English
Featured On Landing Page:
Not
Featured On Media Page:
showInLandingPage:
no
Report by the Haycraft Commission of Inquiry into the May 1921 Jaffa Riots
Report by the Haycraft Commission of Inquiry into the May 1921 Jaffa Riots
(Excerpts)
Jerusalem, 10 August 1921
[…]
PART II. CONCLUSIONS.
GENERAL.
When we come to consider the causes of these disturbances we find an immediate cause, which of itself could not have been sufficient to give rise to more than a street riot of the ordinary kind, confined to a comparatively small body of persons, restricted to a limited area, and within the power of the Jaffa police to control. That cause was the M.P.S. demonstration, and its clash with the procession of the Jewish Labour Party.
But this was no ordinary riot. The disturbance raged for several days with intensity wherever Arabs came into contact with Jews, and spread into the surrounding country, where Jewish colonies, having nothing whatever to do with Bolshevism, were attacked with ferocity. The Bolshevik demonstration was the spark that set alight the explosive discontent of the Arabs, and precipitated an outbreak which developed into an Arab-Jewish feud.
It has been said to us by Jewish witnesses that there was no essentially anti-Jewish question at that time, but that a movement against the Jews was engineered by persons who, anxious to discredit the British Government, promoted discontent and disturbance of the peace by stirring up the common people against the Jews. It is argued by them that all the trouble is due to the propaganda of a small class whose members regret the departure of the old régime, because British administration has put an end to privileges and opportunities of profit formerly enjoyed by them; that in co-operation with them are certain foreigners, principally French agents, who are ready to make mischief for political reasons, and to encourage any sort of disturbance calculated to embarrass the British Government. These witnesses asseverate that Zionism has nothing to do with the anti-Jewish feeling manifested in the Jaffa disturbances. They declare that the Arabs are only anti-Zionist or anti-Jewish because they are primarily anti-British, and that they are merely making use of the anti-Zionist cry in order to wreck the British Mandate.
We are satisfied that this is not the case. Although an inclination to take advantage of any trouble in the country may have been present in the minds of a very few for this and that reason, yet the feeling against the Jews was too genuine, too widespread and too intense to be accounted for in the above superficial manner. That there is discontent with the Government has appeared during this inquiry, but we are persuaded that it is due partly to the Government policy with regard to a Jewish National Home in Palestine, partly to Arab mis-understandings of that policy, and partly to the manner in which that policy is interpreted and sought to be applied by some of its advocates outside the Government. It culminates in a suspicion that the Government is under Zionist influence, and is therefore led to favour a minority to the prejudice of the vast majority of the population. We have been assured, and we believe, that had there been no Jewish question, the Government would have had no political difficulty of any importance to deal with so far as its domestic affairs are concerned. We consider that any anti-British feeling on the part of the Arabs that may have arisen in the country originates in their association of the Government with the furtherance of the policy of Zionism.
That the disturbance of the peace in Jaffa was in the first instance provoked by the demonstration of the M.P.S., and that there had been a conflict arising therefrom before the Arabs joined in, has been fully stated in the narrative portion of this report. It is our opinion that, taking into consideration the strained condition of Arab feeling, it was unwise to risk trouble by allowing a generally detested, although numerically small body of Communists to carry on any sort of propaganda among this already uneasy population. No one wanted them, and now that the danger has been realised the most notorious have been deported.
Had there been nothing more than some rough handling of the demonstrators by the Arabs, there would be little for us to say. It would have been the usual row to which we are accustomed from time to time in all countries. But we have no doubt that the Arabs were the first to turn this quarrel into a race conflict, and, when once this issue was joined, they behaved with a savagery which cannot be condoned. Dr. Beadles, the Principal Medical Officer, Jaffa, thus speaks of his examination of the dead bodies on the 1st May:
"I was struck most with the number of wounds on each body, and the ferocity of the wounds. I am speaking particularly of broken skulls. Some of the victims had dozens of wounds,"
The last expression may be an unconscious exaggeration, but it shows the impression produced on the mind of a man who had practised his profession during the war, and was not unaccustomed to the sight of wounds. The killing was accompanied and followed by an orgy of pillage which was a disgrace to a civilised community.
That the Jews retaliated with equal savagery is not to be denied, but they had much to revenge.
There were two stories of mutilation, one on each side, but they were not supported by any evidence, and we do not believe them. Two cases were established of injuries by corrosive acid inflicted during the Jaffa trouble. In one case a Jew was the victim, in the other case an Arab.
