street. This is clear from whet is said by Judge Copland, Flight-Lieutenant Domville and a business man who was among the crowd. The shower of stones· and missiles of all sorts continued to be thrown at the police.
Mr. Faraday then at 12.20 p.m. ordered his firing party to fire. The fire was controlled, and consisted of one volley of one shot from each of the fifteen men. One witness, Mr. Nashashibi, says this first volley was fired in the air, but there is no other evidence to support that statement and it would seem to be incorrect. All the witnesses agree that the first volley produced very little, if any, effect on the crowd.
We may refer here to an incident related by Constable Thomson. He says that just after the first volley was fired he rode down the Port Road to the arch beyond the Mosque Gate. Several Palestinians had fallen from their horses there owing to the slippery ground. He ordered them to remount and while one constable had one foot in the stirrup an Arab standing on the top of the arch dropped a large building stone, a foot square, from a height of ten feet on to the constable's head and killed him. Immediately afterwards a similar stone was thrown at the same constable from the same place. It struck him on the face and smashed it in.
Then Mr. Faraday (referring to the collapse of the horses already mentioned) called out to the District Commissioner, Mr. Crosbie, “Horses are no good; only rifles are any good, can I shoot again”? The District Commissioner gave his consent and at the same time the Superintendent of Police, Mr. McConnell, said to Mr. Faraday, “Hold your fire as long as possible”.
Mr. Faraday then ordered a second volley to be fired.
The fire, as before, was controlled and consisted of one round. This volley stopped the advance of the crowd which, in fact, gave way. The police moved up to the head of the Square and formed in a semi-circle commanding the three roads of approach to the Square, namely, Ajami Road in front, Siksik Street on the left, and Port Road on the right.
In this new position the firing party divided into three sections and fired a third volley, each section firing down one of the three named streets. The fire in the case of this third volley was independent. It took place about 12.25 p.m.
While the police were in this position they were very heavily attacked with missiles from all sides, particularly from a café called the Zarafieh Café at the corner- of the Square and Siksik Street. The police found it necessary to fire into the cafe to clear it. As a result of these operations the Square and the three roads of approach were now fairly clear.
We have hitherto dealt exclusively with the operations in the Clock Tower Square and the three roads of approach to it. It is now necessary to consider what was happening in other parts of the town.
On the morning of Friday, the 27th, Mr. Faraday had posted a party at Suq Salahi, that is, the Salahi Market. It comprised one British inspector (Inspector Black), one sub-inspector, three non-commissioned officers and forty-five other ranks (Palestinian), one troop of Palestinians comprising three non-commissioned officers and twenty-two other ranks under Corporal Buggey of the British Police. Mr. Stafford was in command of this party. It was placed at this point because it enabled him to meet the head of the Procession on the route to King George's Avenue which was part of the originally contemplated long route for the procession.
About the same time as the baton charges in the Clock Tower Square occurred (that is, about 12.15 p.m.) Mr. Stafford was attacked by a mob coming from the direction of Ajami Road down Suq Salahi. Another part of the mob came along Siksik Street. The mob armed themselves with iron bars and wooden staves torn from shops. Mr. Stafford's force was unarmed. Mr. Stafford had with him two mounted troops and one of these he now sent against-the crowd in Siksik Street. This troop broke through the crowd and rushed into the Square and slipped down on the asphalt creating the confusion which we have already mentioned. Subsequently Mr. Stafford's force was pushed back into King George's Avenue. This was about 1.15 p.m. There, at the point where Jerusalem Road meets King George's Avenue, Mr. Stafford came upon a half-section of armoured cars ( that is, two cars) in charge of Flight-Lieutenant Grace. As Mr. Stafford was being subjected to heavy shower of stones and missiles from the mob he asked Flight-Lieutenant Grace to fire upon them. This officer said he could not fire without orders, and when asked if he could get orders he said, according to Mr. Stafford's evidence, that his wireless was out of order. Anyhow all he did was to move his armoured cars (or one of them) further into view of the mob. Flight-Lieutenant Grace incidentally was fired upon; but, upon turning his turret against the mob, he was afterwards left alone. Mr. Stafford himself' was hit and produced a cigarette case which was in his pocket and had been broken by the stone. Apparently Mr. Stafford's men fell back at first, but eventually rallied and drove the mob down King George's Avenue. At this point Corporal Henry with two riflemen arrived. He had a revolver in his hand and said “Shall we open fire?”. Mr. Stafford agreed, and they fired twice into the crowd. Further fighting took place with stones and two revolver shots were again fired at the mob.
