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Shaw Commission Report
Report of the Shaw Commission on the al-Buraq / Western Wall Disturbances of August, 1929
CHAPTER XIV.
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.
London, 12 March 1930
We pгорове now to summarize
(A) our general conclusions on the more important matters raised during our enquiry,
(B) our findings as to the causes of the outbreak, and
(C) our recommendations for the future.
This arrangement, though it involves some duplication in the references to paasages in this report, has the advantage that our opinion as to both causes and remedies are recorded separately from our other findings and can be seen at a glance.
(A) GENERAL CONCLUSIONS ON MORE IMPORTANT MATTERS.
(1) Nature of the outbreak.
1. The outbreak in Jerusalem on the 23rd of August was from the beginning an attack by Arabs on Jews for which no excuse in the form of earlier murders by Jews has been established. (Chapter III, page 63.)
2. The outbreak was not premeditated. Disturbances did not occur simultaneously in all parts of Palestine but spread from the capital through a period of days to most outlying centres of population and to some rural districts. (Chapter IV, page 81.)
3. As will be realized from the brief account of the disturbances given on pages 62 to 65 of Chapter III, they took the form, for the most part, of a vicious attack by Arabs on Jews accompanied by wanton destruction of Jewish property. A general massacre of the Jewish community at Hebron was narrowly averted. In a few instances, Jews attacked Arabs and destroyed Arab property. These attacks, though inexcusable, were in most cases in retabation for wrongs already committed by Arabs in the neighbourhood in which the Jewish attacks occurred.
4. The outbreak neither was nor was intended to be a revolt against British authority in Palestine. (Chapter XII, page 149.)
(ii) Zionist complaints against the Mufti of Jerusalem.
5. The motive of desire to secure his own position as President of the Supreme Moslem Council, which formed part of the case put forward against the Mufti, has not been established. The Mufti, so far as we can see, had no reason to suppose that his tenure of office was in any danger. (Chapter IV, pages 71 and 72.)
6. In playing the part that he took in the formation of societies for the defence of the Moslem Holy Places and in fostering the activities of such societies when formed, the Mufti was influenced by the twofold desire to annoy the Jews and to mobilize Moslem opinion on the issue of the Wailing Wall. He had no intention of utilizing this religious campaign as the means of inciting to disorder. Inasmuch as the movement which he in part created became through the force of circumstances a not unimportant factor in the events which led to the outbreak, the Mufti, like many others who directly or indirectly played upon public feeling in Palestine, must accept a share in the responsibility for the disturbances. (Chapter IV, pages 73 to 75.)
7. The innovations of practice introduced by the Moslem religious authorities, of whom the Mufti is the head, in the neighbourhood of the Wailing Wall were intended in part to annoy the Jews and in part to emphasize Moslem rights of ownership over the Wailing Wall, the pavement in front of it and the surrounding property. Generally, however, in the matter of innovations of practice little blame can be attached to the Mufti in which some Jewish religious authorities also would not have to share. (Chapter IV, page 75.)
8. There is no evidence that the Mufti issued any requests to Moslems in Palestine to come up to Jerusalem on the 23rd of August and no connection has been established between the Mufti and the work of those who either are known or are thought to have been engaged in agitation and incitement. (Chapter IV, pages 75 and 76.)
9. After the disturbances had broken out the Mufti cooperated with the Government in their efforts both to restore peace and to prevent the extension of disorder. (Chapter IV, page 77.)
(iii) Zionist complaints against the Palestine Arab Executive.
10. The charges of premeditation and of organization of the disturbances are not proved against the Palestine Arab Executive and, if made in relation to the actual events of the 23rd of August and the following days, are negatived by the known facts. (Chapter IV, pages 78 to 81.)
11. The charge of deliberate incitement to disorder has not been substantiated against the Palestine Arab Executive as a body, but we have little doubt that some of the constituents who elected the Executive carried out among the more ignorant Arab people a campaign of propaganda calculated to incite them. (Chapter IV, page 81.)
12. It is probable, though except in one case there is no proof, that individual members of the Arab Executive further exacerbated racial feeling after the disturbances had begun. (Chapter IV, page 82.)