We are convinced that the charge constantly brought by Jews against the Arabe, that this outbreak had been planned by them, or by their leaders, and was pre-arranged for the Ist May, is unfounded. It appears in evidence that on more than one occasion Arabs in European dress incited the crowd; but the notables on both sides, whatever their feelings may have been, were always ready to help the authorities in the restoration of order, and we think that without their assistance the outbreak would have resulted in even worse excesses. A good deal has been alleged by Jewish witnesses about the instigation of the Arab mob to violence by their leaders. If this means no more than that while educated people talk and write, the mob acts, then there is truth in the allegation. But if it means that had it not been for incitement by the notables, effendis and sheikhs, there would have been no riots, the allegation cannot be substantiated. To some extent the motives that influenced different sections of the Arab population were not the same but the general belief that the aims of the Zionists and Jewish immigration are a danger to the national and material interests of Arabs in Palestine is well nigh universal amongst the Arabs, and is not confined to any particular class. All that can truly be said in favour of the Jewish view is that the leaders of Arab opinion not only make no secret of what they think, but carry on a political campaign. In this campaign, however, the people participate with the leaders, because they feel that their political and material interests are identical. There is no evidence worth considering, to show that the outbreak was planned and organised. Had that been the case, we hesitate to conjecture what the consequences would have been.
It may also be recalled that the 1st May was the Orthodox Easter Day, and that on that morning Orthodox Christians were in their churches, and afterwards received the customary visits of ceremony of their Moslem friends. It was therefore an unlikely day for Moslems and Christians to have chosen for a popular rising.
When we come to consider the raids on the agricultural colonies we find the immediate cause to be the reports of Jews having killed Arabs in the Jaffa riots. They were all the outcome of the general rage against the Jews aroused by these reports. In some cases there were local causes which stimulated this feeling. The Khedera raid was immediately prompted by a false report of the imprisonment of Arab labourers. The raid on Rehoboth was the immediate result of a story about the Jews of that colony having attacked a neighbouring Arab village. There is no evidence to show the responsibility of any particular village for the raid on Rehoboth, but Mr. Miller and Mr. Wainwright think that the false report was concocted on that day by persons at Ramleh who wished to promote an attack on the Jews. It is, however, only fair to add that two notables, who were tried in this connection, were acquitted. In the Petach Tikvah case only the Abu Kishk tribe can clearly be saddled with responsibility. The Yahoudich men never actually raided the colony. They would have done so had they not been caught in time by the military, but they were stopped and soundly punished. There is no evidence to show by whom Kefr Saba and Ain Hai were raided. The raiders found no one to kill, but looted and destroyed. In none of these five cases can the conduct of the Arabs be excused or condoned. Most of the colonists had lived for years on quite friendly terms with their Arab neighbours, and had in many cases given them regular employment on a large scale. The bloodthirsty attacks on these peaceful settlements, which had been guilty of no provocation whatever, are among the worst features of the disturbances.
LOOTING.
As in most countries, the desire for loot appears to have asserted itself strongly immediately the position got out of hand.
Looting was carried out in Jaffa and Menshich on an extensive scale on Sunday and Monday, the 1st and 2nd May, but the looters appear to have been restricted to the poorer and more ignorant elements of the community. The looters were almost exclusively Arabs, the victims almost exclusively Jews.
The areas that suffered most were the Suk el-Deir and the Ajami quarters, where well-stocked shops were forcibly entered and stripped of their contents.
Men, women and children were to be seen pillaging and making off with goods of every description. Residential quarters suffered to a lesser extent.
On the 5th May the Government appointed a Looting Committee to
(i) Inquire into the nature and extent of pillage.
(ii) Inspect looted premises.
(iii) Collect information which might lead to prosecutions, and to the recovery of looted property.
The Committee was presided over by Mr. A. B. C. Gibson, who was assisted by a Moslem and a Jewish member. With a view to recovering as much as possible of the looted property the Committee intimated that persons returning loot to the Governorate by the 9th May would not be prosecuted in respect of goods so returned. The response was, however, small and practically nothing of value was returned. 479 claims were submitted in respect of loss by pillage, but the Looting Committee is unable to give any indication of the amount of damage suffered by the claimants.
A system of searches was instituted but failed to disclose the where-abouts of any of the stolen property, which had presumably been buried or secreted in the villages.
During and immediately after the riots complaints were constantly being received that soldiers under the guidance of Jews were searching houses. This was strongly resented, especially in houses where there were Moslem women, and orders were at once issued that soldiers were not to search houses without authority. It is, indeed, doubtful if soldiers at any time made such searches, and it is probable that the alleged soldiers were demobilised Jews who had put on their old uni-forms because of the authority which these conferred.
The looting of and damage suffered by colonies was the subject of consideration by a special Committee appointed by the Government.
We understand that up to the present 25 convictions have been recorded in respect of looting in Jaffa.
THE GOVERNOR.
During the three days of the Jaffa riots the Governor of Jaffa, Colonel Stirling, had a most difficult task to fulfil. After May Day the military were in occupation of Jaffa, although martial law was not declared until Tuesday. But the position on May Day was an impossible one. The Civil Administration had broken down under the pressure of popular violence. Looking back on the events, we realise that such an outbreak was liable to occur at any moment; but at the time it was totally unexpected, and all Palestine was taken by surprise. It was mainly owing to insufficiency of training, service and traditions, that the police were not of the quality required to withstand the crush of racial strife, and in some cases were not even willing to do so. Colonel Stirling was not responsible for that. We are of opinion that he did all he could have been expected to do in the circumstances.