Soon afterwards, in answer to a telephone message to the District Superintendent of Police, Mr. Stafford received reinforcements in the shape of a tender, with eight riflemen in it. Mr. Stafford sent away nine casualties in the tender, and took these eight riflemen and eight foot-men and moved back to the top of King George's Avenue and back into the Suqs from which he had previously· retired. No further firing took place and the mob appears gradually to have dispersed. Mr. Stafford remained in the Suqs until about 2.30 p.m. when all was quiet.
Another disposition by the police consisted of a troop placed at the French Hospital at the top of Ajami Hill. It comprised three non-commissioned officers and twenty other ranks (Palestinian). They were armed only with batons. There is no evidence that they took any substantial part in the suppression of the disturbance.
We revert now to the events in Clock Tower Square where the police had established order in the Square and the three approaches to it. Having done this, Mr. Faraday considered that he ought to go and take assistance to Mr. Stafford who he knew was unarmed. He therefore dismounted, left Mr. Cafferata in charge of the Square, and accompanied by Constable Stinson and Corporal Rees went up a back street towards Suq Salahi. On his way he met with considerable resistance. He narrowly escaped being hit by a large stone thrown from the roof, and was forced to fire. When he arrived there he could not find Mr. Stafford who, in fact, had previously been forced back in the direction of King George's Avenue. In Dr. Bordcosch Street a revolver was fired at Mr. Faraday and he replied with two rounds.
Mr. Faraday then went to the Old City. This quarter consists of very narrow streets in which there were snipers. In fact, a bullet from the rioters had already hit Mr. Broadhurst's helmet and Mr. Cafferata had had to fire at armed persons in this area. Mr. Faraday, therefore, contented himself with stationing some police at intervals round the outer boundaries of the Old City and leaving it with that guard.
Mr. Faraday then combed through the Bargareh area. and returned to the Square. He says that he himself fired nine rounds between leaving the Square and returning to it. His companion, Constable Stinson, fired four shots behind the Central Police Stables in the Port Road at persons who fired either with revolvers or pistols. Further, he says, Corporal Rees while with him fired three shots at two hotels from which he was being fired at. Constable Savory who joined him later fired three revolver shots, one behind the District Commissioner's Offices and the other two al hotels from which he was being fired at.
Mr. Faraday then visited the French Hospital troop and recalled them.
After these events the disturbance appears practically to have ceased and everything was quiet by about 1.15 p.m.
This is the end of the Jaffa disturbance, but there are some incidental matters to which reference should be made.
The number of rifle and revolver shots fired by the police during the riot has been given by Mr. Chowne, who, as the storekeeper for the Jaffa Division, was in charge or the ammunition. The number fired is given as 102 rifle shots and 43 revolver shots. Full details are shown in Mr. Chowne's return. We have been at some trouble to try and ascertain whether the return is reliable. While we have come to the conclusion that the numbers given are substantially accurate, we think that some better method should be devised of registering in a book the ammunition received by and distributed from the ammunition store.
The number and nature of the casualties in the Jaffa riot are shown in the return given to us by Dr. Hasan Shukri Khalidi, who was on October 27th and later in charge in the Government Hospital. It includes all cases sent to the Government Hospital and the French Hospital. List ‘A’ includes all (except one Palestinian constable, Abdul Latif Osta, No. 408) who were killed or died of wounds. There were, with Abdul Latif Osta, fifteen of these altogether, and they all died of bullet wounds in the body or head. List ‘B’ shows those injured by gunshot wounds. Twenty-one cases were sent to the Government Hospital and eighteen to the French Hospital. List ‘C’ comprises minor injuries, none of them serious. This may, we think, be accepted as a substantially accurate statement of all the deaths and injuries. caused in the Jaffa riot.