13. For their failure to make during the week preceding the disturbances an attempt to control their followers by declaring publicly and emphatically that they were on the side of law and order, neither the Mufti nor the Palestine Arab Executive can be acquitted of blame. (Chapter IV, page 82.)
(iv) Zionist complaints sgainst the Government.
14. No blame can properly be attached to Mr. Luke on the ground that he did not obtain reinforcements from neighbouring countries before the 23rd of August. (Chapter V, page 84.)
15. Looking back on the question in the full light of our present knowledge, it is our view that it would have been a reasonable precaution if Mr. Luke had mobilized the troops within his jurisdiction at some convenient place in Palestine some time during the days which immediately preceded the disturbances, but, for reasons which we explained on page 84 of Chapter V, we do not think that any serious criticism can properly be levied against Mr. Luke for his failure to adopt this course.
16. We endorse Mr. Luke's action in declining to arm the considerable number of Jewish people whose services were offered to him. (Chapter V, page 85.)
17. We are satisfied that, in taking his decision that 41 Jewish special constables should be disarmed, Mr. Luke was following the highest military advice available to him and was using his own unbiased judgment as to the line of action which was best calculated to serve the interests of the people with whose well-being he was charged. (Chapter V, page 86.)
18. On the question of present and future policy in regard to the arming of Jewish colonies there is a difference of opinion among us which is recorded on page 87 of Chapter V.
19. The police and the crews of armoured-cars exercised a wise discretion in the use and withholding of fire during the disturbances. (Chapter V, pages 87 to 89.)
20. Many exciting and intemperate articles were published in the Press in Palestine between October, 1928, and August, 1929. We consider that the power of the Palestine Government to suspend the Press should have been mvoked against papers which published some of these articles. (Chapter V, pages 90 and 91.)
21. We cannot attach blame to any police officer for failure to prevent the Jewish demonstration at the Wailing Wall on the l5th of August. It is our view that those who were present during the discussions with the leaders of the Jewish youth failed to make it clear to Major Saunders that the Jewish leaders had declined to accept one of the conditions which Mr. Luke had sttached to his decision that the procession should be allowed to go to the Wailing Wall. (Chapter V, pages 92 and 93.)
22. Any attempt to have prevented by force the Moslem demonstration which took place on the 16th of August would have been dangerous and ill-advised. (Chapter V, page 94.)
23. The rumours which were current in Palestine immediately before the 23rd of August were the natural consequence of the two demonstrations on the 15th and 16th of that month. (Chapter V, page 94.)
24. The complaint that the Palestine Government have consistently shown a lack of sympathy towards the establishment of the Jewish National Home and that their policy has been one of weakness is, in a large measure, due to the difficulties inherent in the Mandate and to a failure to appreciate the dual nature of the policy which the Government have to administer. It is our view that the Government did discharge to the best of their ability the difficult task of maintaining a neutral and impartial attitude between two peoples whose leaders have shown little capacity for compromise. (Chapter XI, pages 143 and 144.)
(v) Immigration.
25. Jewish enterprise and Jewish immigration, when not in excess of the absorptive capacity of the country, have conferred material benefits upon Palestine in which the Arab people share.
26. We consider, however, that the claims and demands which from the Zionist side have been advanced in regard to the future of Jewish immigration into Palestine have been such as to arouse among the Arabs the apprehensions that they will in tame be deprived of their livelihood and pass under the political domination of the Jews. (Chapter VII, pages 106 to 111.)
27. We further consider that Sir John Campbell was right when he reported that the crisis of 1927 and 1928 was due "to the fact that immigrants have come into Palestine in excess of the economic absorbing power of the country." (Chapter VII, page 106.)
28. There is incontestable evidence that in the matter of immigration there has been a serious departure by the Jewish authorities from the doctrine accepted by the Zionist Organization in 1922 that immigration should be regulated by the economic capacity of Palestine to absorb new arrivals. (Chapter XI, page 141.)
29. In conjunction with other and more immediate causes for disturbance, the feeling of Arab apprehension caused by Jewish immigration was a factor which contributed to the outbreak. (Chapter VII, page 112.)
