The New South Africa and the Palestine Question

From Good Offices to Total Support

From the formation of South Africa’s first democratic government in 1994, both the government and the governing party, the African National Congress (ANC), expressed support for the Palestinian people, Palestinian self-determination, and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). Relations between the government and the ANC, on the one hand, and Israel and the Palestinians, on the other, evolved in several ways since then. Notably, the South African position moved from a desire to mediate between Israelis and Palestinians to attempts to reconcile different Palestinian factions, and, later, confronting Israel directly in the international legal system.

The first postapartheid South African government, headed by Nelson Mandela, inherited a set of international relations from apartheid South Africa that it mostly retained, believing that it served South Africa better to engage with different states than to isolate (or be isolated from) them. Among these inherited relations were strong ties with Israel, in sectors including military, intelligence, and nuclear weapons development.

The ANC-led government did not alter existing diplomatic, trade, or any other such relations between South Africa and Israel, but it did change some more contentious relationships. The apartheid government had dismantled its nuclear weapons program in 1989, thus ending that cooperation with Israel, and the democratic government ceased military cooperation. Officially, all weapons trading with Israel had ended by 1998, but questions have been raised about continuing arms sales to Israel by private South African companies.

In a major break with this past, the ANC, which had maintained decades-long ties with the PLO, balanced South Africa’s relations with Israel by establishing full diplomatic links with the State of Palestine in February 1995, ten months after Mandela became president.

Basis of South African Foreign Policy

Mandela had asserted: “Human rights will be the light that guides our foreign policy.” This, together with South Africa’s understanding of its national interest, drove foreign policy for three decades. The national interest was articulated in October 2022 in “Framework Document on South Africa’s National Interest and its Advancement in a Global Environment.” It defines the country’s national interest in these terms: “the protection and promotion of its national sovereignty and constitutional order, the well-being, safety and prosperity of its citizens, and a better Africa and world.” This normative posture is derived from the values spelled out in the South African Constitution: human dignity, equality, human rights, non-racialism, non-sexism, and democracy.

The framework document claims South Africa’s foreign policy “favours human rights, the peaceful settlement of disputes, transitional justice, respect for international law and norms and collective action through multilateral organs.” This approach guided South Africa’s policy on the Palestine question.

The Desire to Mediate

South Africa played central roles in several mediation initiatives in Africa, and in 2002 it launched the Presidential Peace Initiative (Spier Initiative) to mediate between Palestinians and Israelis. Intended as a vehicle by which South Africans could help bring about a peaceful resolution to Israeli occupation and colonization, it tried to persuade relevant parties to engage in talks. The government believed it had credibility with Israelis and Palestinians who were committed to peace, especially since it almost dogmatically supported the Oslo Accords and a two-state solution.

The initiative included a range of moves: visits to South Africa by members of Israel’s right-wing Likud Party, visits to Palestinian and Israeli officials by South Africans, meetings between Palestinian and Israeli political figures, meetings between former Israeli army generals in South Africa and former generals of the apartheid-era South African Defence Forces, support for Israeli conscientious objectors, communications with Palestinian resistance groups, and coordination with selected members of the Israeli intelligence and army.

Spier achieved little that could be considered a step toward ‘Palestinian-Israeli peace’. Israel used the terms of the initiative to extract benefits from South Africa (in which it partially succeeded) and to blunt South African support for the Palestinians (in which it failed). South Africa was repeatedly called upon by the pro-Israeli lobby and by Israel to demonstrate even-handedness and to end support for the Palestinian struggle.

In 2004, Israel’s Minister of Trade and Industry, Ehud Olmert, and South Africa’s minister of trade and industry, Mandisi Mpahlwa, signed a trade agreement between their two countries. It had a significant impact on bilateral relations: trade increased each year between 2005 and 2012 by almost 7 percent in each direction. But Israel rejected South Africa’s attempts to facilitate any agreement with the Palestinians. Even in meetings South Africa hosted, Israeli delegates were former politicians with little or no influence on their government, while Palestinian delegations included officials from the Palestinian Authority (PA) and PLO.

In its broad objective, then, the Spier Initiative failed. Nevertheless, some officials continue to occasionally punt the notion that South Africa can mediate between Israel and the Palestinians. And pro-Israeli elements still try to use Spier’s objectives to keep South Africa “neutral,” make it more sympathetic to Israel, and ensure the continuation of the 2004 trade agreement.