It should be mentioned also that during the whole day of the 27th October a military force was ready in Jaffa at the disposal of the Government. In fact, apart from what Flight-Lieutenant Grace did with his armoured car, the military force was never called upon and took no part in the operations. It consisted of a company of Royal Ulster Rifles. This company, less one platoon, was at the Municipal Stables in King George's Avenue. The platoon was at the Governorate. Four armoured cars were also available and a battalion, less one company of Royal Ulster Rifles at Sarafand, fourteen miles away.
Another incident, of a very regrettable nature, concerns the death of a small boy of six years old. It appears that the boy was playing with some other children in an uncovered yard which was enclosed by a tin fence. A bullet was fired, by whom is unknown, from the direction of Butmeh Street, some sixty yards away. It penetrated the tin fence and killed the boy. It is obvious that the killing was unintentional for nobody could be seen in the yard from the other side of the tin fence. This is all the available information in regard to this painful episode.
C. The Haifa Disturbance.
As in Jerusalem and Jaffa notices under sections 32 and 33 of the Police Ordinance were issued, dated the 10th and 11th October.
On the 27th October shortly after 1 p.m. the District Commissioner, Northern District, whose headquarters are at Haifa, heard of the disturbance in Jaffa and by about 3 p.m. the news on that disturbance began to filter through to the populace of Haifa, the reports greatly exaggerating the casualties.
At sunset it was reported to the District Commissioner that people were gathering at the Mosque which is shown on the map of Haifa.
At 7.15 p.m. persons arrived from Jaffa by train and proceeded to the Mosque where their accounts of the events in Jaffa excited the crowd, estimated at some two thousand, which was assembled there.
At about 7.30 p.m. the police received a report that some young Arabs were interfering with car drivers and Jewish people generally. A police patrol was sent out and this interference was stopped without incident. A movement of people in a westerly direction, that is towards the Government Offices, then began. This took the crowd past the police barracks. The crowd were turned back by the police and followed and the police made a line across the street. Some argument ensued and the crowd was driven back by a mixed British and Palestinian baton party. The crowd, however, returned armed with large stones, a supply of which was handy owing to street repairs being in progress, and bombarded the police who were forced to take cover. Another baton charge was made without success and the crowd came on again, driving the police back in the direction of their barracks where rifles and ammunition are kept and where at this time some prisoners were in the lock-up. In this encounter six police had been injured by stones.
Major Foley, District Superintendent of Police, then warned the crowd which numbered about two thousand that if they did not disperse he would be forced to fire on them and this warning was repeated by a Palestinian Officer in Arabic. The firing party was brought out in order that the crowd might see their rifles, but the crowd stoned that party which was forced to take cover, and continued to stone the police barracks with road metal of sufficient size to break some of the wooden window frames.
Major Foley, having again warned the crowd, again called out the firing party which consisted of four British constables, two of whom fired one rifle shot each. The crowd ran away but immediately returned and threw a volley of stones at the police and two more rifle shots were fired (making a total of four shots fired). This was followed by a baton charge which drove the crowd back to the Mosque. During this charge one British constable was seriously stabbed in the back. One man who was in the front of the crowd received a bullet wound. From the stones and boulders afterwards found in the police barracks, it was clear that a savage attack had been made.
Owing to the swill action which had been taken by the police, no further incident occurred on that day.
During the night of the 27th/28th October, the District Commissioner had a meeting with Arab notables who promised to help to prevent further disturbance and it appears that they did what they could.
During that night troops were also put into emergency positions in Haifa and in other parts of the Northern District. The military force in Haifa was one company stationed at Hadar Hacarmel.
Early in the morning of the 28th hostile crowds began to collect in the east end or Haifa and barricades were thrown by the populace across the roads. Police patrols were sent out to deal with this situation.
At about 8.45 a.m. a party of about three hundred excited Arabs suddenly came in the direction of the police barracks throwing stones and shouting. British Inspector Mosedale, who was standing in the doorway of the barracks, pointed a rifle at them and they ran away. Shortly afterwards a crowd of some six or seven hundred armed with sticks and stones returned to the police barracks.