30. The selection of immigrants under the Labour Schedule is in effect entrusted to the General Federation of Jewish Labour in Palestine. In the allocation of certificates supplied to them for this purpose it is the practice of the Federation to have regard to the political creed of the several possible immigrants rather than to their particular qualifications for admission to Palestine. This system cannot be defended: that political creed of any complexion should be a deciding factor in the choice between intending immigrants is open to the strongest excерtion. (Chapter VII, page 105.)
(vi) Land problem.
31. Soon after the institution of civil government in Palestine the Administration became anxious lest the interests of tenants and cultivators should be prejudiced by the sale of large estates. (Chapter VIII, page 114.)
32. The Land Transfer Ordinances of 1920 and 1921 were passed with the object of protecting the interests of cultivators and of preventing their expropriation from the soil. Those Ordinances failed to achieve their objects and were replaced by the Protection of Cultivators Ordinance of 1929. (Chapter VIII, pages 114 to 117.)
33. Between 1921 and 1929 there were large sales of land in consequence of which numbers of Arabs were evicted without the provision of other land for their occupation. In some cases the Arabs who were dispossessed received cash compensation and no criticism can be levied against the Jewish land companies in respect of these transactions. Those companies were acting with the knowledge of the Government (Chapter VIII, pages 117 to 119.)
34 The Protection of Cultivators Ordinance of 1929, while giving compensation for disturbance, does nothing to check the tendency towards the dispossession of cultivators from their holdings. The mere provision of compensation in money may even encourage that tendency. (Chapter VIII, page 124.)
35. The position is now acute. There is no alternative land to which persons evicted can remove. In consequence a landless and discontented class is being created. Such a class is a potential danger to the country. Unless some solution can be found to deal with this situation, the question will remain a constant source of present discontent and a potential cause of future disturbance. (Chapter VIII, pages 123 and 124.)
36. Palestine cannot support a larger agricultural population than it at present carries unless methods of farming undergo a radical change. With more intensive cultivation, should this prove to be possible, room might be found for a number of newcomers in certain districts. (Chapter VIII, page 121.)
(vii) Arab Constitutional Grievances.
37. It is a matter for regret that the Arab leaders did not accept the offer of a Legislative Council that was made to them in 1922. Today the Arab people of Palestine are united in their demand for a measure of self-government. This unity of purpose may weaken, but it is liable to be revived in full force by any large issue which involves racial interests. It is our belief that a feeling of resentment among the Arabs of Palestine consequent upon their disappointment st continued failure to obtain any measure of self-government is greatly aggravating the difficulties of the local Administration. (Chapter IX, pages 130 and 131.)
(viii) Minor Arab Grievances.
38. Of the four complaints discussed in Chapter X of this report, some are not well founded and none can be regarded as constituting a serious grievance.
(ix) Difficulties Inherent in the Mandate.
39. The difficulties inherent in the Balfour Declaration and in the Mandate for Palestine are factors of supreme importance in the consideration of the Palestine problem. The issue of a clear definition of policy, backed by a statement that it is the firm intention of His Majesty's Government to implement that policy to the full, would be of the greatest assistance in securing the good government of the country. (Chapter XI, page 139.)
40. There exists among the Arabs in Palestine a strong feeling of resentment at a position in which, while they have no means of direct access to His Majesty's Government, the Jews in Palestine, through the exercise of the functions conferred upon the Zionist Organization by Article 4 of the Mandate, are allowed to approach His Majesty's Government direct. (Chapter XI, page 148.)
(x) Defence and Security.
41. The policy of reducing the garrison in Palestine and Trans-Jordan was carried out too far. (Chapter XII, page 145.)
42. The conduct of the British police in Palestine during the period of the disturbances deserves the highest commendation. The Palestinian police, regarded collectively, were not to be relied upon after fire had been opened or for purposes of fighting at close quarters. The Trans-Jordan Frontier Force behaved with exemplary loyalty. (Chapter XII, pages 145 to 147)
43 The Intelligence Service in Palestine has proved to be inadequate. (Chapter XII, page 148.)
(B) SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AS TO CAUSES OF THE OUTBBEAK OF AUGUST LAST.