Focus on the Palestinians

Israel’s benefits from the trade agreement increased until the Israel-South Africa relationship changed course around 2012.

South Africans were angered by Israel’s two major onslaughts against Gaza—Operation Cast Lead/ Battle of al-Furqan (2008-2009) and Operation Returning Echo (March 2012). After agitation by the South African Palestinian solidarity movement, the ANC Conference in December 2012 resolved to support the global campaign for boycotts, divestment, and sanctions (BDS), weeks after Israel launched Operation Pillar of Defense/ Stone of Shale in November 2012, killing, wounding, and displacing hundreds of people in Gaza. The conference ended a year in which trade between South Africa and Israel had peaked at $1.19 billion. The following year, that figure dropped to $871.7 million. In 2014, the trade agreement expired, and South Africa was uninterested in renewing it. By 2019, trade had dropped to $407.7 million.

The changed South African mood was not sudden; it followed at least half a decade of engagement with a range of Palestinians, including through the Spier process. By the late 2000s, many in the ANC realized that recognizing the State of Palestine and the PA as its government were inadequate. They had begun to question the notion of the PLO and PA being the “sole representatives” of the Palestinian people – especially after Hamas (which was not represented in the PLO) won the 2006 parliamentary elections.

Within days of Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh being elected PA Prime Minister, South Africa’s President Thabo Mbeki publicly invited him for an official visit to South Africa. The election had convinced Mbeki that South Africa should develop relations with all Palestinian factions. However, PA President Mahmoud Abbas quickly dispatched a representative to South Africa to convince Pretoria not to host Haniyeh. The matter was quietly dropped.

The approach to the various Palestinian factions was initiated by South Africa’s ambassador to Syria, Mohammed Dangor, through the embassy in Damascus, where most Palestinian factions—Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, the PFLP – General Command, and the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine—had offices. In 2008, ANC Secretary-General Kgalema Motlanthe visited Damascus, accompanied by Ebrahim Ismail Ebrahim, chair of the ANC’s International Relations Subcommittee. They met leaders of some factions, including Hamas. Two other senior government officials, Minister of Intelligence Ronnie Kasrils and Deputy Foreign Minister Aziz Pahad, also met these factions in Damascus. In October 2010, Motlanthe (now South Africa’s deputy president) officially met representatives of the larger factions in Syria.

In 2011, Ebrahim – now a deputy foreign minister – met Mustafa Barghouti, head of the Palestinian National Initiative, another party that was, then, outside the PLO. Ebrahim met him twice: in Pretoria as deputy minister, and then as head of the ANC’s International Relations Subcommittee at the ANC headquarters in Johannesburg. These meetings indicated the government’s shift in position toward recognizing all Palestinian factions and eliciting their views, a notable example of which was the 2015 visit, hosted by the ANC, of a Hamas Politburo delegation led by Khalid Mishal. In his capacity as the ANC head, President Jacob Zuma signed a letter of intent with Mishal, and the ANC publicly asked Hamas to open an office in South Africa.

The South African government has encouraged non-governmental efforts at fostering reconciliation between Palestinian factions and discussing the revival of an inclusive PLO. These efforts included Palestinians from within Israel, the West Bank, Gaza, and in the diaspora, with representatives of Fatah, Hamas, and other factions. Government officials and ANC leaders attended several meetings in which such discussions took place, in Lebanon (2015) and in South Africa (2016 and 2017), organized by civil society organizations.

Slow Downgrade

Not unexpectedly, as the South African government focused on intra-Palestinian matters, its appetite for mediation between Israelis and Palestinian waned.

In 2010, one South African participated in the Freedom Flotilla that attempted to break Israel’s siege of Gaza. After Israel’s attack on the flotilla on 30 May 2010, South Africa withdrew its ambassador to Tel Aviv, Ismail Coovadia; he returned two months later.

Two years later, the Palestine solidarity movement mobilized in response to numerous reports of a stream of South African groups hosted in Israel by the Israeli government, including delegations from the ANC Youth League, police going for training, and businesses sending staff for training. Deputy Minister Ebrahim Ebrahim announced a policy prohibiting state officials from visiting Israel unless it was for their diplomatic duties or to “further the peace process.” By 2013, the stream of delegations became a trickle, and trade also began to decrease.

