Japan and the Palestine Question

While Palestine was engulfed in war and indigenous Arab resifdents were expelled, Japan was under occupation by the Allied Powers , led by the United States . After the atomic bombings of Hiroshima on 6 August and Nagasaki on 9 August 1945 (which led to unconditional surrender on 15 August), imperialist Japan was about to be reborn as a postwar pacifist nation through drastic social reforms, including the dismantling of its military and business conglomerates. As a result, the Japanese government's response to the Palestinian issue, particularly the Nakba , was initially almost negligible. One of the few exceptions was Japan's Christian minority, some of whom viewed Jewish settlement in Palestine as a favorable development, while ignoring the contempt Jewish settlers held toward local Arabs—a contempt similar to that directed by Japan toward indigenous peoples in China , Taiwan , and Korea .

In January 1952, just three months before the restoration of Japanese sovereignty, the United Nations delivered a letter to the Japanese government requesting financial contributions to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA). The Japanese government decided not to respond to the request on the grounds that Palestine was remote, Japan had no relationship with its people, and it could not afford to give charity.  Few Western countries had contributed to the United Nations, a factor that also influenced Japan’s decision.

However, in 1953 Japan decided to contribute funds to UNRWA. In the postwar period, Japan was working to contribute funds to UN agencies, such as UNICEF , as part of its efforts to rejoin the international community. For the Japanese government, this contribution to UNRWA was intended as a political appeal to Arab countries that were reintegrating into the international community or, more specifically, to Arab countries that were regaining their sovereignty. Although Japan’s initial contribution was only $10,000, this “symbolic” expenditure marked the beginning of postwar Japanese diplomatic involvement in the Palestine Question.

The Oil Shock and the Transformation of Japanese Diplomacy Toward the Middle East

For about twenty years after Japan regained its sovereignty, it focused its efforts on apologizing and providing reparations within the Asian region for its harsh colonial rule. Its diplomacy toward the Middle East was limited, guided by the desire to access Middle Eastern oil without going through Western oil majors. For example, the private company Idemitsu-Kosan sent oil tankers to Iran . After Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh nationalized Iran’s oil industry in 1951, the oil tanker Nissho-Maru shipped oil from Iran to Japan in 1953. This trade ended abruptly when the United States and the United Kingdom coordinated Mossadegh's overthrow.

Japanese society began to take an interest in the decolonization of the Middle East, including Palestine, only in the latter half of the 1950s. When Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser , Indian prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru , and others advocated for non-alignment principle at the 1955 Bandung Conference , the seeds of solidarity movements with Asia, Africa, and Latin America began to sprout among Japanese intellectuals. In 1958, with the support of Tokuma Utsunomiya , a member of a group within the ruling Liberal Democratic Party aiming for the normalization of Japan-China relations, the Tokyo office of the Algerian National Liberation Front (FLN) was established.

The slow but steady progression of Japan's engagement in the Middle East was dramatically altered by the 1973 oil crisis. The high economic growth supported by the rise of all key industries, including the automobile and consumer electronics industries, ended with the sharp rise in oil prices when oil production was cut by Arab oil-producing countries after the 1973 War . At that time, Japan relied on oil for 75 percent of its primary energy, 78 percent of which was imported from Saudi Arabia and other Middle Eastern countries. Amid social panic in Japan, Chief Cabinet Secretary Susumu Nikaido of the Kakuei Tanaka Cabinet (Liberal Democratic Party) stated in November 1973 that the Japanese government would seek to implement UN Resolution 242 and support the Palestinians' right to national self-determination. The statement concluded, “The Japanese government will continue to monitor the situation in the Middle East with grave concern, and depending on how the situation develops in the future, we may have no choice but to reconsider our policy toward Israel,” clearly setting forth the “Arab shift” in Japanese diplomacy. Simultaneously, a delegation headed by Deputy Prime Minister Takeo Miki was dispatched to Arab states including Saudi Arabia and Egypt to appeal on behalf of the Japanese government’s position.

Although Japan recognized Israel a month after the restoration of its sovereignty (April 1952) and opened a legation in Tel Aviv in 1955 (upgraded to an embassy in 1963), diplomatic relations and cultural exchange with Israel remained weak, with the exception of a few Christians and youth groups attracted to the kibbutz movement. The 1973 oil crisis diminished Japanese-Israeli relations for nearly half a century. Meanwhile, Japan's contribution to UNRWA increased substantially to $5 million per year beginning in 1974. Since this change in stance was primarily driven by energy security, some in Japan criticized this as abura (“oil” in Japanese) diplomacy rather than “Arab” diplomacy.

Developing Relations with the Palestine Liberation Organization

In the 1970s, a series of events triggered Japan’s relationship with the Palestine Question. On 30 May 1972, Kozo Okamoto and two other members of the Japanese Red Army attacked Lydda airport in Israel, an event that highlighted the international nature of the Palestinian revolution. In 1975, Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) Lebanon Office Representative Shafiq al-Hout visited Tokyo at the invitation of the Japan Council against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs (Gensuikyo) and the Japan Congress against A- and H-bombs (Gensuikin); he coordinated the establishment of the PLO Tokyo Office through discussions with members of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party. Al-Hout visited Japan twice before the PLO Tokyo Representative Office was established in February 1977. On his second visit, he came with Faruq al-Qaddumi , the head of the PLO Political Department. Prime Minister Takeo Miki (of the Liberal Democratic Party), who led a delegation to the Middle East shortly after the oil crisis, welcomed al-Qaddumi. Jamal al-Sourani , the PLO Cairo office representative, also visited Yokohama and Tokyo in 1975. In November 1977, a large symposium was held at the Yokohama International Conference Center with some 600 researchers and politicians on the Palestine Question.