44. The fundamental cause, without which in our opinion disturbances either would not have occurred or would have been little more than a local riot, is the Arab feeling of animosity and hostility towards the Jews consequent upon the disappointment of their political and national aspirations and fear for their economic future. The origin and growth of this feeling are discussed on pages 150 to 153 of Chapter XIII. The feeling as it exists today is based on the twofold fear of the Arabs that by Jewish immigration and land purchase they may be deprived of their livelihood and in time pass under the political domination of the Jews.
45. In our opinion the immediate causes of the outbreak were :—
(a) The long series of incidents connected with the Wailing Wall which began on the Jewish Day of Atonement in September, 1928, and ended with the Moslem demonstration on the 16th of August, 1929. These must be regarded as a whole, but the incident among them which in our view most contributed to the outbreak was the Jewish demonstration at the Wailing Wall on the 15th of August, 1929. Next in importance we put the activities of the Society for the Protection of the Moslem Holy Places and, in a less degree, of the Pro-Wailing Wall Committee. (Chapter XIII, pages 153 to 155.)
(b) Exciting and intemperate articles which appeared in some Arabic papers, in one Hebrew daily paper and in a Jewish weekly paper published in English. (Chapter V, page 90, and Chapter XIII, page 156.)
(c) Propaganda among the less-educated Arab people of a character calculated to incite them. (Chapter IV, page al and Chapter XIII, page 156.)
(d) The enlargement of the Jewish Agency. (Chapter XIII, page 156.)
(e) The inadequacy of the military forces and of the reliable police available. (Chapter XII, page 145 and Chapter XIII, page 157.)
(f) The belief. due largely to a feeling of uncertainty as to policy, that the decisions of the Palestine Government could be influenced by political considerations. (Chapter XI, page 140 and Chapter XIII, page 157.)
(C) RECOMMENDATIONS.
We would preface this summary by stating that we attach the highest importance to our first recommendation that His Majesty's Government should consider the advisability of issuing a clear statement of policy, the value of which would be greatly enhanced if it dealt with the points which we set out in paragraph 46 (b) below.
Our recommendations in regard to the immigration and land questions are largely based on the assumption that in their definition of policy His Majesty's Government will clearly state that the rights and position of non-Jewish communities in Palestine are to be fully safeguarded.
Definition of policy.
46.—(a) It is our view that the issue of a clear statement of the policy which His Majesty's Government intend to be pursued in Palestine is essential to the good government of that country. We therefore recommend that His Majesty's Government should consider the advisability of issuing such a statement with the least possible delay; it is important that His Majesty's Government should make it clear that they intend to give full effect to that policy with all the resources at their command. (Chapter XI, page 139.)
(b) Whatever form that statement of policy may take, its value would be greatly enhanced (i) if it contained a definition in clear and positive terms of the meaning which His Majesty's Government attach to the passages in the Mandate providing for the safeguarding of the rights of the non-Jewish communities in that country and (ii) if it laid down, for the guidance of the Government of Palestine, directions more explicit than any that have yet been given as to the conduct of policy on such vital issues as land and immigration. Chapter XI, page 142.)
Immigration.
47.—(a) Any uncertainty as to the line of policy to be pursued in the vital matter of immigration is bound to be reflected in the conduct of the Palestine Government and in the attitude and temper of the Arab people and of those who represent Jewish interests. We recommend therefore that His Majesty's Government should issue at an early date a clear and definite declaration of the policy which they intend to be pursued in regard to the regulation and control of future Jewish immigration to Palestine and, in the framing of that declaration, should have regard to our conclusions on the subject of immigration. (Chapter VII, page 112.)
(b) The administrative machinery for the regulation of immigration should be reviewed with the object of preventing a repetition of the excessive immigration of 1925 and 1926. (.Chapter VII, page 112.)
(c) Consideration should be given to the possibility of devising some more suitable method of regulating the disposal of immigration certificates under the Labour Schedule. (Chapter VII, page 112.)
(d) Until such time as some form of representative government is established in Palestine, machinery should, if possible, be devised whereby non-Jewish interests in Palestine could be consulted upon matters which, had there been a Legislative Council, would have been referred to the special immigration committee of which mention is made in the statement of policy contained in the White Paper of 1922. (Chapter VII, page 112.)
Land.