THE POLICE
The budget strength of the Police Detachment for the Administrative District of Jaffa is 10 officers, 53 mounted police, and 135 foot. The actual distribution in the sub-districts at the time of the disturbances was as follows:-
| --------- | Officers. | Mounted men. | Foot. |
| Jaffa | 6 | 20 | 84 |
| Ramleh | 3 | 17 | 23 |
| Tulkeram | 1 | 15 | 22 |
Two of the officers were British, five officers and 141 men Moslems, two officers and 19 men Christians, one officer and 21 men Jews.
The men are enlisted for only two years, a period which hardly enables them to acquire the degree of training and discipline necessary to subordinate those racial and religious prejudices which are so pronounced in Palestine, to the sense of duty. The absence of barrack life, too, is not conducive to discipline or to the growth of esprit de corps. Nor are the pay and conditions of service such as to attract the type of recruit, whose early environment and education fit him for the ready conception of those principles of impartiality which can alone make an efficient policeman, and invest him with the public confidence. It is stated by witnesses of all communities that, owing to unfavourable conditions of enlistment, recruits for the police force are drawn from among those who are unable to find employment in other avocations. We are, however, persuaded that, with reasonable conditions, ample training, and a sufficiently long period of enlistment, the Palestinian offers good material for the creation of an efficient Force. This is indicated by the exemplary conduct of those officers and other ranks of the Force, who arrived from Jerusalem under the command of Major Montefiore. They were picked men, and had undergone a special course of training at the Police School in Jerusalem. We feel that it would be an act of prudence, well worth the expense, to secure the services of a number of experienced British constables or N.C.Os. to leaven the force, and to inculcate that spirit of duty and loyalty which is absent at present owing to lack of good traditions.
At the time of the outbreak of the riots, Mr. Wainwright, the District Commandant of Police, was absent at Khan Yunis, a coastal village in the Gaza district, 66 miles from Jaffa, whither he had proceeded on the morning of Saturday, the 30th April. There was no telephone at Khan Yunis, and Mr. Wainwright, on hearing of the disturbances, was only able to return to Jaffa by Tuesday, the 3rd May. There was, in our opinion, insufficient justification for his absence. Considerations of prudence demanded that he should have remained at his post. The Governor, who was away on District inspection on Friday, states that had he been present he would not have permitted Mr. Wainwright to leave the district.
Mr. Wainwright in his own evidence admits that he informed the acting Assistant Governor that he thought there would be a fight, but it does not seem to have occurred to him that there was any danger of it developing into a general disturbance. Fears were, however, entertained by other officers of the Force as to probabilities of conflict between the Labour demonstration and the M.P.S., and, as has been related, dispositions were worked out with a view to distributing the police at points at which they would be most effective. In applying by telephone to his headquarters for permission to leave the district, Mr. Wainwright appears not to have told the Deputy Director of Public Security, with whom he was speaking, of these fears. His failure to invite his Director's attention to the fact that a Labour demonstration would be held during his absence was a serious omission.
We were informed by British Reserve Inspector Atkins that he is responsible for the custody and issue of police arms and ammunition and other stores. The storeroom is merely a portion of the police office, partitioned off with a curtain of blankets. Several police clerks work in this room, and it is, presumably, open to those members of the Force or public who have business with the police office. It seems to us a singularly lax arrangement to keep such important things as armoury stores in a place of this sort. According to Mr. Atkins, only 15 rounds of ammunition were issued on the Sunday, and of these five rounds were issued to each of three policemen. The police had other ammunition, which ought not to have been in their possession, and some of this excess ammunition was without doubt improperly used. Its possession may be attributed to the lack of an efficient system of checking the return of armoury stores issued for guards, patrols, field firing, or other special duties. The evidence of Sergeant Beer and Privates Singer and Klevitsky, though to be accepted with reserve, indicates a careless-ness that is almost alarming.
Of the Palestinian Police Officers, Mr. Cohen and Tewfik Bey did reasonably well. Of the others it is difficult to say more than that, although they lost control of the situation, they cannot be associated with the lawlessness and violence which characterised the behaviour of numbers of their subordinates. In this connection it is important to remember that during Sunday and part of Monday the force was without the leadership of a senior British officer. Undoubtedly Abdin Bey, the Assistant District Commandant, had a heavier burden thrown upon him than he could in fairness be expected to carry. Nevertheless, we feel that he committed a serious error of judgment in leaving the Immigration House when the attack there had begun, and in remaining away as long as he did.