A party of six police tried to get this crowd to disperse, but they were unable to do so and the crowd began again to stone the barracks.
Two constables with rifles were brought out. After blowing a whistle and calling upon the crowd to stop British Inspector Mosedale ordered two rounds to be fired at the legs of the crowd, but as the crowd still came on, more rounds were fired and two of the crowd were wounded.
A party of younger Arab notables then came and offered to use their influence lo persuade the crowd to disperse and Major Foley who had arrived while the firing was in progress accepted this offer, and they were able to persuade the crowd to go back slowly. A party or police following the crowd in an easterly direction were fired upon by a man with a revolver.
At about 9 a.m. persons in the vicinity of the railway station began stoning cars and lorries and constructing barricades and as there were no police in the vicinity. Mr. Webb, the General Manager of the Palestine Hallways, communicated with Major Foley by telephone. It is possible that the presence of this crowd at the railway station was to some extent due to the expected arrival by the morning train of certain leaders who had been arrested in connection with the Jaffa disturbance.
Before the police arrived, an attack was made on a Jewish lorry which had stopped owing to a puncture. The driver and passengers were seriously injured by stones and the lorry was burnt. It should, however be noted that some Arabs came to the assistance of the occupants of the lorry and took them to a place of safety.
At about the same time a taxi, the property of a Jew, was prevented from moving by barricades near the Mosques and stoned by the crowd. The windows were broken and the persons therein were injured, two of them seriously.
At 9.30 a.m. the morning train arrived from Jaffa and some stones were thrown at it by the crowd which by this time was of considerable size. An unarmed party of British and Palestinian police under Sergeant Mitchell, which had returned from Jaffa, left the station and after proceeding some twenty yards in the direction of the police barracks were heavily stoned by the crowd and two or three shots were fired from the houses. Several of this party were hit by stones and experienced considerable difficulty in reaching the police barracks owing to barricades across the road.
In consequence of Mr. Webb’s message and of other information which he received, Major Foley asked the Officer Commanding the Troops at Hadar Hacarmel to send a detachment to the railway station and himself collected two lorry loads of police. The first consisted of five British and three Jewish Palestinians and he dispatched them under Inspector Charlton with instructions to open fire, following shortly afterwards himself with a similar party in the other. The dispatch of these police was somewhat delayed owing to the difficulty which Major Foley experienced in obtaining communication with the Officer Commanding Troops.
Inspector Charlton's lorry was forced to charge through two barricades and on arrival near the railway station was heavily stoned by the crowd. The party then opened fire, firing approximately ten rounds. Major Foley arrived about two minutes later with his party and as stones were still being thrown by the crowd from the side streets a few more shots were fired in order to disperse them and steps were taken to clear the streets.
By the time the police returned from clearing the streets, a platoon of the Seaforth Highlanders under Lieutenant Andrews had arrived at the railway station.
The barricades numbering thirty-one which had been erected by the populace to prevent the movement of police and troops were cleared away.
During the remainder or the day, crowds continued to assemble at intervals and it was necessary to patrol the streets, but no further incident occurred.
On the 29th October, a party of Jewish and Arab Communists caused some trouble and arrests were made.
On the 31st October, some excitement was caused owing to a rumour that Arabs had been killed by the police and secretly buried and graves had to be opened in the presence or Moslem representatives in order to show this was not so and to re-assure the people. Upon the graves being opened it was found that the bodies therein had been dead for a month.
On that day a party of Houranies, a rough type of 8yrian labourer, many of whom had taken part in the attacks on the police, left Haifa. It was suggested that their departure might have been due to the fact that they had given up hope of looting.
The total number of rounds fired in Haifa was 49, 47 from rifles and 2 from revolvers.
The total casualties were: killed from bullet wounds 4; wounded in-patients bullet wounds 10. Of the totals, 6 wounded in-patients were police and 10 wounded out-patients were police.