The PLO Tokyo Office, established in Tokyo in 1977, was active with not only Japanese politicians but also writers, cultural figures, and journalists. In particular, the publication of the Japanese-language magazine Firasutin Biraadi (Filastin Biladi) appealed to Japanese society for the Palestinian cause through its forty-three full issues, from October 1979 to September 1983. In June 1979, the Japan-Palestine Parliamentary Friendship League was established with Tokuma Utsunomiya as its representative and Yoshiko Yamaguchi as its secretary general; the league made PLO Chairman Yasir Arafat ’s first visit to Japan possible in 1981. The 1982 Israeli Invasion of Lebanon and the Sabra and Shatila Massacre , which occurred amidst growing moral concerns about the Palestinian issue in Japanese society, shocked Japan. In March 1983, the International People's Tribunal on Israel's Aggression in Lebanon was held in Tokyo, and in the 1980s, NGOs from Japan began to become involved with the Palestinian people.

Japan's Post-Oslo Relations with the Palestinian Authority and Israel

The Japanese government prefers a two-state solution to the Palestine Question in which an independent Palestinian state is built. In the wake of the 1990–1991 Gulf crisis and the Gulf War , Japan's overall policy toward the Middle East became strongly defined by the Japan–US relationship. During the Gulf crisis, Saddam Hussein ’s regime in Iraq kept nearly 200 Japanese in the country as human shields (described by the Iraqi government as “guests”), which greatly upset Japan’s Middle East diplomacy. In addition, with the unipolarization of global politics following the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War , Japan’s relationship with the United States dictated its relations with other countries. Since the United States pushed for the two-state solution after the Oslo Agreement of September 1993, the Japanese government followed suit. However, the Japanese government made clear that it opposed Israel’s settlement activities in the West Bank and the annexation of East Jerusalem and Golan Heights , citing UN resolutions such as Security Council Resolution 242 and international law. In addition, Japan has rejected the Israeli government's claim that Jerusalem is its capital and has kept its embassy in Tel Aviv.

Until the establishment of the Palestinian Authority (PA) in 1994, the Japanese prime minister had not visited Palestine or Israel. The first visit by a Japanese prime minister to Israel and the Palestinian territories was made by Tomiichi Murayama (Japan Socialist Party ) in 1995. Since then, Japanese prime ministers and foreign ministers have almost always met with Israeli and PA officials during the same visit.

The foreign policy of the Japanese government aims to achieve peace in the Middle East and is based on three pillars: political dialogue with the parties concerned, confidence-building among the parties, and economic assistance to Palestinians. Japan has continued to provide assistance to Palestinian society through the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) and UNRWA, as well as through the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), within which Japan had already established the Japan Palestine Development Fund in 1988 to address organizational institution building, infrastructure development, and human resource development. In addition to financial assistance to the Palestinians through Japanese international NGOs, the Japanese government supported the construction of  the Gaza International Airport . Japan had given grant aid and support for hospitals, and in the 2020s, it undertook the construction of a shelter for the protection of Hisham’s Palace site in Jericho , an archeological site that dates to the eighth century. Gaza International Airport was destroyed by Israeli airstrikes in 2001, yet the Japanese government did not lodge sufficient protests, nor has there been any movement to seek compensation.

In 2006, the Junichiro Koizumi administration launched The Corridor for Peace and Prosperity project, and the Jericho Agro-Industrial Park (JAIP) was established in Jericho in cooperation with the Palestinian Authority, the Israeli government, and the Jordanian government. In addition, in 2013 the Conference on the Cooperation among East Asian Countries for Palestinian Development —a regional cooperative framework under the cooperation of East Asian countries and UN agencies such as the UNDP and UNRWA—was launched in 2013. Japan supported Palestinian nation-building using East Asian economic development knowledge.

In the 2010s, the Japanese government began actively pushing for stronger economic ties with Israel. Under Shinzo Abe ’s administration, the search for cooperation with Israel in the security field began, and the number of Japanese companies operating in Israel and the amount of Japanese investment in Israel increased. In 2017, the Japan–Israel Investment Agreement was signed and entered into force, and in 2023, a study council was set up for an Economic Partnership Agreement between Israel and Japan.

Japan and the Gaza Genocide

The development of relations between Israel and Japan has been significantly hampered by Israel’s attacks on the Gaza Strip since October 2023. The Japanese government continues to demand that Hamas release Israeli prisoners of war and urges the Israeli government to implement an immediate ceasefire and improve the humanitarian situation in the Gaza Strip. Furthermore, based on its position that Israeli settlement activities in the West Bank violate international law, the Japanese government imposed economic sanctions for the first time in July 2024 on four individual settlers found to have committed acts of violence.

Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba refrained from recognizing the Palestinian state in September 2025, when European countries such as the United Kingdom and France did so. It is reasonable to conclude that this decision was influenced by the United States’s strong support for Israel and consideration for the Japan–U.S. alliance. However, Ishiba made clear that Japan’s recognition of Palestine was only a matter of time, and he reiterated his call for Israel to cease combat operations in the Gaza Strip. Japan’s stance on the Palestine Question remains largely defined by the United States’s position on the matter, but it has formulated some independent policies. Japan places particular emphasis on compliance with international norms; it has responded sharply to Hamas’s holding of Israeli prisoners of war and Israeli violations of international law in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. If Japan is to play a significant role in the Palestinian issue going forward, it will be forced to insist on compliance with these international norms.