There is one officer, however, namely, Second Inspector Hanna Effendi Bordcosh, who must incur more serious censure. The conduct of this officer has been referred to in an earlier portion of the report. He was at the Immigration House on Sunday when the trouble there was at its height. He saw and heard firing and bombs being thrown. He saw people being wounded, and an enraged and excited crowd, evidently intent on murder and plunder, battering in the door of the house. There were armed police present, and if Hanna Effendi had asserted his authority he might have done much to lessen the toll of the dead and wounded 42 in all who were subsequently found in and about that house. Fully aware of the gravity of the situation, he returned to his home to have lunch, and to clean his belt of some blood, with which it had become bespattered, leaving the crowd to its own devices, and the inmates of the house to be the victims of the mob's violence. He showed himself utterly lacking in appreciation of his responsibility as a police officer, and of his authority as a uniformed Government official. It is difficult to conceive of a more flagrant disregard of duty.
The attitude of the other ranks of the Jaffa police throughout the riot was on the whole unsatisfactory. We cannot avoid the conclusion that racial considerations influenced their conduct, and that in the early stages of the trouble they became infected with partisanship, which rendered them not only ineffective as an instrument for the preservation of security, but resulted in some becoming active participants in violence and crime of a serious order. We have been unable to accept all the evidence tendered as to the conduct of the police, but convictions have been recorded against members of the Force on charges of homicide, theft, attempted rape and unlawful wounding, these offences being committed in the course of the disturbances. On the other hand it would have been surprising if this half-trained body of men had been able, in the interest of public duty, to stand out against the flood of racial passion which had been let loose.
We feel bound to add that, apart from their conduct during the riots, the Jaffa police made an unfavourable impression upon us through their lack of smartness, alertness, discipline, and policemanlike appearance. During the two and a-half months we were sitting in Jaffa we had many opportunities to observe their demeanour, and although we noticed an improvement towards the end of this period, due, possibly, to the transfer of an inspector from the Jerusalem Detachment, we were unpleasantly affected by their prevailing slovenliness, a defect which one does not expect to find in a force under British command.
CAUSES OF ARAB HOSTILITY TO JEWS.
So long as the Jews remained an unobtrusive minority, as they did under the Ottoman Government, they were not molested or disliked. It was only when it came to be believed by the Arabs that the Jews were exercising a preponderating influence over the Government that a state of feeling arose which required but a minor provocation on the part of a small number of undesirable Jews to ignite an explosion of popular anger against Jews in general. This manifested itself in serious outrages, of which some of the best sort of Jews have been the victims.
It is not within our province to discuss Zionism but only such questions as are popularly supposed to be involved in Zionism, and have been put before us as causes of the discontent culminating in the riots. Whether the construction put by the Arabe or their leaders in opinion on certain statements of fact are reasonable, and whether the statements themselves are true or capable of explanation are questions not altogether relevant to this inquiry. What are relevant are the statements themselves, and the constructions put upon them, because they hey show how it comes about that the present state of public feeling is such that outrages committed by the more ore ignorant and passionate part of the population have been, if not justified, yet, to say the least, explained and condoned by those who are themselves opposed to acts of violence. Persons apparently representing all sections of the non-Jewish community have voluntarily come before us to explain why public feeling became inflamed against the Jews. Moslems, Orthodox Christians, Catholics, Maronites and other Uniates, Anglicans have been represented by witnesses, who included priests of the above Christian bodies and it has been impossible to avoid the conclusion that practically the whole of the non-Jewish population was united in hostility to the Jews. During the riots all discrimination on the part of the Arabs between different categories of Jews was obliterated. Old-established colonists and newly arrived immigrants, Chalukah. Jews and Bolshevik Jews, Algerian Jews and Russian Jews, became merged in a single identity, and former friendships gave way before the enmity now felt towards all. On the 27th June, nearly two months after the first outbreak, two members of the Commission of Inquiry chanced to meet a band of decently dressed Arab children, whose average age could not have exceeded six or seven, marching in procession along the Ajami quarter, brandishing sticks and branches, and shouting the words, "We want to fight the Jews." The incident was small, perhaps, but not without significance, and it was noted by the members of the Commission who saw it that no attempt was made by several policemen present to interfere with it in any way. So long as the popular feeling described above continues it will not be possible to maintain law and justice effectively, because the mass of the people cannot be trusted to do justice where a Jew is concerned.
The grievances put before us by Arabs and others as having contributed materially to the state of exasperation which found its outlet in the disturbances are already known to the readers of the newspapers, but their repetition cannot be avoided in this report. We are satisfied that these grievances had the effect thus alleged, but this conclusion involves no pronouncement on our part upon their individual merits or demerits. The principal ones are contained in the following allegations:-
(a) That Great Britain, when she took over the administration of Palestine, was led by the Zionists to adopt a policy mainly directed towards the establishment of a National Home for the Jews, and not to the equal benefit of all Palestinians.
(b) That in pursuance of this policy the Government of Palestine has, as its official advisory body, a Zionist Commission, bound by its ideals and its conception of its role to regard Jewish interests before all others, and constituted by its singular prerogatives into an imperium in imperio.
(c) That there is an undue proportion of Jews in the Government service.