D. The Nablus Disturbance.
A notice under section 32 of the Police Ordinance giving the police power toto disperse any assembly was issued in Nablus and was current on the 27th October.
On that day at about 4.30 p.m. news of the Jaffa disturbance was received and signs of excitement were noticed. Mr. Fool, the Assistant District Commissioner, tried to get into communication with the Mayor with the object of distributing the known facts about Jaffa, but little could be done in that direction and by 5 p.m. crowds were parading the streets.
The military force of one platoon and the police reserves were collected in the Government Offices with Mr. Foot and Mr. Fitzgerald, the District Superintendent of Police, and a Palestinian Assistant Superintendent of Police was sent into the Old City.
This Palestinian Assistant Superintendent, accompanied by a Palestinian Sub-Inspector and ten Palestinian constables, made his way through the crowds which were shouting and singing and at one point were trying to destroy a traffic signal and by about 6 p.m. succeeded in reaching the Post Office and Barclay's Bank which are next door to each other. The Assistant Superintendent and Sub-Inspector had revolvers, the constables were unarmed.
When this party arrived, the crowd was throwing stones at the Post Office and the Bank which broke the windows. The Assistant Superintendent blew his whistle and called upon the crowd to disperse. The stone throwing, however, continued and a baton charge was ordered. This failed to disperse the crowd which still continued to stone the police.
The Assistant Superintendent again called upon the crowd to disperse and threatened to open fire. The crowd did not do so and fire was opened by the Assistant Superintendent and the Sub-Inspector. Several shots were fired at the crowd in the streets, but the majority were fired at the roofs of houses from which a number of stones and tins full of earth were being thrown at the police.
Mr. Fitzgerald received news of this encounter and proceeded by motor tender to the spot with a party of twelve armed constables. On his arrival, stones were still being thrown from the roof tops and the alleyways and a party was detailed to clear the roofs. This they succeeded in doing, and Mr. Fitzgerald with his reinforcements was able to restore order without further resort to firing.
The Assistant Superintendent and Sub-Inspector said that they fired fifteen rounds and eleven rounds respectively.
One man who was hit in the back with a bullet was admitted to hospital and subsequently died. The police and the medical authorities know of no other casualties among the public. Seven members of the police force were injured by stones but were not admitted to hospital.
E. The Second Jerusalem Disturbance.
The disturbance occurred on Saturday the 28th and Sunday the 29th October, 1933.
In its origin and nature it is entirely different from the first disturbances at Jerusalem and from those at Jaffa and Haifa. Of these three the first two were the direct result of instigation by the Arab Executive at Jerusalem. The third, that at Haifa, anticipated, but was in conformity with, the plans of' the Arab Executive in Jerusalem. The central feature of the first Jerusalem and the Jaffa disturbances, if not of that of Haifa, was an organised procession. The second Jerusalem disturbance, on the contrary, was mainly fortuitous in its origin. It consisted of three entirely separate incidents all of which occurred without any definite preparation and without any plan for a procession.
At 1.30 p.m. on Friday the 27th October, news come through to Jerusalem of the Jaffa disturbance which had taken place that day. Some tension naturally followed, and the arrival in Jerusalem of a car-load of youthful agitators from Nablus added to the general excitement. Ridiculously untrue rumours were spread abroad; for instance, that machine guns had been used and that Musa Kazim Pasha had been killed, and so on.
On the morning of Saturday the 28th October, the first of the three incidents occurred. At 8.40 a.m. on that day, an Inspector of Police, by name Muhd Saadi went to Herod's Gate and found from a hundred to a hundred and fifty persons gathered on the walls of the Old City at that point. They were throwing stones at a British constable who was standing on duty there with a motor cycle, outside the Gate. Saadi called on the crowd to desist from their stone-throwing but without effect. They shouted, he Says, that they wanted to kill the policeman; and he adds that that seemed in fact to be their intention. The crowd meanwhile grew greater, and began to come through the Gate. Saadi here fired four revolver shots, but the stone throwing increased amid shouts of “Kill him”, “Kill him”. At this point a police-tender with fifteen armed constables came up and the crowd dispersed. That was the end of the incident. Some or the crowd apparently were wounded, but none came to the police for treatment as they did in the case of other disturbances.