48.—(a) A scientific enquiry should be undertaken by experts into the prospects of introducing improved methods of cultivation in Palestine. Land policy could then be regulated in the light of facts ascertained by those scientific investigations. It is of vital importance that in any scheme of land development adopted as the result of expert enquiry, regard should be had to the certain natural increase in the present rural population. (Chapter VIII, page 123.)
(b) It is of vital importance that, pending the results of this survey, the present tendency towards the eviction of peasant cultivators from the land should be checked by the adoption of one of the alternative methods mentioned on page 124 of Chapter VIII or by some other appropriate means.
(c) The Palestine Government should consider the possibility of reviving the Agricultural Bank or of providing by other means for the need of the poorer cultivators who require credit facilities to enable them to improve their present methods of farming. (Chapter VIII, page 122.)
Constitutional development.
49. We do not wish to make any formal recommendation on this question. We would, however, urge that, when the question of constitutional development in Palestine again comes under review, regard should be had to our conclusion in Chapter IX of this report that the absence of any measure of self-government is greatly aggravating the difficulties of the local Administration.
The Wailing Wall.
50. In December last, while we were still in Palestine, we communicated to you a recommendation that His Majesty's Government should take such steps as lay within their power to secure the early appointment, under Article 14 of the Mandate for Palestine, of an ad hoc Commission to determine the rights and claims in connection with the Wailing Wall. We thought it advisable to anticipate this recommendation and to bring it to your notice in time for His Majesty's Government, if they so desired, to make use of it when the question of the appointment of such a Commission came before the Council of the League of Nations in January last. We have since learned that the League Council agreed to the proposed appointment of a Commission. The early determination of rights and claims connected with the Wailing Wall is, in our view, a measure essential in the interests of peace and good government in Palestine. We consider, therefore, that the constitution of the Commission and its departure for that country should be expedited by every possible means.
Activities of religious societies.
51. Since the disturbances the legislation in Palestine dealing with offences against the State, including sedition, has been repealed and replaced by an Ordinance based on English criminal law. In the circumstances we feel that it is unnecessary for us to make any recommendation under this head.
Press incitement.
52. —(a) Steps should be taken to ensure that the attention of senior officers of the Palestine Government is in future called to any articles appearing in the Press in Palestine which are of an inflammatory character and likely to excite the feelings of the people of that country.
(b) The Palestine Government should examine the Press Law now in force in that country with a view to making provision, if such provision does not now exist, which would enable them to obtain from the Courts a conviction in any case in which it is proved that articles tending to a breach of the peace have been published in a newspaper in Palestine. (Chapter V, page 91.)
Incitement.
53. Steps should at once be taken to remedy the admitted defects in the Intelligence Service in Palestine. An adequate and efficient Intelligence Service is essential to enable the Government to check the activities of persons who endeavour to stir up racial feeling. (Chapter XII, page 148.)
Functions of the Zionist Organization and the Palestine Zionist Executive.
54. —(a) We recommend that His Majesty's Government should reaffirm the statement made in 1922 that the special position assigned to the Zionist Organization by the Mandate does not entitle it to a share in any degree in the government of Palestine. (Chapter XI, page 142.)
(b) We recommend, for the consideration of His Majesty's Government, that they should examine the possibility of laying down some precise definition of the meaning of Article 4 of the Palestine Mandate. (Chapter XI, page 143.)
Defence and security.
55. —(a) The question of the most suitable form of garrison for Palestine should be referred to the appropriate advisers of His Majesty's Government. (Chapter XII, page 146.)
(b) Until that question has been decided and thereafter until racial feeling has shown some marked improvement, no reduction should be made in the present garrison of two battalions of infantry. (Chapter XII, page 145.)
(c) An independent enquiry should be made by an experienced police officer from some other Dependency into the organization of the Department of Police in Palestine.
You have already accepted and acted on this recommendation. (Chapter XII, page 147.)
(d) The Palestine Government should be instructed to enquire into and report upon the possibility of forming a reserve of special constables. (Chapter XXI, page 148.)
Source: Report of the Commission on the Palestine disturbances of August, 1929. / Presented by the secretary of state for the colonies to Parliament by command of His Majesty March, 1930. London: His Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1930.