(d) That a part of the programme of the Zionists is the flooding of Palestine with a people which possesses greater commercial and organising ability than the Arabs, and will eventually obtain the upper hand over the rest of the population.
(e) That the immigrants are an economic danger to the population because of their competition, and because they are favoured in this competition.
(f) That immigrant Jews offend by their arrogance and by their contempt of Arab social prejudices,
(g) That owing to insufficient precautions immigrants of Bolshevik tendencies have been allowed to enter the country, and that these persons have endeavoured to introduce social strife and economic unrest into Palestine and to propagate Bolshevik doctrines.
Labouring under these grievances the Arabs have regarded with suspicion measures taken by the Government with the best intentions. The Transfer of Land Ordinance, 1920, which requires that the consent of the Government must be obtained to all dispossessions of immovable property and forbids transfers to others than residents in Palestine, they regard as having been introduced to keep down the price of land, and to throw land which is in the market into the hands of the Jewa at a low price. The temporary measure, now inoperative, which prohibited the export of cereals, was enacted, as they contend, to oppress the native landowners so as to compel them to sell their land, and at the same time to provide cheap food for the Jewish immigrants.
In connection with their grievance against the disproportionate number of Jews in the Government the Arabs urge that the Legal Secretary is a Jew well known as an ardent exponent of Zionism, and, while making no personal attack upon him, say that the control which he is able to exercise over the Courts of Law lessens their confidence in the administration of justice. They also point to the personnel of the Public Works Department. They assert that Jews are exclusive in business, that a Jewish tradesman will not buy from an Arab if the goods he wants can be obtained from a Jew, and they argue that a Jewish official who has the power to influence the granting of a Government contract will not let it go to anyone but a Jew if he can help it.
With regard to the workmen and labourers employed by the Public Works Department and on the railways, they complain that the employment of a large number of Jews out of all proportion to the Jewish population of the country has displaced Arab labour, and is a means of using public money for the support of the very immigrants whose introduction is viewed with alarm and hostility. They say that they are made to pay for the Jewish National Home.
This brings us to the question of Jewish immigration. The objections on the part of the artisans and labourers are mostly economic. If the new arrivals could have been taken at once into agricultural colonies their coming would have had little effect on the working people of Jaffa; but their employment on public works and railways, and their entry into competition with the town people as artisans, labourers and porters, particularly since they have come in relatively large numbers, has aroused the same feeling of hostility and alarm that alien immigration has excited in other communities with which we are familiar. It would be useless to argue with the Arab that they are not aliens because they are returning to their ancient home, since this is to him the aspect of the Zionist question with which he will have nothing to do. He tells you that they are Russians and Poles, and sometimes adds that they are Bolsheviks. In any case he com-plains that they take the bread out of his mouth. The immigration policy has been likened to the bounty-fed commerce of the Germans, because the immigrant is subsidised in one way or another, and because, whereas the Arab has to starve when he is out of work the newcomer is believed to be provided for by the Government or subsidised by his own organisation.
Arabs who are not artisans or labourers repeat the above objections and add that immigrants compete in clerical occupations, especially now that Hebrew has been made an official language. Their main objection to immigration haa, however, been political, and this objec tion, although originating with the more educated Arabs, has filtered through the khans and coffee-shops into the streets and villages. It can be summed up in the fear that through extensive Jewish immi gration Palestine will become a Jewish dominion. This fear is not lessened when they read in Zionist literature such passages as the following, taken from the Keren Ha-Yesod Book, which will be referred to again later, "The object of the modern Jewish pioneer in Palestine is to prepare room and work for the thousands and millions that wait outside."
A curious instance of the way in which men's minds work in regard to this question and the readiness with which the villagers take alarm at any movement which appears to threaten the existing relations between the races, is a notion which Mr. Reading, Sub-District Governor of Tulkeram, found current among villagers. It was this that the Jews when they had sufficiently increased in numbers would become so highly organised and so well armed as to be able to overcome the Arabs, and rule over and oppress them. There was probably a causal connection between this notion and a rumour current in the early days of May, that the Jews were being secretly armed by the Government. This rumour caused considerable unrest, and the Arabs were clamouring for arms. The influence of these notions and rumours should not be underestimated, for it must be borne in mind that in this part of the world racial and religious prejudices are elemental.
There is also a limited social objection to Jewish immigrants so far as Jaffa is concerned. Among the causes of the anti-Jewish irritation felt by the Arabs of Jaffa was a certain attitude of arrogance displayed in the streets and open places of the town by younger "Haluzim" of both sexes. Several witnesses have referred to the manner in which strings of these young men and women, in free and easy attire, would perambulate the streets arm in arm, singing songs, holding up traffic and generally conducting themselves in a manner at variance with Arab ideas of decorum. It is not difficult to understand the feelings inspiring these young people on their arrival in Palestine. It is natural that the transition from the cramping conditions under which they had been living in the countries whence they came to the freedom of their "National Home," the land of their dreams and hopes, should have stimulated an exuberance of spirit, probably combined with an exaggerated appreciation of what is implied by the term "National Home." On the other hand it is natural that Arabs should be irritated by the self-assertion and aggressiveness of these new arrivals, and that this pouring of new wine into old bottles should not proceed altogether easily. Our task in this inquiry is to establish facts rather than to impute blame; but the circumstance to which we refer shows how necessary it is that those responsible for the oversight of the immigrants should impress upon the latter the importance of directing their natural and legitimate enthusiasms into channels where they cannot offend others, and how necessary it is that they should warn them of the need to study the susceptibilities of their Arab fellow-citizens.