On this same day Saturday the 28th, a deputation waited on His Excellency the High Commissioner who replied to it. The substance of this reply was published as an official communiqué.
Some sniping is said to have occurred on this evening, that is, the evening on the 28th (Saturday), but no particulars, nor any results of the sniping, are available.
Upon this same day, the 28th, the police had made various dispositions and had got in three platoons of troops, two to the Citadel and another at the Government Offices These remained ready until the disturbances were over, but they were never actually used.
Upon Sunday morning, the 29th, the tension was considerable, and trouble was expected when the congregation at the Mosque came out about 12.30 p.m. after noon-day prayers. These expectations were realised, and two further disturbances arose from this source.
It is to be remembered that there was no organized procession or attack. The crowd, emerging from the Mosque about 12.30 p.m. and gathering in numbers as it went, spread throughout the City in two main streams. One went towards the Damascus, and the other towards the Jaffa Gate.
We deal first with the collision of the crowd with the police at the Damascus Gate. Here Major Munro was in charge of some forty policemen. These were lined upon the main road facing the Gate. Two Palestinian police who had been inside the Gate rushed out and told Major Munro that they had been fired at by the crowd, but that they had not returned their fire. It was subsequently stated by one, Saleh Abdo, an Arab, that one of these two policemen did fire; but we are quite satisfied from the evidence of Major Munro and other witnesses, who very carefully examined their rifles and ammunition afterwards, that neither policeman had fired.
Major Munro then gave his party the order “one round load”. At this point one Palestinian policeman accidentally fired in the air. The crowd now came on to the entrance of the gateway, and fired shots at the police who took cover. In doing this the police became divided into two parties. Constable Caruth, who was not in Major Munro's party, here fired two shots at a man in the crowd who had fired at the police. He hit two of the crowd. These were the only two shots fired by the police at the Damascus Gate. Five were wounded. The crowd then retreated inside the Gate, the wounded were taken away in ambulances, and the crowd dispersed. All was quiet then till 7 p.m. when it is said that the police patrol left there were fired at and a bomb – found to be a “dud” – was thrown into the Government Office grounds. Nothing further on that or subsequent days occurred at the Damascus Gate. No damage to property occurred during the incident.
We deal now with the other incident which happened to that part of the crowd which went from the Mosque to the Jaffa Gate.
This part of the crowd came into contact with two armed constables named Reginald Mott (British) and Abdulla Zahar (Palestinian) at a point where the Street of the Chain ends and David Street begins. The spot is called Bab el Silsileh (The Gate of the Street of the Chain). This is at the boundary of the Jewish Quarter of the Old City. There were seven or eight hundred in the crowd, according to Mott, who added that he could not see the end of them. Zahar says there were eight hundred. Mott in English and Zahar in Arabic called on the crowd to disperse but without effect. Mott also blew his whistle. The crowd armed with sticks and throwing stones and bottles still came on. Mott then tried to disperse them with the butt end of his rifle. He was then attacked by the crowd, who threw him down and tried to take his rifle from him. They dragged him towards the Mosque, into the Street of the Chain, some thirty yards away from Zahar. Mott was twice struck on the head with a stone and fell. As he fell he called on Zahar to fire, which Zahar did, twice. Mott, still lying on the ground, also fired twice. The crowd however still came on, and Mott, now on one knee, fired three more rounds. Zahar did the same. The crowd then dispersed.
The story of the incident depends almost entirely on the evidence of Mott and Zahar, but it is in some degree confirmed by Constable Haiselden (British) who was at the time in the British Police Station in the Street of the Chain. He was himself fired at and returned the fire, but missed. The crowd, he says, looked very dangerous.
In the absence of any Arab or independent witnesses we must accept the story of Mott and Zahar but we desire to add that we have very little doubt that what they say is substantially what happened.
There was no damage to property of any importance in any of the three incidents which constitute the second Jerusalem disturbance.
Section Ill. Casualties.
The detail of the killed and other casualties which required medical attention, so far as we could ascertain it, is shown below.