The ANC’s December 2017 Conference called on government to downgrade the South African embassy in Tel Aviv to a liaison office. In May 2018, after Israel killed 234 Palestinians participating in the Great March of Return, South Africa recalled its ambassador, Sisa Ngombane, in protest.

The Minister of International Relations and Cooperation, Lindiwe Sisulu, later said the recall was the first step in the downgrade process. The ambassador was never returned and the embassy has operated without an ambassador and with junior staff ever since. In November 2023, the government withdrew all South African diplomats from Israel, in protest against Israel’s genocide in Gaza. By then, the government – especially President Ramaphosa and Minister of International Relations and Cooperation Naledi Pandor – were increasingly referring to Israel’s apartheid practices in official speeches, especially after the publication of reports by B’Tselem and Human Rights Watch (in 2021) and Amnesty International (in 2022) on Israel’s apartheid system.

South Africa’s stance toward Israel was also reflected in the African Union (AU). In July 2021, AU Commission Chair Moussa Faki Mahamat granted Israel observer status to the continental body. Within days, South Africa led a lobby to revoke Israel’s accreditation. Pandor said the matter was serious enough to cause South Africa to reconsider its presence in the AU. It remained contentious; an Israeli delegation was removed from the AU Summit in February 2023, and Israel’s observer status remains suspended.

South Africa’s Response to al-Aqsa Flood and Israel’s Genocide

Since 7 October 2023, when Palestinian resistance forces in Gaza broke through the fence surrounding the territory and attacked targets in southern Israel, the South African government focused attention on relations with Israel and the deteriorating conditions of the Palestinian people. Within hours of the 7 October operation, South Africa expressed concern at the escalation, blaming the illegal occupation of Palestinian land, settlement expansion, desecration of Muslim and Christian holy sites in Jerusalem, and ongoing oppression of Palestinians; it did not criticize the Gaza resistance. The statements drew immediate and malicious responses from the pro-Israeli lobby and the Israeli ambassador in South Africa.

The South African cabinet subsequently slammed the 7 October attack, but the focus remained on Israel’s onslaught. As the death toll and destruction in Gaza increased, Ramaphosa and Pandor issued strong condemnations. The latter and Hamas leader Haniyeh discussed the situation during a phone call. The frenetic government activity peaked on 6 November 2023 with the announcement that South Africa withdraw diplomats from Tel Aviv.

A week later, the South African Parliament passed a resolution calling on the government to expel the Israeli ambassador and shut down the Israeli embassy, neither of which occurred. On the same day, Ramaphosa hosted a special meeting of BRICS nations (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) to discuss the Israeli genocide. Tensions intensified when Ramaphosa announced that South Africa was one of six countries that had referred Israel to the International Criminal Court (ICC) for war crimes and that Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu and other Israeli politicians should be tried by the ICC.

South Africa vs. Israel in the International Court of Justice

South Africa was one of fifty-two states that participated in the International Court of Justice (ICJ) hearing regarding the legality of Israel’s occupation at the end of February 2023, arguing that the occupation was illegal. The hearing had followed a request from the UN General Assembly for an ICJ advisory opinion.

On 29 December 2023, the ICJ announced that South Africa had instituted proceedings against Israel, accusing it of violating its obligations under the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. The application condemned Palestinian resistance actions against civilians, but it emphasized that no actions could justify breaches of the Genocide Convention. South Africa asked the Court to indicate provisional measures against Israel to protect Palestinians in Gaza. The ICJ heard the matter in January 2024; its order on 26 January 2024 accepted South Africa’s claims and rejected Israel’s counterclaims. On 12 February 2024 and 6 March 2024, South Africa applied to the Court for additional provisional measures

South Africa’s application evoked several different responses. First, Israel, the United States, and other Israeli allies attacked South Africa, accusing it and, especially Pandor, of being on Iran’s payroll. Relations between South Africa and Israel worsened. But there was also an outpouring of support for South Africa from the public in the Global North and the Global South and from various Global South governments.

Despite these strong positions and actions, the Palestine solidarity movement continues to criticize the South African government for allowing the export of coal and other important products to Israel, for not prosecuting South Africans who served in the Israeli army, and for not officially severing diplomatic relations with Israel.

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