We have described the M.P.S. demonstration on the 1st May as a" minor provocation," and its relation to the disturbances as that of a spark igniting explosive material. Nevertheless, we feel that there may have been a tendency to underrate, perhaps on account of their small numbers and the fact that these numbers decreased after Novem-ber, 1920, the danger to be apprehended from the Bolshevik Jews in Palestine, of whom most, but not all, were recent immigrants. The Bolshevik element in the country produced an effect out of pro-portion with its numbers, not by the success of its propaganda but by the genuine uneasiness it inspired in the Arabs, more particularly in those of the poorer classes in the country districts. Of this unfeigned uneasiness we had ample evidence in the course of the Khedera inquiry, and it was a serious matter. It was a circumstance which conferred upon this handful of agitators an importance that cannot be measured by their exiguous intrinsic numbers, or by their failure to capture the Jewish Labour movement in the country.
We consider that the Arabs had a real fear of the Bolshevik element and of its propaganda, a fear which became acute with the less enlightened. How far that fear was justified it is impossible to say; the extent of the danger to be apprehended from these people cannot in the nature of things be accurately assessed. The case is different from that of the villagers of the Tulkeram neighbourhood, who were led to attack Khedera owing to their belief in a preposterous and baseless story of the detention of Arab labourers by the colonists. There was, as we pointed out in our report on the Khedera incident, no justification for believing, however genuinely, a rumour which could easily have been ascertained to be without foundation. With regard to the Bolsheviks, however, it was not possible for the Arabs positively to establish whether propaganda of the nature indulged in by the M.P.S. was likely to result in serious danger to the country or not; but the indications were such as to fill them with reasonable apprehensions on the subject. They saw that the M.P.S. activities were resulting in the beginnings of industrial strife, previously unknown in the country they saw strikes and labour demonstrations, which filled their conservative minds with alarm; they read leaflets dis-tributed by the M.P.S., in which the people were invited to participate in class war, and to promote anarchy and social upheaval. Such phenomena were sufficient, in our opinion, to cause uneasiness in the minds of the Arabs, and did, in point of fact, cause such uneasiness among them. Non-Bolshevik Jewish Labour organisations also indulged in strikes and other similar activities familiar enough in Europe, but new to Jaffa; and thereby served to create in the minds of the Arabs a feeling of dislike and distrust of Jewish labourer immigrants generally.
But for the considerations set forth above we feel convinced that there would be no animosity towards the Jews as such; that there is no inherent anti-Semitism in the country, racial or religious. We are credibly assured by educated Arabs that they would welcome the arrival of well-to-do and able Jews who could help to develop the country to the advantage of all sections of the community. Zionists, for their part, dwell freely on the theme that the realisation of the policy of the "National Home" will benefit Arabs as well as Jews; but we feel bound to express the opinion, arrived at in the course of the inquiry. that the Zionist Commission, which is the representative of the Zionist Organisation in Palestine, has failed to carry conviction to the Arabs on this point. So far as we can judge, the only sentiment it has inspired in them is one of profound distrust.