This detail may be summarised as follows:
The police constable killed was killed by a large stone and all the public killed were killed as the result of fire.
Of the injured, three of the police were seriously stabbed and seventy-three of the public were injured by fire.
So far as we are able to form an opinion, of the police injured thirteen were seriously injured and forty-three received minor injuries ; and of the public injured, thirty-three were seriously injured and one hundred and fifty-four (including some injured by fire) received minor injuries.
Section IV. – Damage to Property.
Apart from one lorry, the property of a Jewish colony, which was destroyed by fire in Haifa, no serious damage was done to property.
Minor damage, such as broken windows, removal of blinds, etc. was done to property at Jaffa, particularly to the Zarafieh Café. No damage was done to Government property in Jaffa.
Windows at the railway station and police barracks and some window frames at the police barracks and the windows of a taxicab were broken at Haifa.
The windows of Barclay's Bank and the Post Office were broken al Nablus.
No damage to property was done in Jerusalem.
No claims in respect of any damage to property in any of the districts have been made to Government.
Section V. – General Observations.
1. The immediate cause of the disturbances with which we are concerned was the resolution of the Arab Executive calling upon the Arabs to hold demonstrations to protest against the policy of Government, the ground for which was prepared by a general feeling of apprehension amongst the Arabs engendered by the purchase of land by the Jews and by Jewish immigration. It seems, however, that when the disturbances had actually begun certain incidents were chiefly due to a desire to retaliate generally against the police on account of the action which they had been forced to take, the accounts of which were doubtless greatly exaggerated. In particular, it is clear that the first outbreak of disturbances in Haifa and that at Nablus were the direct result of the disturbances at Jaffa.
2. We feel that our Report would be incomplete without some reference to the conduct of the police throughout all these disturbances.
It is clear that on Arab crowd in Palestine is mercurial and excitable and when excited, dangerous. These disturbances were aimed against the Government and not against the Jews but in mixed centres, such as the Old City of Jerusalem and Haifa and in Jaffa, owing to its proximity to Tel Aviv, the fear of any disturbance becoming religious and racial, with the possibility of a repetition of the events of 1929, must always be present to the mind of every police officer. In these circumstances, the police force of all ranks are placed in a particularly difficult position when disturbances occur in Palestine.
The general principles upon which the police are instructed to act in the case of a disturbance are laid down in three Manuals which have been produced to us. We have consulted these Manuals and need only say that they appear to us to be reasonable and to work out in detail the general principles of law applicable to the circumstances.
In regard to the police generally, we are of opinion that they acted with restraint and forbearance and that whenever possible they called upon the crowds to disperse and tried to persuade them to do so before using force to disperse them. We are of opinion that the evidence given before us does not disclose a single instance in which any member of the police departed from or exceeded or failed to observe any instruction laid down in the above mentioned Manuals. Throughout the loyalty, personal courage and discretion of all ranks were very commendable and reflect great credit on the Inspector-General and officers responsible for their training.
It appears to us that the officers in command of Jerusalem, Jaffa and Haifa, that is, Major Wainright, Mr. McConnell and Major Foley, took adequate and proper precautions for dealing with the positions with which they were faced and throughout performed their duties efficiently and with restraint, and that there is nothing in their conduct which is open to criticism.
We should like to add particularly a word about Mr. Faraday who was actually in command of the operations on the spot in Jaffa, and was, in consequence, placed in a position of particular difficulty and responsibility, and, in the events which happened, danger. Of him, we wish to say that in our opinion, based upon the evidence before us, his ability, personal courage and discretion in the conduct or the Jaffa operations were wholly admirable.
3. Throughout the disturbances the military forces were placed in positions of readiness, but on no occasion did they come into conflict with the populace.
4. We desire to express to Mr. Saleh Hakim, the Secretary to the Commission, and to Miss Painting and Miss Sheppard, the stenographers, our high appreciation of their very willing and most efficient assistance.
J. W. Murison.
H. H. Trusted.
4th January, 1934.
Source: The Palestine Gazette , Supplement 7 February 1934, pages 87-105.