This distrust is not of recent growth, but appears first to have taken root in the early days of the Military Administration. At this time, according to evidence brought before us, Jews enjoyed greater facilities than Arabs in the matter of obtaining permits to travel on and to import merchandise by military railways, owing to the fact that the Zionist Commission was accepted by the Administration as sponsor for the Jews, whereas the Arabs had no corresponding body to whom they could apply for guarantees for this purpose. Consequently the Jews were able to obtain their permits promptly, while the Arabs had to follow a cumbersome and lengthy procedure. This inequality of treatment was clearly not the fault of the Zionist Commission, and was probably inevitable at the time, but it created ill-will on the part of the Arabs towards the Commission. The subsequent activities and pretensions of the Commission do not seem to have dispelled or mitigated this ill-will, and if we refer to the topic here it is because the distrust inspired in the Arabs by the Zionist Commission has been, in our opinion, an appreciable factor in creating the feeling, but for which the Jaffa outrages would probably not have taken place. It seems to us that the Zionist Commission was in a better position than any other unofficial body or organisation to fulfil the important function of conciliating the Arabs, and of rendering, or attempting to render, the policy embodied in the Balfour Declaration acceptable to them. Such a function would require tact and powers of conciliation of a high order, and we feel that a part of the energies of the Zionist Commission could have been devoted to no more appropriate, more valuable, and more vital purpose. We find, however, a belief among the Arabs that the Commission has either desired to ignore them as a factor to be taken into serious consideration, or else has combated their interests to the advantage of the Jews. An unfortunate impression was created. in the country by the practice of the Zionist Commission, abandoned since April, 1920, of paying subsidies to Jewish policemen and Jewish Government clerks of junior grades in aid of their official salaries, Again, we have had evidence to the effect that the Zionist Commission put strong pressure upon a large Jewish landowner of Richon-le-Zion to employ Jewish labour in place of the Arabs who had been employed on his farm since he was a boy. The farmer, we were told, yielded to this pressure with reluctance, firstly, because the substitution of Jewish for Arab labour would alienate the Arabs, secondly, because the pay demanded by the Jewish labourers, and the short hours during which they would consent to work, would make it impossible for him to run his farm at a profit,
Furthermore the influence exercised, or believed to be exercised, by the Commission over the framing of legislation, and in the selection of Government officials (also, occasionally, in the reinstatement of officials dismissed by the Government), has done nothing to lessen the distrust with which it is regarded by the Arabs, who have no similar body to exercise corresponding influence on their behalf. It is not for us to say that the activities, real or alleged, of the Zionist Commission were or are illegitimate; we can, however, say that in our opinion the Commission's conception of its duties and functions has exercised an exacerbating rather than a conciliatory influence on the Arab population of Palestine, and has thus been a contributory cause of the disturbances which are the subject of our inquiry.
It is important that it should be realised that what is written on the subject of Zionism by Zionists and their sympathisers in Europe is read and discussed by Palestinian Arabs, not only in the towns but in country districts. Thus a witness from Tulkeram, who appeared before us in the course of the Khedera inquiry, quoted as an instance of provocative writing the following passage from a book entitled " England and Palestine," by H. Sidebotham[i]:
"It is desired to encourage Jewish immigration by every means, and at the same time to discourage the immigration of Arabs…”
The book from which this quotation was taken was published as far back as 1918; but our attention has been called to other not less provocative statements appearing in Zionist publications since the disturbances, whilst we were sitting. Thus the Jewish Chronicle, No. 2,720, of the 20th May, 1921, makes the following statement in the course of its leading article:-
"Hence the real key to the Palestine situation is to be found in giving to Jews as such, those rights and privileges in Palestine which shall enable Jews make as Jewish as England is English, or as Canada is Canadian. That is the only reasonable or, indeed, feasible meaning of a Jewish National Home, and it is impossible for Jews to construct it without being accorded a National status for Jews."
Again, Palestine, the official organ of the British Palestine Committee, in its issue of the 4th June, 1921, in discussing the question of Jewish immigration, describes Palestine as a "deserted, derelict land." This description hardly tallies with the fact that the density of the present population of Palestine, according to Zionist figures, is something like 75 to the square mile.[ii] On the 14th May there appeared in The Times a letter from Mr. V. Jabotinsky, a member of the Executive of the Zionist Organisation, in which he urged that, in view of the Jaffa disturbances, Jews alone should have the privilege of military service in Palestine, Arabs being excluded from the right to bear arms. Generous allowance must be made for the natural and justifiable feeling of indignation aroused among Jews by the Arab aggression on their co-religionists in Jaffa, and in the colonies which were so wantonly attacked. On the other hand utterances such as those we have quoted have not made for a resumption of friendly relations between Jews and Arabs. About the same time there appeared the "Karen Ha-Yesod Book," a volume issued by the promoters of the " Palestine Foundation Fund." In the chapter of this book devoted to the political position, disappointment is expressed that "the most vital of all rights in similar cases the right of the Zionist Organisation to exercise its influence, through legally secured channels, in the choice of suitable candidates for this all-important post" (se, that of High Commissioner for Pales-tine) is not included in the draft Mandate.
Until the Commission came to examine Dr. Eder, acting Chairman of the Zionist Commission, they were unaware to what extent such expressions of opinion as those we have quoted above were authorised by responsible Zionists. Dr. Eder was a most enlightening witness. He was quite unaggressive in manner and free from any desire to push forward opinions which might be offensive to the Arabs. But when questioned on certain vital matters he was perfectly frank in expressing his view of the Zionist ideal. He gave no quarter to the view of the National Home as put forward by the Secretary of State and the High Commissioner. In his opinion there can only be one National Home in Palestine, and that a Jewish one, and no equality in the partnership between Jews and Arabs, but a Jewish predominance as soon as the numbers of that race are sufficiently increased. He declined to admit the word "dominion," but chose" predominance." As acting Chair-man of the Zionist Commission Dr. Eder presumably expresses in all points the official Zionist creed, if such there be, and his statements are, therefore, most important. There is no sophistry about Dr. Eder; he was quite clear that the Jews should, and the Arabs should not, have the right to bear arms, and he stated his belief that this discrimination would tend to improve Arab-Jewish relations. He considered that with regard to the appointment of the High Commissioner for Palestine the Zionist organisation should be allowed either to formulate objections to the selection of the British Government, or to submit a list of its own nominees for consideration. We do not comment upon his opinions because the discussion of the questions raised is not our concern, but it is relevant to our report to show that the acting Chair man of the Zionist Commission asserts on behalf of the Jews those claims which are at the root of the present unrest, and differ materially from the declared policy of the Secretary of State and the High Com-missioner for Palestine. It is perhaps worth noting as an instance of the diversity of manner in which Jews and Arabs look upon the same questions, that, whereas Arab witnesses denounce the Government of Palestine as a Zionist Government, Dr. Eder stigmatises it as an Arab administration.
The attitude of responsible Zionists as revealed above is not negligible, as it is one of the irritant causes of the present discontent. It arises perhaps from a habit of regarding Palestine as "a deserted, derelict land," sparsely inhabited by a population without traditions of nationality, where political experiments may be launched without arousing local opposition. Such a conception is considerably at variance with the spirit of the authorised Zionist policy as defined in the declared intentions of the Secretary of State and the local Government.
Much, we feel, might be done to allay the existing hostility between the races if responsible persons on both sides could agree to discuss the questions arising between them in a reasonable spirit, on the basis that the Arabs should accept implicitly the declared policy of the Government on the subject of the Jewish National Home, and that the Zionist leaders should abandon and repudiate all pretensions that go beyond it. The immigrants should be made to understand that, whatever their historical and religious claim, they are after all seeking a home in a country at present overwhelmingly Arab, and that it behoves them to adopt a considerate attitude towards the people among whom they must wish to live in peace and friendship. The Arab notables, on the other hand, should make it clear to the Arabs that in no case can they expect murder, violence and pillage to be condoned.
CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS.
It may be thought that the time and labour expended on the examination of witnesses has been out of all proportion with the result as disclosed in this report We have been unwilling to check the flow of witnesses, preferring to give all persons who came forward to be heard an opportunity of speaking freely before us rather than leave any party under the impression that it had not had a fait chance of putting its claims before the Commission.
We cannot close this report without expressing the sense of our obligations to the Mayor and Municipal Council of Jaffa for their courtesy in placing a room at our disposal for the purpose of our sittings. In conclusion, we desire to pay a warm tribute to the services of our Secretary, Mr. Bryant, whose competence in dealing with the volume of work entailed by the inquiry has been above all praise.
We subjoin, in the form of appendices-
(a) A résumé of our conclusions, drawn up for the convenience of the Government, but not to be regarded as an ex pression of our views except if read in conjunction with the context of the report.
[ …]
THOS. W. HAYCRAFT, Chairman.
Members: H. C. LUKE.
J. N. STUBBS.
APPENDIX A.
Résumé.
The fundamental cause of the Jaffa riots and the subsequent acts of violence was a feeling among the Arabs of discontent with, and hostility to, the Jews, due to political and economic causes, and connected with Jewish immigration, and with their conception of Zionist policy as derived from Jewish exponents.
The immediate cause of the Jaffa riots on the 1st May was an unauthorised demonstration of Bolshevik Jews, followed by its clash with an authorised demonstration of the Jewish Labour Party.
The racial strife was begun by Arabs, and rapidly developed into a conflict of great violence between Arabs and Jews, in which the Arab majority, who were generally the aggressors, inflicted most of the casualties.
The outbreak was not premeditated or expected, nor was either side prepared for it; but the state of popular feeling made a conflict likely to occur on any provocation by any Jews.
The general body of Jews is opposed to Bolshevism, and was not responsible for the Bolshevik demonstration.
When the disturbance had once begun an already acute anti-Jewish feeling extended it into an anti-Jewish riot. A large part of the Moslem and Christian communities condoned it, although they did not encourage violence. While certain of the educated Arabs appear to have incited the mob, the notables on both sides, whatever their feelings may have been, aided the authorities to allay the trouble.
The police were, with few exceptions, half-trained and inefficient, in many cases indifferent, and in some cases leaders of or participators in violence.
The conduct of the military was admirable throughout.
The raids on five Jewish agricultural colonies arose from the excitement produced in the minds of the Arabs by reports of Arabs having been killed by Jews in Jaffa. In two cases unfounded stories of provocation were believed and acted upon without any effort being made to verify them.
In these raids there were few Jewish and many Arab casualties, chiefly on account of the intervention of the military.
This résumé is necessarily too condensed to be regarded as the expression of the conclusions of the Commission, except when read in conjunction with the report.
[i] "England and Palestine: Essays towards the Restoration of the Jewish State," by Herbert Sidebotham. London, 1918. Page 235.
[ii] See page 24 of the "Keren Ha-Yesod Book."
Source: Colonial Office of Great Britain (Sir Haycraft), Palestine. Disturbances in May, 1921. Reports of the Commission of Inquiry with Correspondence Relating Thereto, London, H. M. Stationery office, 1921.